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Letter dated 26 April 2024 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2683 (2023), have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 2683 (2023).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan on 15 March 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 5 April 2024.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023)

Summary

In a well-appointed room with the curtains drawn to shield it from the February heat in Juba, a veteran of both Khartoum and Juba politics described the complex constellation of outcomes open to South Sudan in the coming months. “We have become better at extinguishing fire”, he told the Panel, giving credit to a political process that has allowed former enemies to live and, to an extent, work, side by side in Juba. “But not at avoiding fire”.

South Sudan is grappling with a dilemma. Many South Sudanese are tired of a political process that has done little to improve lives beyond those of its immediate participants. Elections, currently scheduled for December 2024, are therefore seen as a popular means of delivering accountability for leaders widely perceived to have left many of their constituents behind. Despite some achievements, however, much of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan is yet to be implemented and many fear, as a result, that their still-fragile country is not yet ready for elections.

It is not yet clear how this dilemma will be resolved. None of the available options command a consensus or effectively mitigate a potentially violent response from those left unsatisfied.

The continued prominence of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement beyond December 2024 is in little doubt, and both have continued to promise elections while pressing ahead with campaigns and mobilization events across the country.

Opposition groups, notably the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition and its leader, First Vice-President Riek Machar, have more to lose from flawed elections. They have consequently stressed the need to follow the prescriptions of the peace agreement and to first complete the unification of the country’s disparate security forces, draft a permanent constitution, conduct a census and engage the country’s displaced populations.

Beyond this political calculus, numerous practical obstacles currently also stand in the way of credible elections.

The deployment of some unified forces marks an important step towards the implementation of security sector reforms, but recent clashes between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), in violation of both the peace and ceasefire agreements, underscore its limitations. Insecurity, including land-related violence, persists across much of the country, resulting in deaths, displacement and serious human rights abuses. Ongoing recruitment and defections also continue to place pressure on reforms, with the Panel also corroborating the continuing recruitment of youth and children by both SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces.

The passage of election-related legislation and the recent reconstitution of the National Elections Commission, the Political Parties Council and the National Constitutional Review Commission are important achievements, but these critical bodies are almost entirely unfunded and lack the ability to operate effectively beyond Juba. A supplementary budget intended to partially fund their work is yet to be passed, with efforts to do so further complicated by a broader economic crisis.

In this context, there are no guarantees that elections will deliver on their promise. The risk that they will become a destabilizing event grows greater as elections draw nearer without clarity on what kind of contests will be held and what preparations will be in place. Substantial divisions exist not only across the signatories to the peace agreement, but also within them, as the incentives of leaders in Juba diverge from the expectations of subnational actors struggling for both survival and relevance.

Violence is often a prominent ingredient of South Sudanese politics, and many actors retain both the will and the means to challenge unsatisfactory political outcomes with force.

Perhaps the greatest threat of elections, however, is that they consume all political attention to the point of distracting entirely from the deep challenges that will continue to shape peace and security in South Sudan whether votes are cast in December 2024 or not.

Regional pressures, including the conflict in the Sudan, continue to exacerbate the humanitarian emergency in South Sudan. More than 580,000 returnees and refugees have now sought refuge in South Sudan, exacerbating catastrophic hunger. Around a third of the population of South Sudan is displaced and, as the lean season approaches, more than half of the population are projected to face crisis levels, or higher, of food insecurity.

This humanitarian crisis is further aggravated by an economic one. South Sudanese oil exports have been disrupted by the conflict in the Sudan, significantly reducing government revenues. Non-transparent off-budget government procurement continues to divert significant public funds away from salaries and services, while the pressures of servicing costly commercial debts are also compounding, even as the Panel has documented efforts by the Government to agree to the country's largest ever oil-backed loan.

The coming months are a critical opportunity for the leaders of South Sudan to work together to manage diverging incentives and expectations before they lead to further instability.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Background	5
A. Mandate and travel	5
B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders	5
C. Methodology	6
II. Elections	6
A. Election preparations and challenges	6
B. Differing views on elections	9
C. Constrained civic space ahead of elections	12
III. Implementation of security sector reforms	13
A. Deployment of Necessary Unified Forces	13
B. Ongoing recruitment by parties to the peace agreement	14
C. Recruitment of youth and children	16
D. Defections leading to instability	17
E. Mediations with non-signatory armed opposition groups	20
IV. Humanitarian situation	20
A. Intensifying regional humanitarian pressures	21
B. Entrenched food insecurity	22
C. Land contestation driving conflict	23
V. Arms	27
A. Attempts to procure weapons by opposition groups	27
B. New South Sudan People's Defence Forces vehicles	27
C. Past procurement of armoured personnel carriers	28
D. Additional efforts to procure weapons	29
E. Explosion at South Sudan People's Defence Forces barracks	29
VI. Finance and natural resources	30
A. Disruption to oil exports	30
B. Government procurement diverting public funds	32
C. Government borrowing putting pressure on public finances	35
VII. Conclusion	36
VIII. Recommendations	36
IX. Annexes*	38

* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 30 May 2023, with the adoption of its resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2024.

2. By its resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2024 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 7 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), updated by paragraph 15 of resolution [2521 \(2020\)](#) and most recently renewed by resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#).

3. On 21 July 2023, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (see [S/2023/548](#)).

4. During the mandate period, the Panel travelled to South Sudan on several occasions, including the capital, Juba, Upper Nile State and Jonglei State, as well as to Kenya and Uganda. The Government of South Sudan requested that the Panel postpone proposed travel to Western Equatoria State.

B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.

6. The Panel is grateful for the cooperation of the Government of South Sudan during the mandate period, including for the opportunity to meet with President Salva Kiir Mayardit; First Vice-President Riek Machar; the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations in New York; three state governors; cabinet ministers; representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Mining, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Petroleum, and Finance and Planning; senior figures within the South Sudan security services; and members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly representing all parties. The Panel also met with representatives of the National Security Service, Military Intelligence and the South Sudan National Police Service, as well as with senior figures within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), and the South Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).¹ The Panel also met with a number of private companies, as well as with civil society organizations, activists, humanitarian actors and organizations, journalists and religious leaders.

¹ "SPLM-IO" is used to refer to the political party, "SPLA-IO" to its armed forces and "SPLM/A-IO" to them jointly.

7. In paragraph 18 of its resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the Panel consulting with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS. The Panel consulted extensively with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan and elsewhere. It also consulted with the security mechanisms established under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (the peace agreement). The Panel also met with a number of diplomatic and multilateral representations in Juba.

8. The Panel sent 29 letters to the Government of South Sudan, Member States in the region and other individuals and entities, to which it received 16 substantive responses prior to drafting the present report. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Government of South Sudan setting out an overview of the key findings of the present report and has offered to include its response as an annex to the report.

C. Methodology

9. The present report was prepared on the basis of the Panel's extensive research and investigations and was written in March 2024. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to gather a body of credible information, obtained from a wide range of sources. The Panel reviewed documentation made available by individuals, commercial entities, confidential sources and the Government. The Panel also drew on its earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential.

10. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 ([S/2006/997](#)). It has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

11. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary. Few sources were willing to be identified in the report, with many fearing reprisals or harassment for having engaged with the Panel. In other cases, issues discussed carried social stigmas that the source did not wish themselves or their family to incur. In such cases, the Panel has provided a general description of the features most relevant to their testimony. In a few cases, where this could not be done without identifying the source, the source is referred to only as confidential.

II. Elections

A. Election preparations and challenges

12. More than a decade since independence, South Sudan still awaits its first elections. The peace agreement, signed on 12 September 2018, calls for elections, on the basis of a permanent constitution, to be held 60 days prior to the end of a three-year transitional period, which was to start eight months after the signing of the agreement.² In August 2022, however, the Government acknowledged that the peace agreement had been only partially implemented and extended the transitional period by two years, postponing elections until December 2024. In his accompanying speech, President Kiir noted that "I consider the reunification of the army, constitution-

² Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, sects. 1.1.5, 1.20.5 and 1.1.2.

making, and the conduct of a census necessary to implement elections and establish a new government without reverting to war.”³

13. Since this extension, some additional steps have been taken towards elections. Key pieces of legislation have been signed into law, including the National Elections Act and the Political Parties Act. Between November 2023 and January 2024, the National Elections Commission, the Political Parties Council and the National Constitutional Review Commission were reconstituted and their Commissioners and senior leadership were appointed. Shortly thereafter, in January 2024, the Political Parties Council announced the start of the process of registering political parties, with a deadline of June 2024.⁴

14. As December 2024 draws nearer, however, doubts have mounted over whether South Sudan will be ready.⁵ Elections remain an aspiration for most South Sudanese,⁶ and another extension of the transitional period will likely further strain the legitimacy of the current power-sharing Government. Equally, however, few wish to jeopardize the gains of the peace process for a deadline that has proved flexible in the past.

15. Many of the preconditions for elections outlined in the peace agreement remain unimplemented. As at March 2024, the lengthy process of drafting a permanent constitution is yet to begin, and no census has been conducted. This, in turn, has delayed voter registration and the delineation of political boundaries.

16. The three reconstituted electoral institutions remain almost entirely unfunded. In discussions with the Panel, they noted that their limited staffs are largely unpaid and that they have almost no means of travelling beyond the capital.⁷ One opposition politician told the Panel that when he attempted to register his party, the institutions lacked the resources to print the forms he was required to complete.⁸

17. The three electoral institutions have submitted individual budgets for their work, totalling a combined 713 billion South Sudan pounds (SSP) (\$475 million),⁹ equivalent to a third of the current budget of South Sudan of SSP 2.1 trillion (\$1.4 billion).¹⁰ In February 2024, the Council of Ministers instead approved a smaller supplementary budget of SSP 107 billion,¹¹ promising that additional funds would be included in the budget for the next financial year.¹²

³ See annex 1.

⁴ Interviews with representatives of the National Elections Commission and the Political Parties Council, Juba, February 2024. See also “PPC gives political parties six-month to register starting January”, Eye Radio, 19 December 2023.

⁵ South Sudanese discussion forums, and interviews with former and current South Sudanese officials, electoral institutions, government and opposition leaders and civil society, September 2023 to March 2024. See also Radio Tamazuj, “Bor residents doubtful about December elections”, 15 February 2024. See also annexes 2 to 6.

⁶ A recent UNMISS survey found that around 90 per cent of respondents consider elections important and intend to vote. See UNMISS, “Perception and public opinion survey 2022–23”. See also Detcro and PeaceRep, *Perceptions of Peace in South Sudan: Longitudinal Findings*, October 2022.

⁷ Interviews with representatives of the National Elections Commission, the Political Parties Council and the National Constitutional Review Commission, Juba, February 2024.

⁸ Interview with opposition leader, Juba, February 2024.

⁹ Interviews with representatives of the National Elections Commission, the Political Parties Council and the National Constitutional Review Commission, Juba, February 2024.

¹⁰ Approved budget for the 2023/24 financial year. The South Sudanese financial year runs from 1 July to 30 June.

¹¹ “Cabinet passes minimum SSP107b supplementary budget”, Eye Radio, 9 February 2024.

¹² Interviews with representatives of the National Elections Commission, the Political Parties Council and the National Constitutional Review Commission, Juba, February 2024.

18. As at March 2024, however, the supplementary budget is still awaiting approval by Parliament, which is not scheduled to return from its Christmas recess until April. Even if approved, however, it will likely be challenging for South Sudan to meet these additional spending commitments in a context where public servants and security forces have gone months without salaries and where ongoing disruptions to South Sudanese oil exports are causing additional financial pressures.

19. Election preparations are also bringing into focus the challenges of planning elections in a context where many of the peace agreement's provisions are only partially implemented or implemented out of sequence.

20. The Political Parties Act, for example, prohibits the registration of political parties with active armed wings.¹³ As a result of delays, however, many parties, including SPLM/A-IO, retain armed forces that are still awaiting the second phase of the unification process. Electoral officials told the Panel, however, that they believe that this disqualifies the SPLM-IO from registration as a political party in its current form.¹⁴ In a recent document produced by the Political Parties Council, the SPLM-IO is listed as a "political/armed movement" and not an eligible political party.¹⁵

21. By contrast, section II.8.6 of the Political Parties Act has been interpreted as to automatically register all previously registered political parties in South Sudan, notably SPLM of President Kiir, despite it also technically having an armed component.

22. Opposition politicians also expressed other frustrations with the registration process, including an apparent prohibition against other parties using the historically significant "SPLM" initials¹⁶ and arbitrary fees and timetables.¹⁷ "The rules set by the Political Parties Council are a shifting goalpost," said one.¹⁸

23. Beyond technical preparations, prospective elections also face substantial practical challenges. The security forces are far from unified, while nearly every state in South Sudan remains affected by prolonged subnational conflicts that impede secure elections and obstruct basic electoral activities such as voter education and registration. Few plans have been made to engage displaced populations, including the more than 2.2 million South Sudanese who remain outside the country as refugees and the more than 2 million South Sudanese who remain internally displaced.¹⁹

24. These facts are largely uncontested among the leaders of South Sudan, who largely accept that elections carried out further to the letter of the peace agreement will be impossible by December 2024. The broad outline of South Sudan's political landscape post-December 2024, notably the continued prominence of President Kiir and SPLM, are also largely beyond doubt. The debate has, instead, shifted to how a range of increasingly incompatible commitments made by the leaders of South Sudan can best be implemented, including whether elections can, and should, be conducted even in the absence of important prerequisites.

¹³ See chap. IV, art. 26 (i) of the Political Parties Act (2012) (amendment of 2022). Available at <https://ppcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/South-Sudan-Political-Parties-Amendment-Act-2022.pdf>.

¹⁴ Interviews with representatives of the Political Parties Council, February 2024.

¹⁵ Proposed budget for the Political Parties Council and the Political Parties Fund, 14 December 2023, on file with the Panel.

¹⁶ Interviews with representatives of elections institutions, Juba, February 2024.

¹⁷ See, for example, The City Review, "Small parties decry confusion, 'high fees' dragging registration process", 12 February 2024.

¹⁸ Interview with political party official, February 2024.

¹⁹ Based on displacement data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

25. These decisions will be of significant consequence to the peace and stability of South Sudan. None of the viable routes forward command widespread consensus, with substantial divisions existing across the major political parties, but also within them. Many political actors also retain both the means and the will to resort to violence if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of a political process, particularly at the subnational level.

B. Differing views on elections

President Kiir and SPLM

26. The SPLM party of President Salva Kiir Mayardit has been the most vocal about the need for elections in December 2024. Senior party officials have repeatedly argued that elections are possible without a permanent constitution and census, and that there is no substantial need to accommodate displaced populations.²⁰ SPLM has thus pressed ahead with significant election preparations and campaigning, even before the requisite regulations and institutions have made it possible for others to do the same.

27. For several years, President Kiir and his supporters in national and local government have leveraged the benefits of his incumbency and the SPLM brand to conduct rallies and mobilization campaigns across much of South Sudan. While President Kiir has personally toured parts of the country,²¹ SPLM-appointed representatives, including governors and youth cadres, have also organized hundreds of rallies dating as far back as 2018.

28. As part of this process, President Kiir and SPLM have made considerable efforts to build support beyond the greater Bahr el Ghazal region, including within prominent non-Dinka communities such as within the Azande kingdom in Western Equatoria State, the Shilluk population in Upper Nile State, and the Anyuak kingdom in eastern Jonglei State.²²

29. Government security forces have been deployed as part of several SPLM rallies. In one rally in Eastern Equatoria State, for example, senior SSPDF officers and units participated while wearing SPLM-branded clothing.²³ South Sudanese observers have described the campaigning by SPLM as demonstrating a previously unseen level of intensity, and expressed fears of “a militarization of politics and politicization of the military.”²⁴

30. At the same time, President Kiir has used his executive authority to build support and undermine opposition parties by appointing and removing dozens of officials at every level of government.²⁵

31. Despite its effective mobilization and campaigning, some disagreements have emerged within SPLM. In December 2022, for example, President Kiir was endorsed

²⁰ Interviews with current and former government officials, September 2023 to March 2024. See also “SPLM-SG spells out five priorities for elections to take place”, Eye Radio, 21 September 2023. See also the report of the Panel ([S/2023/922](#)).

²¹ In March 2023, for example, President Kiir toured the greater Bahr el-Ghazal region and held rallies in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states.

²² A delegation led by the Anyuak King Akwai Agada Akwai Cham met with the SPLM Secretary General in Juba in early March 2023, according to reporting by the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation on 2 March 2023. President Kiir also hosted the Shilluk King, Kwongo Dak Padiet, and the Azande King, Atoroba Peni Rikito, on several occasions in 2022 and 2023.

²³ Interview with a politician, January 2024. See also Radio Tamazuj, “Concerns rise over militarization of political campaign in Lafon”, 18 January 2024.

²⁴ Interview with an official of a political party, February 2024.

²⁵ See the report of the Panel ([S/2023/294](#)). See also annex 7.

as the Chairperson and Presidential candidate of SPLM. Some party members have, however, expressed reservations about the ways in which party structures were reshaped in the process.²⁶ President “Kiir declared himself as flagbearer without proper consultation”, said one former party member, arguing that this demonstrated an excessive focus on “the personality and not the party” and noting that previous conflict in South Sudan has emanated from disagreements within SPLM.²⁷

32. Publicly, however, few such grievances have been articulated. “There is a lot of dissent within the party but not strong enough to stand up to Kiir ... people will not be willing to come up to the microphone ... It is politics of self-preservation.”²⁸

Riek Machar and SPLM-IO

33. SPLM-IO, led by First Vice-President Riek Machar, has, by contrast, increasingly distanced itself from the elections scheduled for December 2024.

34. On 13 February 2024, SPLM-IO issued a position paper in which it stressed that “critical prerequisites for elections” were yet to be fully implemented, including the completion of security arrangements, the permanent constitution-making process and a census. In describing “the way forward”, the document outlines a two-year timeline for the implementation of these prerequisites, including, notably, a permanent constitution.²⁹ As such, SPLM-IO leadership essentially encouraged a further two-year extension of the transitional period.

35. While SPLM-IO is undoubtedly the most significant opposition party in South Sudan, it also arguably has the most to lose from imperfect elections. Its senior leadership enjoy prominent roles within the current Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, but the party’s political and military influence has also waned since Machar’s initial brief return to Juba in October 2018, in particular beyond the capital. This has limited the party’s ability to mobilize and campaign across the country, including in its historic heartlands. Machar himself remains largely confined to Juba, and the party’s leaders thus remain reluctant to validate an election process that they do not, at present, consider to provide them with sufficient political space to participate effectively.³⁰

36. More broadly, several SPLM/A-IO leaders fear that elections and any subsequent dissolution of the unity Government will further limit the full implementation of the peace agreement, including many provisions, such as security sector unification, that are critical to its membership. “We do not want the peace agreement to become all about elections”, one senior representative told the Panel.³¹ “We did not surrender to anyone”, said another senior SPLA-IO officer; “we signed up to a peace agreement.”³²

37. A prolonged transitional period has also led to significant divisions within SPLM/A-IO, however, in particular between its national leadership in Juba and its subnational components and forces. In the context of contentious elections, these divisions could lead to significant tensions and instability, particularly if subnational commanders feel neglected or overlooked in the decision-making of their leaders in Juba.

²⁶ Interview with a senior former SPLM representative, January 2024. See also “President Kiir seeks power to restructure SPLM party”, Eye Radio, 2 December 2022.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Interview with a South Sudanese intellectual, January 2024.

²⁹ See annex 8.

³⁰ Interviews with senior SPLM-IO representatives, September 2023 to February 2024.

³¹ Interview with a senior SPLM-IO representative, February 2024.

³² Interview with a senior SPLA-IO representative, February 2024.

38. As the Panel has previously reported, for example, senior party officials in Juba are perceived by many to have failed to share the material benefits of signing the peace agreement.³³ SPLM/A-IO members in several states have also been targeted for detention and assaults, disrupting their political activities.³⁴ Vice-President Machar's perceived silence during such episodes has exacerbated these divisions. As a party member put it to the Panel, "Nothing has been forthcoming from the SPLM-IO. They've just anchored themselves to a peace agreement that is not moving anywhere."³⁵

39. For many in SPLM-IO, the overwhelming likelihood that President Kiir will remain in power beyond December 2024 is also hard to ignore. This, combined with the slow pace of security sector unification and the absence of pay for opposition forces, has led to frustration and incentivized numerous defections, further weakening both its political and military ranks.³⁶

Other political parties

40. Other, smaller, political parties are largely reacting to the decisions of what one party leader called "the two giants", in an effort to navigate the landscape as pragmatically as possible.³⁷

41. In its February 2024 position paper, for example, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) supported elections "as stipulated in the roadmap," while also calling for a dialogue among all signatories to the peace agreement, given that key prerequisites for elections remain unimplemented.³⁸

42. One of the principal challenges for these parties is the absence of substantial armed wings in a context where the relevance and influence of political parties is still derived largely from their armed components. One party leader told the Panel that, "in the SPLM, SPLM-IO, SSOA, the majority are politicians and soldiers simultaneously. When they fail as politicians, they use their armed wings ... we don't have a military wing ... if there is a violation of political rights for one of our members, we have no one to turn to."³⁹

43. Many opposition parties therefore recognize that they are unable to compete effectively in a landscape that is stacked against them. For many, the main goal is to gain sufficient recognition so that they might be absorbed into SPLM or an eventual government. "Seasoned politicians and their parties are just there to be strategically positioned and will eventually join the SPLM. All they want is to join the SPLM, get ministerial positions and nothing else."⁴⁰

³³ See previous reports of the Panel ([S/2021/365](#), [S/2022/359](#) and [S/2022/884](#)).

³⁴ See annexes 7 and 9. Interviews with SPLM-IO representatives, civilians and activists, November to December 2022, February 2023 and February 2024.

³⁵ Interview with an SPLM-IO representative, February 2024.

³⁶ See previous reports of the Panel ([S/2021/365](#), [S/2022/359](#) and [S/2022/884](#)). Interviews with SPLM-IO representatives, February 2024.

³⁷ Interview with an opposition party leader, February 2024.

³⁸ See annex 10.

³⁹ Interview with a political party representative, 1 February 2024.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

C. Constrained civic space ahead of elections

44. Journalists and civil society organizations have also expressed concerns about “shrinking political space” and the inability of South Sudanese media to cover proposed elections freely under current conditions.⁴¹

45. Election preparations are taking place in the context of significant pre-existing constraints on civic space and political expression in South Sudan,⁴² and further restrictions on press and digital freedoms are shaping the public conversation around elections. Senior government officials have set the tone in recent months by justifying strict media controls as “a protective measure”⁴³ and by threatening media personnel during press briefings.⁴⁴

46. Prominent media outlets have recently been closed, including Al Watan,⁴⁵ a major Arabic-language newspaper, while Radio Miraya, an UNMISS-operated radio station, was subject to a temporary ban.⁴⁶

47. Representatives of prominent media outlets have been harassed,⁴⁷ while media restrictions and detentions have extended also beyond the capital, including into the states of Unity, Lakes, Jonglei and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal.⁴⁸ The Panel has spoken to several journalists and civil society actors who have been threatened and ordered to report to security services as a consequence of their work, with some choosing to leave the country.⁴⁹

48. As the Panel has previously reported, online and digital forums have also grown in prominence, not only as avenues for political expression, but also as targets for surveillance and harassment.⁵⁰ Online forums have, for example, been used to successfully secure the release of detained individuals, such as some staff of a youth organization.⁵¹ At the same time, several activists have reported an increase in threats, surveillance and harassment because of content they have posted in both open and closed online forums.⁵²

⁴¹ Interviews with journalists and civil society organizations, September 2023 to March 2024. See also “Activist raises concern over shrinking political space”, The Dawn, 23 January 2024. Available at <https://thedawn.com.ss/2024/01/23/activist-raises-concern-over-shrinking-political-space/>. See also No. 1 Citizen, “Press freedom in question as election looms”, 17 January 2024.

⁴² See, for example, A/HRC/54/CRP.6.

⁴³ SSGTV, “Information Minister Makuei Lueth bashes human right defenders, justifies media censorship by Govt”, 22 October 2023. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUaJBsY1qXg.

⁴⁴ Press briefing video featuring the Minister of Information, Michael Makuei, and the former Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Deng Dau Deng Malek, 2 April 2023. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=XIfXmHLu4-4.

⁴⁵ Annex 11. See also Reporters without Borders, “South Sudan: arbitrary suspension of the daily Al-Watan after publication of president’s letter of condolence to Israel”, 28 December 2023.

⁴⁶ UNMISS press conference on the incident. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2Y1OQf0Brg.

⁴⁷ Radio Tamazuj, “Security confiscates press IDs of UJOSS president, cameraman”, 16 January 2024. See also annex 12.

⁴⁸ See annex 13. Correspondence with editor of a media outlet, January 2024; Radio Tamazuj, “Activist threatened with arrest after refusing to apologize to N. Bahr el Ghazal governor”, 10 January 2024; and Radio Tamazuj, “Community radio journalist arrested in Yirol West County”, 26 April 2023.

⁴⁹ Interviews and correspondence with journalists and civil society, September 2023 to March 2024.

⁵⁰ Interviews with civil society actors, January 2024. See also Sudans Post, “South Sudan activists, lawmakers and journalists ‘outraged’ by cyberattacks on Sudans Post”, 16 July 2023.

⁵¹ Interviews with youth activists, January and February 2024.

⁵² Correspondence with a human rights activist and a journalist, January 2024.

III. Implementation of security sector reforms

49. The implementation of the security sector reforms outlined in the peace agreement, including the unification of forces, is repeatedly highlighted as one of the critical prerequisites for credible elections. These provisions are considered by many as key to addressing ongoing insecurity, as well as to creating sufficient civic space for free and fair campaigning. After an initial deployment of unified forces, however, implementation has slowed in recent months, while clashes between SSPDF and SPLA-IO have increased, including in Terekeka in Central Equatoria State,⁵³ Nasir in Upper Nile State⁵⁴ and across Unity State.

A. Deployment of Necessary Unified Forces

50. On 15 November 2023, the Government announced that a first group of Necessary Unified Forces was being formally deployed.⁵⁵ Additional deployments followed later in November 2023 and in December 2023.⁵⁶

51. In all, six “battalions”⁵⁷ of unified forces have now been deployed, with each placed under the command of existing SSPDF divisions and commanders. While the Panel has not been able to independently verify reported numbers, which have been subject to some variance and inconsistency, around 3,777 forces appear to have been deployed, or around 7 per cent of the total first batch of graduated forces. Only military personnel appear to have featured in these initial deployments, which appear to date to be focused on areas that were historically under opposition control.

- Two “battalions” have been deployed to Upper Nile State, one to Renk, under the command of SSPDF Division 1, and one to Malakal under the command of SSPDF Division 2.⁵⁸
- Two “battalions” have been deployed to Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, both under the command of SSPDF Division 5.
- One “battalion” has been deployed to Western Equatoria State under the command of SSPDF Division 6. The Panel has corroborated reports that some of these forces were briefly stationed in a school before being moved.⁵⁹
- One “battalion” has been deployed to Eastern Equatoria State under the command of SSPDF Division 7.

52. Approximately 1,750 graduated VIP Protection Forces also appear to remain in Luri, near Juba. Beyond this, however, the Panel has been told that further deployment of the military components of the Necessary Unified Forces are now limited, as a

⁵³ Statement by SPLA-IO spokesperson, 14 February 2024, on file with the Panel; reports by international monitors, February 2024; and Radio Tamazuj, SSPDF attacked SPLA-IO base in Terekeka County: SPLA-IO official”, 14 February 2024.

⁵⁴ Statement by SPLA-IO spokesperson, 12 February 2024, on file with the Panel; reports by international monitors, February 2024; and “Human rights violations in Upper Nile state undermines peace implementation”, The Dawn, 13 February 2024.

⁵⁵ Statement by SSPDF, 16 November 2023, on file with the Panel. See also annex 14.

⁵⁶ Interviews with government officials, Juba, February 2024.

⁵⁷ Battalion sizes in South Sudan are typically around 750 to 1,000 soldiers. These deployments did not necessarily adhere to this definition, with some reportedly comprising only around 500 soldiers.

⁵⁸ All deployment figures are based on interviews with personnel from the security mechanisms established by the peace agreement and with international observers in January 2024. Figures have been corroborated, where possible, by documents produced by international observers.

⁵⁹ Interviews with international observers, security sector officials and state government officials, February 2024.

large number of the graduated forces failed to report back to training centres in September 2023.⁶⁰ The Panel had previously reported that conditions in training sites had led a large number of graduates to disperse into local communities in search of food and jobs.⁶¹

53. One female graduate of the Necessary Unified Forces who had previously met the Panel⁶² said that “out of the over 5,000 forces that graduated here, fewer than a hundred are now living here. I have no home, and nowhere to go. We need food, sanitary pads, medicine, [and] tents.”⁶³

54. Opposition forces deployed as part of the Necessary Unified Forces have not yet been paid, and many appear to have been deployed without adequate supplies of food and other equipment.⁶⁴ Government officials have, however, indicated that salaries for deployed opposition forces may be included in the supplementary budget that is awaiting approval by Parliament.⁶⁵

55. Forces were also, in most cases, initially deployed without weapons. The Government has cited the arms embargo imposed by resolution 2428 (2018) and renewed by resolution 2683 (2023) as one of the primary reasons they could not be armed. The Government has not sought an exemption under paragraph 5 of resolution 2428 (2018). In some cases, such as in Western Equatoria State, local SSPDF commanders and state government officials appear to have provided some arms to deployed forces.⁶⁶ No weapons collected during civilian disarmament campaigns appear to have been reallocated to unified forces.⁶⁷

56. An agreement is also yet to be found on the unification of the middle command structure of both the army and police and, as such, all the deployed forces have been placed under the command of existing SSPDF officers. Several officers noted to the Panel that, in their view, the proposed unification of forces has come to more closely resemble the absorption of opposition forces into existing SSPDF structures rather than the creation of a new unified national force.⁶⁸

57. As noted in the Panel’s interim report (S/2023/922), the Government has reported preparations for the second phase of training and graduation, although no substantial progress has been made. Several opposition commanders expressed frustration with the process:⁶⁹ “why should I go for phase two and suffer the fate of those who went through phase one? Right now, I have authority over my community and collect taxes. I will lose all this when I go for the second phase.”⁷⁰

B. Ongoing recruitment by parties to the peace agreement

58. Recruitment is a persistent theme of security sector reform in South Sudan, where the number of forces nominally under an officer’s command is typically the primary currency when negotiating ranks and access to resources. Government officials have also stressed that recruitment has become necessary to ensure a supply

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ See S/2023/294.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Interview with an officer in the South Sudan National Wildlife Service, February 2024.

⁶⁴ Interviews with SPLM/A-IO officials and combatants, December 2023 to February 2024.

⁶⁵ Interviews with government officials, Juba, February 2024.

⁶⁶ Interviews with the Governor of Western Equatoria State and senior military officers, Juba, February 2024.

⁶⁷ See S/2023/922; interviews with local analysts, civil society representatives, international observers and government officials, July 2023 to January 2024.

⁶⁸ Interviews with senior SPLM/A-IO officials, Juba, February 2024.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Interview with an SPLA-IO commander, March 2024.

of young recruits to the security forces.⁷¹ Recruitment that swells the ranks of non-unified forces counteracts the net impact of parallel efforts to unify the country's armed forces and, as such, is prohibited by the peace agreement.⁷²

59. In January 2024, for example, SSPDF announced the creation of a new division-sized force, Division 12, or "Shark Infantry". It is expected to be barracked in Lakes State.⁷³

60. In recent months, the Panel has also recorded several incidents in which the South Sudan National Police Service has recruited new personnel.

61. In December 2023, for example, the Governor of Eastern Equatoria State issued an executive order recruiting 300 police officers to tackle border insecurity.⁷⁴

62. In January 2024, the new Inspector General of Police, General Atem Marol Biar, toured the greater Bahr el-Ghazal region and announced "refresher training sessions" for 1,000 police officers in each of the region's four states.⁷⁵ The Panel was told that the Inspector General eventually aims to graduate 1,000 officers in each of the 10 States of South Sudan.⁷⁶ Some officials stressed that such training would either target deserters or "refresher" training for existing officers. Others emphasized that these were likely, at least in some cases, to be new recruits. An audio interview with General Biar and videos of police parades also appear to suggest that new, untrained recruits were included.⁷⁷

63. On 29 February 2024, President Kiir presided over the graduation of around 870 police cadets in Juba, identified as belonging to the classes of 2022 and 2023.⁷⁸

64. According to senior election officials and representatives of the police, there are plans for some 50,000 police forces to play a significant role in securing elections.⁷⁹ This number significantly exceeds the number of police graduated as part of the Necessary Unified Forces, none of whom have been deployed to date, as well as the total number of known police officers.⁸⁰ The Government's election security plan therefore likely implies the recruitment and deployment of police officers outside of the formal unification process.

65. The South Sudanese police force has transformed significantly in recent years. Its mandate has been expanded and the force appears to be better equipped, including

⁷¹ Interviews with government officials, Juba, February 2024.

⁷² See chap. 2.1.8 of the 2018 peace agreement.

⁷³ Statement by the Press Unit of the Deputy Governor of Lakes State, 17 January 2024, on file with the Panel. See also *Northern Corridor Morning Post*, "Deputy Governor of Lakes State presides over handover ceremony of Malou training centre to Division 12 Shark Infantry", 19 January 2024. Video from the formation of Division 12, on file with the Panel.

⁷⁴ Annex 15.

⁷⁵ Interviews with representatives of the police, government officials and international observers, February 2024. Corroborated by a statement by the South Sudan National Police Service, 9 January 2024, on file with the Panel. See also Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan police to launch nationwide professional training", 9 January 2024. See also [S/2023/922](#).

⁷⁶ Interviews with police officers and international observers, February 2024.

⁷⁷ Radio Miraya, Audio interview with the Inspector General of Police, 8 January 2024. Video of the Lakes State Police Commissioner with new police recruits in Rumbek on file with the Panel. See also No. 1 Citizen video of Inspector General of Police General Atem Marol Biar addressing police officers in Rumbek, Lakes State, on 9 January 2024 (available at www.facebook.com/100048194229751/videos/1193297578171582). See also Sudans Post, "Unveiling a potential breach: hundreds of recruits being trained in Aweil again", 1 February 2024.

⁷⁸ Photographs and statement by the South Sudan National Police Service, 9 February 2024, on file with the Panel. See also annex 16.

⁷⁹ Interviews with police officers and international observers, February 2024. Video of recent address to new graduates by President Kiir on file with the Panel. See also "Angelina to police: we count on you for election preparations", *The City Review*, 18 October 2023.

⁸⁰ Documents on file with the Panel.

with new armoured personnel carriers.⁸¹ Some South Sudanese believe the police is being empowered in some strategic locations as a counterweight to other forces within the congested South Sudanese security landscape.⁸²

66. Police forces have also participated as “organized forces” or “joint forces” in a number of security operations across the country, blurring the distinction between various security organs. As one South Sudanese journalist put it, the forces “do not necessarily [belong] to Police or to the army ... the SSPDF, police, all services are the same and they are usually referred to as ‘organized forces’, ... [some] are recruited under the police and then divided up [across the other services]”.⁸³ Another stated that “the reality is that the police are not operating as police. They’re used as military. They have all the military equipment ... just they’re in police uniform.”⁸⁴

C. Recruitment of youth and children

67. The Panel has corroborated several reports concerning the ongoing recruitment of youth,⁸⁵ including children, by both SPLA-IO and SSPDF over the past year. While SSPDF forces have attempted to fill gaps left by soldiers who have deserted because of economic hardship, SPLA-IO forces appear to be attempting to grow their numbers in anticipation of a second phase of the unification process.⁸⁶

68. The Panel has corroborated reports of SSPDF youth recruitment around Maridi, in Western Equatoria State,⁸⁷ as well as SPLA-IO recruitment in the same state, including after the defection of forces from their barracks at James Diko in Yambio County.⁸⁸

69. While some recruitment appears to have been forcible, some youths have also volunteered to join forces in a context where there are often few viable economic alternatives.⁸⁹ Recruits are often promised food and good prospects if they are eventually graduated as part of the Necessary Unified Forces, in particular after the Government’s promise to substantially increase salaries for security forces and civil servants in its most recent budget.⁹⁰ Some also appear to have exploited tribal fears and sentiments in areas like Tambura, where Azande youth were persuaded to join SSPDF.⁹¹

70. In November 2023, SPLA-IO forces targeted a market in Yambio County. Community leaders told the Panel that those unwilling to join SPLA-IO ranks were forced to pay around SSP 20,000 (\$13).⁹² SPLA-IO forces also allegedly forcibly recruited around 60 youth from two churches near Yambio town.⁹³

⁸¹ See [S/2022/359](#).

⁸² Interviews with a government official and civil society, January 2024.

⁸³ Interview with a journalist, January 2024.

⁸⁴ Interview with an analyst in Unity State, February 2024.

⁸⁵ The Panel has not engaged in any formal age verification. The absence of birth certificates and differing local traditions concerning the definition of an adult also complicate determinations.

⁸⁶ Interviews with international observers, community leaders and former combatants, September 2023 to February 2024.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Interviews with community leaders, military officers and humanitarians, February 2024.

⁸⁹ Interviews with children and youth, representatives of the Ministry of Gender and Social Affairs and humanitarian organizations, February 2024.

⁹⁰ Ibid. See [S/2023/922](#), annex 1.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Interviews with community leaders, humanitarians and religious leaders, February 2024.

⁹³ Ibid.

71. The Panel interviewed several individuals who claimed to be under 18 years of age when recruited.⁹⁴ One girl described herself as 15 years old. “I was living with my elder sister because both my parents were dead ... nobody was paying my school fees.

72. “I went to buy snacks at [a] market at night ... Some men approached us and told us they had joined [some SSPDF] soldiers and were being treated well and given money, so we should join them. I told them that I did not want to join the army. They tugged at our hands forcefully and pulled us along.

73. “They treated us well and gave us food to eat. [They] told me that I would be released in the morning on the condition that I report every day for the parade and wait for transportation to Maridi ... We swept the compound in the morning. I didn’t spend the next night at the house ... I did report back as I promised.

74. “We were transported to Maridi days later ... The girls made tea, cooked food and washed the clothes of the forces. I became the girlfriend of one of the officers ... I was not maltreated because I agreed to grant him sex anytime he wanted sex. The only problem was that many officers wanted to have sex with me, too, and I did not have a choice. Nobody forced me to have sex, but most officers threatened me if I refused to have sex with them.”

75. The girl was eventually released. “I was so happy when I left ... the training centre was like a prison.”

76. A boy identified himself as 16 years old. “I was living with my parents, but I was not in school. I was selling cigarettes, biscuits and sweets. It was on Sunday during a market day ... I came across an old friend who had joined the [SSPDF] forces in 2022 ... He told me about his travels and how he could now access free money, and soldiers could no longer intimidate him ... I decided to follow him because life was not easy for me ... He told me that he would pick me up in the evening and take me to the house where they registered the names of people interested in joining the army ... We were picked up by a truck two days later and taken to the SSPDF barracks in Maridi.

77. “We were received well and given food to eat when we arrived. Afterwards, life was hard. We woke up early in the morning to sweep the compound, go for runs and do some training ... We were also asked to go out and collect firewood for cooking and wash the clothes of the officers.

78. “I stayed at the camp for four months before I was rescued ... I was conflicted because I didn’t want to go back to the same suffering in my village, but I was relieved because the camp felt like a prison, and I hardly had regular meals.”

D. Defections leading to instability

79. As the implementation of security sector reforms has slowed, defections have continued to shape the political and security landscape in South Sudan. Several opposition figures acknowledged to the Panel that defecting is currently, for many, a better way to access resources and protect one’s rank than waiting for the unification process to complete.⁹⁵ Defections have, however, often resulted in subsequent violence and displacement.

⁹⁴ Interviewed with interpreters, February 2024.

⁹⁵ Interviews with SPLM/A-IO and other opposition group officials and with international observers, Juba, February 2024.

Defections and violence in Unity State

80. Unity State and its substantial Nuer population have long served as a stronghold of SPLM/A-IO. Prior to the peace agreement, Mayom and Koch Counties were the only predominantly Government-aligned locations in the state. Since 2018, however, clusters of Nuer SPLA-IO commanders and their forces in Guit, Leer and Mayendit Counties have defected. In the process, they have reshaped the political alliances of various Nuer subclans.

81. In October 2023, senior SPLA-IO commanders Lieutenant General Simon Maguek Gai and Major General Samuel Dok Wanjang, joined by several officers from Leer County, announced their defection to SSPDF, in what has come to be known as the “Thonyoor declaration”.⁹⁶

82. Their defection was coordinated by senior members of SPLM in Juba and Unity State, including by the Unity State Governor, Joseph Monytil.⁹⁷ The defecting commanders were given weapons, food and supplies⁹⁸ and were immediately integrated into the SPLM party.⁹⁹ According to some reports, the defections were, in part, motivated by the fact that food promised by the Government had not been delivered to SPLA-IO forces in the area.¹⁰⁰ SPLM/A-IO representatives immediately criticized the defections as “politicized”.¹⁰¹

83. Some of the defecting officers subsequently detained dozens of civilians,¹⁰² as well as at least two dozen SPLA-IO soldiers, in Koch County, Unity State, allegedly for refusing also to defect.¹⁰³

84. Maguek Gai subsequently mobilized additional armed youth and other opposition forces in Leer and Mayendit Counties, also in Unity State.¹⁰⁴ On 28 November 2023, these forces allied with SSPDF to attack an SPLA-IO base and civilian locations in Leer County.¹⁰⁵ Violence quickly spread to other parts of the County, leading to the displacement of hundreds of civilians.¹⁰⁶ Local government

⁹⁶ See annex 17.

⁹⁷ Statement by the Office of the Governor of Unity State, 8 October 2023, on file with the Panel. See also South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation broadcast, 8 October 2023, available at www.data.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/774727/56/0 and Eye Radio footage of the announcement at the SPLM Secretariat in Juba, available at www.facebook.com/watch/?v=664273799128691.

⁹⁸ Correspondence with a journalist, a local analyst and a state government official, November 2023.

⁹⁹ Photographs and videos seen by the Panel, November 2023. See also S/2023/922.

¹⁰⁰ Sudans Post, “SPLA-IO commander in Unity State says forces defecting due to killer hunger”, 2 November 2023.

¹⁰¹ The City Review, “SPLM-IO official claims Maguek defection plan to delay deployment of forces”, 26 October 2023; statement by the SPLA-IO spokesperson on 14 October 2023, on file with the Panel.

¹⁰² Reports from international monitors, reviewed by the Panel, November 2023.

¹⁰³ Reports by international monitors, reviewed by the Panel, October and November 2023. See also The City Review, “SPLA-IO fumes over detention of officers in Unity State”, 30 October 2023 and “SPLA-IO urges peace monitors to help release of detained soldiers”, The Dawn, 3 November 2023 (available at <https://thedawn.com.ss/2023/11/03/spla-io-urges-peace-monitors-to-help-release-of-detained-soldiers/>).

¹⁰⁴ Videos of mobilization events on file with the Panel, October and November 2023.

¹⁰⁵ Audio recordings of interviews with Leer County Commissioner, on file with the Panel, November 2023. Correspondence with a human rights activist, a local analyst and international monitors, November 2023. See also Sudans Post, “Yakani warns of return to war as peace parties clash in Unity State”, 28 November 2023.

¹⁰⁶ Audio recordings of interviews with Leer County Commissioner, on file with the Panel, November 2023. See also “Civilians displaced as SSPDF and SPLA-IO clash in Leer County”, Eye Radio, 28 November 2023 (available at www.eyeradio.org/civilians-displaced-as-sspdf-and-spla-io-clash-in-leer-county/). See also annex 18.

representatives also ordered SPLA-IO soldiers to leave Bentiu town and handed command of two SPLA-IO military bases in the area to the defecting officers.¹⁰⁷

85. A few weeks later, on 29 January 2024, significant clashes broke out in Nyuelnyuel¹⁰⁸ in northern Rubkona County in Unity State between SPLA-IO and forces comprising SSPDF Division 4, Military Intelligence, the South Sudan National Wildlife Service, the police and forces loyal to Tito Biel Wich¹⁰⁹ from Mayom County.¹¹⁰

86. Nyuelnyuel and neighbouring Rotriak, also in northern Rubkona County, are both strategic locations that host large groups of returnees and nomads from the Sudan, as well as Nuer populations displaced by flooding. The presence of this population, and cross-border commercial connections with the Sudan, have generated revenue for SPLA-IO forces.

87. The fighting erupted after a convoy of senior political and military officers, which included Koch County Commissioner, Gordon Koang Biel, attempted to force its way through an SPLA-IO checkpoint.¹¹¹ Dozens of SSPDF, including several officers, were killed or wounded in the fighting,¹¹² as were SPLA-IO soldiers.¹¹³

88. An SSPDF soldier who was present described the incident to the Panel: “We were the first to arrive in Nyuelnyuel ... [The clashes] were a provocation by the Koch County Commissioner. He took over our activities ... we were supposed to be the ones to step out of the car and speak to the SPLA-IO officers [at the checkpoint] but he went before us and escalated. If it was up to us, we would not even have fought the SPLA-IO that day... [A few days prior] the younger officers advised the politicians who went with us that [travel to Nyuelnyuel] was dangerous, and we should return to Bentiu. In our system, the soldiers are not told what they’re going to do. The high-ranking officers and political leaders know what the mission was about.”¹¹⁴

89. The fighting in Nyuelnyuel follows a trend in Unity State whereby senior state officials have used a combination of government forces, defected SPLA-IO commanders and youth militias to launch assaults on areas controlled by SPLA-IO in an attempt to displace populations perceived as supportive of opposition groups and capture strategic locations, such as revenue-generating checkpoints, markets and ports. In February 2022, for example, SPLA-IO cantonment sites and locations in Mirmir, Leer and Mayendit Counties, all in central Unity State, were attacked by youth militias under the control of County Commissioner Gordon Koang Biel.¹¹⁵ In the immediate aftermath of the fighting, a local market was looted, cattle were raided and some civilians were killed as more than 400 civilians were displaced.¹¹⁶ Local SPLA-IO forces subsequently fled to other locations in northern Unity State and

¹⁰⁷ See annex 19.

¹⁰⁸ Also sometimes referred to as Barkur.

¹⁰⁹ See [S/2022/359](#).

¹¹⁰ Interviews with a journalist, an SSPDF soldier, an SSPDF officer and two local analysts, February 2024. See also Sudans Post, “Fighting erupts between SSPDF and SPLA-IO in northern Unity State”, 29 January 2024.

¹¹¹ Interview with an SSPDF soldier present during the fighting, February 2024. Interviews with a journalist and a second SSPDF officer, February 2024.

¹¹² Ibid. See also Radio Tamazuj, “SPLA-IO faults Unity State governor of mobilizing youth to attack their positions”, 1 February 2024.

¹¹³ Ibid. See also Sudans Post, “Death toll in Unity State fighting climbs to seven as SPLA-IO withdraws to Sudanese border”, 31 January 2024.

¹¹⁴ Unofficial translation of an interview with an SSPDF soldier, February 2024.

¹¹⁵ See A/HRC/52/CRP.3 and [S/2022/359](#).

¹¹⁶ Reports by international observers, 31 January 2024. Interview with a journalist and local analyst, February 2024. See also Radio Tamazuj, “SPLA-IO faults Unity State governor of mobilizing youth to attack their positions”, 1 February 2024.

across the border into the Sudan, as Government-aligned forces took control of their base and deployed along major roads.¹¹⁷

E. Mediations with non-signatory armed opposition groups

90. Mediation efforts between the Government and non-signatory opposition groups held under the auspices of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome have largely stalled since November 2022.¹¹⁸ In December 2023, therefore, President Kiir requested that the President of Kenya, William Ruto, initiate renewed talks between the Government and these hold-out groups.

91. In a letter dated 5 January 2024, President Ruto wrote to all five leaders of the non-signatory groups confirming President Kiir's request and inviting them for pre-mediation talks.¹¹⁹

92. Pa'gan Amum Okiech, leader of Real Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and sanctioned individual Paul Malong Awan Anei (SSi.008), leader of the South Sudan United Front/Army, are open to participating in Kenyan mediations. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, the leader of the National Salvation Front (NAS), told the Panel, however, that he is sceptical of the proposed mediations. He alleges that President Kiir wants to split opposition groups to maintain the status quo in Juba,¹²⁰ and has cited security concerns about meeting in Kenya.¹²¹ On 27 January 2024, therefore, NAS and two additional non-signatory groups acknowledged President Ruto's invitation, but proposed that pre-negotiation consultations be held in Rome instead.¹²²

93. A few weeks earlier, a number of defecting NAS officers had claimed that Cirillo had been dismissed as the leader of NAS, a claim that the NAS leadership has disputed.¹²³ Clashes between NAS and government forces have continued in southern Central Equatoria, leading to significant civilian displacement.¹²⁴

IV. Humanitarian situation

94. Ongoing insecurity, coupled with intensifying regional pressures, have continued to exacerbate the desperate humanitarian situation in South Sudan. Throughout 2023 and into 2024, regional and internal violence drove more than 90 per cent of the new population displacement.¹²⁵

¹¹⁷ Interviews with two local analysts, February 2024. Reports from international observers, reviewed by the Panel, February 2024.

¹¹⁸ Interviews with the secretariat of the Community of Sant'Egidio and a South Sudanese government official, February 2024. See also [S/2023/294](#).

¹¹⁹ See annex 20.

¹²⁰ Interview with Thomas Cirillo Swaka, February 2024.

¹²¹ Interview with leaders of non-signatory opposition groups, February 2024. See also Eye Radio, "NAS prefers peace talks in Rome, cites Kenya unsafe", 29 December 2023. See also previous reports of the Panel ([S/2019/301](#) and [S/2023/294](#)).

¹²² See annex 21.

¹²³ See annex 22.

¹²⁴ Reports by local monitors, February 2024. See also Eye Radio, "5,400 displaced in recent NAS, SSPDF clashes in Wonduruba", 20 February 2024.

¹²⁵ Panel calculations based on data from IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix for South Sudan, "Event tracking: displacement and return", 1 January 2023 to 8 February 2024.

A. Intensifying regional humanitarian pressures

95. As noted in the interim report of the Panel (S/2023/922), the conflict in the Sudan has placed immense humanitarian pressures on South Sudan, particularly in states along the Sudanese border. More than 600,000 individuals have now crossed into South Sudan since the start of the conflict in April 2023.¹²⁶

96. While South Sudanese returnees previously made up the bulk of these population flows, Sudanese refugees now represent an increasing proportion of new arrivals.¹²⁷ This has further complicated the humanitarian response, as Sudanese refugees cannot be resettled in the same way as many South Sudanese returnees. At the same time, thousands of individuals have also moved in the opposite direction, into the Sudan,¹²⁸ due to food insecurity, conflict, overcrowding and the spread of diseases in South Sudanese transit centres.¹²⁹ Some South Sudanese fighters have also participated in the Sudan conflict, although there is no indication of any State sanction for such activities.¹³⁰

97. In addition, between 1 August and 31 December 2023,¹³¹ more than 105,000 South Sudanese refugees living in the Gambela region in Ethiopia returned to South Sudan as a result of the suspension of the distribution of food aid¹³² and several episodes of violence in Gambela.¹³³ This figure represents around a quarter of all South Sudanese refugees living in Gambela, and their arrival in conflict-affected and food-stressed locations in eastern Upper Nile and Jonglei States was described as “unprecedented”¹³⁴ and placed additional strains on these locations.

98. In addition, a long-standing border dispute in southern Abyei between two Dinka factions has led to some of the deadliest recent violence anywhere in South Sudan, with thousands displaced and hundreds of casualties reported across more than 60 incidents in 2023.¹³⁵ In November 2023, for example, dozens of SSPDF soldiers, including a senior commander, and civilians were killed near the border after soldiers became embroiled in the border dispute.¹³⁶ In early 2024, related violence during a two-week period displaced thousands and killed at least 75 people, including women and children.¹³⁷

¹²⁶ UNHCR and IOM data as at 13 March 2024.

¹²⁷ Interviews with humanitarian actors, Juba, February 2024.

¹²⁸ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: response to the Sudan crisis, situation report No. 25 (as of 19 January 2024)”, 25 January 2024.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* and presentation by a consortium of humanitarian partners in South Sudan, January 2024.

¹³⁰ See annex 23.

¹³¹ Relief Web, “Humanitarian situation overview: Ethiopia-South Sudan cross-border displacement, February 2024”, brief, 21 February 2024.

¹³² World Food Programme, “Widespread food diversion impacts WFP food distributions across Ethiopia”, 9 June 2023.

¹³³ *Addis Standard*, “News: Security crisis in Gambella region severely impacts human rights, needs urgent attention – EHRC”, 24 July 2023.

¹³⁴ REACH Initiative, “Humanitarian situation overview: Ethiopia – South Sudan cross-border displacement”, brief, February 2024.

¹³⁵ This followed similar violence in the area in 2022, when nearly 300 people were killed. Unpublished report on file with the Panel.

¹³⁶ See annexes 24 to 29; reports by international observers, November 2023. See also Radio Tamazuj, “Dozens of SSPDF soldiers killed in latest Abyei-Twic fighting”, 15 November 2023 (available at <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/dozens-of-sspdf-soldiers-killed-in-latest-abyei-twic-fighting>).

¹³⁷ Save the Children, “South Sudan: at least 75 people killed including three children as violence surges in Abyei”, 9 February 2024. See also Achol Bark and Clionadh Raleigh, “Violence rises across South Sudan’s disputed Abyei State”, ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) brief, 9 February 2024.

B. Entrenched food insecurity

99. Acute food insecurity has become deeply entrenched in South Sudan. Since January 2018, at least 56 cases of localized (phase 5) famine have been recorded in the country as classified through the Government-led Integrated Food Security Phase Classification process.¹³⁸ A single such famine event is deemed a catastrophe; South Sudan has now averaged one such event every six weeks for more than six years.

100. Nearly all the locations affected by famine-like circumstances have experienced violent conflict during this period, as well as treacherous working conditions for humanitarians. South Sudan was the most dangerous country in the world for aid workers in 2023.¹³⁹ During the year, nearly 400 incidents affecting humanitarian access were documented, including the killing of 34 aid workers,¹⁴⁰ attacks on convoys, bureaucratic impediments, looting of assets and other operational interference.¹⁴¹ Similar figures were reported in 2022.¹⁴²

101. More than 7 million people, or more than half the population, are likely to experience “crisis” (phase 3) levels of food insecurity or worse by April 2024, with the worst affected populations concentrated in the greater Upper Nile region,¹⁴³ which has also received the majority of recent population flows from the Sudan. In parallel, funding cuts have continued to limit the humanitarian response. In 2023, for example, South Sudan saw a 21 per cent increase in requirements, but a 17 per cent drop in funding, according to United Nations agencies.¹⁴⁴

102. According to current figures and projections, the overall numbers of acutely affected populations have slightly declined from the 2022/23 period, which was the worst affected period on record.¹⁴⁵ Humanitarian agencies have also stressed, however, that the reduction does not represent a “meaningful improvement” and likely masks the true scale of food insecurity in South Sudan.¹⁴⁶ One key factor is how such food insecurity is calculated.

103. Historically, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification process has used the 2008 census in South Sudan as a population baseline, adjusted for population growth. In 2023, however, numbers from the Government’s own population estimates, published in April 2023, were used.¹⁴⁷ This population estimate has generated

¹³⁸ Data from IPC portal. Data excludes other potential incidents not captured because of access constraints, a lack of consensus on classification and incidents documented by other agencies and actors.

¹³⁹ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan tops list of most dangerous countries for aid workers in the world, and the humanitarian crisis deepens amid mounting needs, access constraints, and lack of funding”, press release, 17 August 2023.

¹⁴⁰ United Nations Children’s Fund, South Sudan humanitarian situation report No. 12 (1 January to 31 December 2023), 13 February 2024.

¹⁴¹ Datasets on humanitarian access for 2022 and 2023 are available at <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/south-sudan-humanitarian-access-incidents>.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity and malnutrition analysis, September 2023–July 2024”, 6 November 2023. Available at www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Global humanitarian overview 2024, January update (snapshot as of 31 January 2024)”, 16 February 2024.

¹⁴⁵ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation October–November 2022 and projections for December 2022–March 2023 and April–July 2023”, 3 November 2022 and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation for September–November 2023 and projections for December 2023–March 2024 and for April–July 2024”, 6 November 2023.

¹⁴⁶ Correspondence with a humanitarian analyst, November 2023.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. See also annex 30.

significant criticism across a wide array of South Sudanese stakeholders, in part because it allegedly overestimates the population size for the greater Bahr el-Ghazal region, home to key constituencies of President Kiir, while allegedly underestimating populations in the Equatorias and in the greater Upper Nile region.¹⁴⁸ Consequently, figures for people in need in critical areas such as the greater Upper Nile region may be undercounted within new projections.

104. Other metrics, such as measures of malnutrition among children under 5 years of age, indicate that nearly 1.7 million children are suffering from acute malnutrition, nearly doubling in the last five years.¹⁴⁹ Child morbidity is also around 55 per cent, a marked deterioration from previous years.¹⁵⁰ The latter figure suggests that “in a household [with] two children, one of them is going to [be perpetually sick]”.¹⁵¹ Recent humanitarian reporting indicates that only 5 per cent of South Sudanese children receive the minimum diet needed for development.¹⁵²

105. Despite its potential limitations, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis provides some perspective on the relative needs in various parts of the country. Rubkona County in Unity State, for example, is home to one of the largest sites of internally displaced persons in South Sudan, as well as to several additional informal sites. It is now featured as an area of critical concern. Independent assessments conducted by humanitarian agencies suggest that 80 per cent of the population of Rubkona faces acute food insecurity, with 15,400 people experiencing famine-like conditions.¹⁵³

106. This is due to a complex constellation of factors including the influx of returnees from the Sudan, several years of consecutive flooding, reduced food distribution and the compounding effects of successive waves of conflict and displacement.¹⁵⁴

107. A “near-total liquidation of household assets”,¹⁵⁵ increased child homelessness and child labour and the “near-collapse of traditional household coping mechanisms”¹⁵⁶ have also resulted in increased sexual exploitation in the area.

C. Land contestation driving conflict

108. As cyclical violence and climate extremes have rendered significant parts of the country inaccessible, displacing millions, land is increasingly driving conflict and insecurity in South Sudan.¹⁵⁷

109. Efforts to resolve such conflicts through State institutions have suffered from a lack of trust in both national and local governance, as well as the incentives of powerful armed actors to subvert the underresourced legal system. In October 2023, for example, the Council of Ministers adopted a land policy that stipulated that land

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification portal (www.ipcinfo.org).

¹⁵⁰ Presentation by the food security and livelihoods cluster, November 2023.

¹⁵¹ Ibid; oral presentation by humanitarians involved in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis process, November 2023.

¹⁵² South Sudan Nutrition Cluster Strategy 2024, 22 November 2023. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-nutrition-cluster-strategy-2024>.

¹⁵³ REACH, “Emergency food security update: Rubkona County”, November 2023.

¹⁵⁴ REACH, “South Sudan cross-border displacement: rapid food security assessment in areas of return – Rubkona County”, September 2023.

¹⁵⁵ REACH, “Coping strategies and social cohesion in areas of return, Rubkona County: preliminary findings”, 20 December 2023, on file with the Panel.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Innovating anticipatory action: lessons from the 2022 South Sudan floods”, 18 January 2024.

in South Sudan belongs to its people and not its communities.¹⁵⁸ In a place where land is inseparably linked to communal and social identity, many people have interpreted this clause as providing legal cover for elite capture of land that has historically belonged to communities.¹⁵⁹ “Elites are the locus of decision-making and they are also the predominant land grabbers,” said one person, “[they have] organized themselves [to align] national policies to their advantage.”¹⁶⁰

Civilian disarmament and land-grabbing in Central Equatoria State

110. On 31 December 2023, government forces, including SSPDF and riverine units,¹⁶¹ entered Gondokoro Payam, north of Juba along the Nile River.¹⁶² It has historically been home to the Bari Equatorian community. Community sources alleged that soldiers rounded up civilians then looted their property, extorted them and arbitrarily arrested dozens of individuals, including children, local chiefs and elders.¹⁶³ The same pattern of arrests, abuse, extortion and looting continued for several days, including in neighbouring villages.¹⁶⁴

111. The violence led to widespread criticism from civil society representatives,¹⁶⁵ religious leaders,¹⁶⁶ a state government official¹⁶⁷ and Bari community representatives.¹⁶⁸ A subsequent SSPDF investigation¹⁶⁹ led to the release of several detainees, the arrest of some soldiers¹⁷⁰ and an apology from the Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs for several “mistakes” made during the operations.¹⁷¹

112. Officially, the violence in Gondokoro occurred in the context of ongoing civilian disarmament campaigns in Central Equatoria State.¹⁷² SSPDF announced that it had collected over 400 weapons from civilians,¹⁷³ although these figures were disputed by local communities and security officials.¹⁷⁴

¹⁵⁸ “Cabinet passes Land Policy as it concludes land belongs to the people, not the communities”, Eye Radio, 28 October 2023.

¹⁵⁹ Annex 31; interviews with local land rights experts, civil society and analysts, January 2023.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with a land rights analyst, January 2024.

¹⁶¹ See S/2023/294 for information about the riverine unit’s procurement of boats.

¹⁶² See annex 32. Corroborated by interviews with a witness and a local analyst, January 2024. Corroborated also by reports from international monitors, reviewed by the Panel, January and February 2024.

¹⁶³ Ibid. See also Radio Tamazuj, “Gondokoro Island residents rap SSPDF over brutality”, 3 January 2024.

¹⁶⁴ Interviews with witnesses and a local investigator, January 2024; investigation conducted by international monitors, reviewed by the Panel, February 2024. See also annex 30.

¹⁶⁵ See annex 33.

¹⁶⁶ See video statement by the Archbishop of Central Equatoria, 3 January 2024, available at www.facebook.com/Classicfm924/videos/324715313863864.

¹⁶⁷ Classic FM 92.4, “Juba County Commissioner condemns Gondokoro incident”, 3 January 2024 (available at <https://fb.watch/rG1TdZ1kF/>).

¹⁶⁸ Annex 34.

¹⁶⁹ Eye Radio, video interview with Central Equatoria State Security adviser, 3 January 2024. Available at www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1778052222680503.

¹⁷⁰ “Soldiers arrested over rights violation in Gondokoro: Adil”, Eye Radio, 16 February 2024.

¹⁷¹ “Defense minister sorry for ‘mistakes’ in Juba County disarmament exercise”, Eye Radio, 18 January 2024. See also The City Review, “Adil: Officers named in Gondokoro report to face law”, 11 January 2024.

¹⁷² Interview with a local lawyer, January 2024. See also S/2023/922.

¹⁷³ See, for example, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, “Over 400 illegal weapons collected from the hands of civilians in the Gondokoro suburb of Juba”, 8 January 2024. Available at www.data.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/776688/56/0.

¹⁷⁴ Investigation conducted by international monitors, reviewed by the Panel, February 2024; The City Review, “Only five guns seized in Kondokoro, says head chief”, 8 January 2024.

113. In its interim report (S/2023/922), the Panel noted that civilian disarmament represents a serious challenge in South Sudan, but also that such campaigns can fuel mistrust and divisions when local communities feel they are being singled out for disarmament. In this case, many Equatorians have alleged that the disarmament campaigns are intended to facilitate parallel efforts to seize their land.

114. “Disarmament is done at the same time as [land] demarcation,” one local chief told the Panel, “That way people [focus on disarmament] and don’t know it is really about demarcation.”¹⁷⁵

115. Another local analyst described land-grabbing in Central Equatoria as following a distinct pattern. “First, deploy soldiers and have a continued force presence on the ground. [Then] create animosities in the communities. [Then] displace people and wait to see if civilians will return. [Then] bring in building materials.”¹⁷⁶

116. During the recent campaign in Gondokoro, this also necessitated the disarming of other government security organs, such as the local wildlife forces, many of whom are themselves Equatorian. “If they [SSPDF] did not disarm [the Equatorian wildlife forces], they would not be able to grab land.”¹⁷⁷

117. Recent events in Gondokoro form part of a broader trend of land contestation across much of Central Equatoria State, which has led to dissatisfaction within Equatorian communities. These sentiments have, in turn, been seized upon by armed opponents of the Government, such as NAS,¹⁷⁸ which has strong roots in Equatorian communities.

118. Across Equatorian communities, the sense of powerlessness has grown as many land disputes are resolved militarily. “This is an issue of who has access to money and who has access to guns,”¹⁷⁹ said one humanitarian working on land reforms. “People with guns [allocate] land to themselves,” said another land rights activist. “In Central Equatoria, every single day ... people are grabbing land by force, at gunpoint.”¹⁸⁰

119. In addition to access to weapons, the ability to mobilize logistical resources is equally critical to large-scale land-grabs. For this reason, nearly a dozen humanitarian, policy, human rights and land rights stakeholders told the Panel that they suspect that senior and well-connected individuals within South Sudanese political, business and military elites are involved.¹⁸¹

120. Nowhere is this more visible than in the capital, Juba, and its surroundings, including Jebel Lado, Luri and Rajaf.¹⁸² Here, many stakeholders described land claims to the Panel as “uncontainable”¹⁸³ and “very contested”,¹⁸⁴ and as involving

¹⁷⁵ Interview with a local chief, January 2024. “Demarcation” refers to the process by which the formal ownership of land is recorded.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with an Equatorian analyst, January 2024.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with a local chief, January 2024.

¹⁷⁸ See previous reports of the Panel (S/2022/359, S/2022/884, S/2023/294 and S/2023/922).

¹⁷⁹ Interview with a humanitarian working on land reform, January 2024.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with a civil society activist, January 2024.

¹⁸¹ Interviews with humanitarians, land rights activists and civil society representatives, January 2024.

¹⁸² Office of the Governor of Central Equatoria State, interviews on land grabbing in Juba County, 27 August 2023 (available at www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1334519427422389).

¹⁸³ Interview with a land rights activist, January 2024.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with a civil society activist, January 2024.

men “possessing military ranks”¹⁸⁵ and controlled by “syndicate groups supported by senior government and security officers.”¹⁸⁶

Contested land in Manyang

121. Manyang comprises several villages on the border of Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap States. Its land is claimed by two Dinka factions, the Dinka Apuk from Gogrial East in Warrap State and the Marial Baai Dinka in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State.

122. On 7 November 2023, violence erupted as armed Apuk youth burned down a local market in the Achonchong area of Manyang.¹⁸⁷ Several civilians were killed and more than 17,000 people were displaced.¹⁸⁸ Food insecurity rose rapidly, and several rapes and sexual assaults were reported.¹⁸⁹

123. In subsequent weeks, violence continued to escalate with additional Dinka factions entering the conflict.¹⁹⁰ Women, children and older persons were most impacted, including through outbreaks of disease.¹⁹¹ Sexual violence, including cases of prostitution for survival by adolescents, were also reported.¹⁹²

124. The violence in November 2023 followed a series of escalations that started around August 2023 as the Apuk community has sought to lay exclusive claim to land in and around Manyang, as well as to large swathes of Jur River County.¹⁹³ This has included the establishment of checkpoints, tax collections, and cattle raids by armed Apuk.¹⁹⁴

125. These incidents, however, have their origin in turn in land and boundary disputes that date back as far as 2012, when President Kiir visited Wau and reshuffled local administrative control in Wau and Jur River Counties, while promising land reforms to both communities.¹⁹⁵ The failure to fully implement these reforms led to persistent violence.¹⁹⁶

126. In a decree issued in December 2023, President Kiir stated that “land, borders and boundaries in the conflict affected areas of ... Apuk, Marialbai ... MUST be put on hold”.¹⁹⁷ The decree also ordered the deployment of “neutral forces”.¹⁹⁸ Mixed Government-aligned forces, including from the police, SSPDF Divisions 5 and 11 and

¹⁸⁵ “CES govt suspends land distribution in Juba County”, Eye Radio, 25 August 2023.

¹⁸⁶ “Gov’t bigwigs top land grabbers – Wani”, No. 1 Citizen, 24 October 2023.

¹⁸⁷ Correspondence with and reports by observers and monitors in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, November 2023 to February 2024. See also annex 35.

¹⁸⁸ Joint humanitarian assessment conducted in December 2023, reviewed by the Panel.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid; interview with a local humanitarian, February 2024.

¹⁹⁰ Interviews and correspondence with international observers in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, January to February 2024; joint humanitarian assessment report conducted in December 2023, reviewed by the Panel; annexes 36 to 40; “Goods worth millions looted, vehicle torched in Wau-Kuajok road ambush”, Eye Radio, 14 November 2023; and Radio Tamazuj, “Humanitarian killed along Kuajok-Wau Road”, 13 November 2023.

¹⁹¹ Joint humanitarian assessment report by multiple agencies and organizations, conducted in December 2023, reviewed by the Panel.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Interviews with observers in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, February 2024. See also annex 41.

¹⁹⁴ Correspondence with and reports by observers and monitors in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, November 2023 to February 2024.

¹⁹⁵ Interviews with a civil society member and a local analyst, February 2023. See also Sudan Tribune, “WBEG’s Wau commissioner: county headquarters move protestors must observe rule of law”, 8 December 2012 and Sudan Tribune, “W. Bahr el Ghazal splits over transfer of County headquarters from Wau town”, 30 October 2012.

¹⁹⁶ Sarah Vuylsteke, “Identity and self-determination: the Fertit opposition in South Sudan”, Small Arms Survey, December 2018.

¹⁹⁷ Annex 42.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

a detachment from Abyei, were dispatched, rather than Necessary Unified Forces that had recently been deployed to Western Bahr el-Ghazal State.¹⁹⁹

V. Arms

127. Paragraph 1 of resolution 2683 (2023) renewed the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018) until 31 May 2024. Paragraph 2 of resolution 2683 (2023), however, eased the embargo so as to exclude “the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment, solely in support of the implementation of the terms of the peace agreement ...”.

A. Attempts to procure weapons by opposition groups

128. On 5 March 2024, two South Sudanese opposition activists, Abraham Chol Keech and Peter Biar Ajak, were arrested in the United States of America and charged with conspiring to violate the arms embargo by exporting substantial quantities of weapons from the United States to South Sudan.²⁰⁰

129. The two men, allegedly working with opposition groups operating in South Sudan, sought to purchase and transfer to South Sudan weapons and ammunition worth up to \$4 million, including automatic rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, including Stinger missiles.²⁰¹ The opposition groups, however, also stressed that ammunition was needed more than weapons.

130. In conversations with undercover law enforcement agents, the two men allegedly detailed their plans to smuggle the weapons into South Sudan, either directly or through another country in the region, and to use the weapons to advance “non-democratic” regime change in South Sudan.²⁰² One non-South Sudanese financier allegedly planned to secure repayment through future mineral licences granted by the opposition groups.²⁰³

B. New South Sudan People’s Defence Forces vehicles

131. During the reporting period the Panel documented the import of a significant number of military vehicles by SSPDF. These appear to have been unarmed at the point of import, but several were subsequently mounted with weapons. The Panel considers it important to report on this procurement for several reasons. First, in the absence of unified security forces, it is arguable that the import and distribution of such vehicles to non-unified forces could be considered as inconsistent with the terms of the peace agreement. In at least one case, vehicles were allocated to SSPDF and proxy forces that have engaged in fighting with SPLA-IO units in Unity State. Second, the procurement of vehicles is also noteworthy as the Government has repeatedly cited funding constraints as an obstacle to the deployment and further training of unified forces.

132. On 16 December 2023, SSPDF thanked President Salva Kiir and the Chief of the Defence Forces, sanctioned individual General Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), for new automobiles, which they planned to distribute to all SSPDF divisions.²⁰⁴ Twenty-two of the vehicles were allocated to Divisions 3 and 5, where at least some were

¹⁹⁹ Reports from monitors, obtained by the Panel, November 2023 to January 2024. Interviews with an international observer and a member of civil society, February 2024.

²⁰⁰ United States District Court, District of Arizona, criminal complaint, case No. 24-3084MJ.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ See annex 43.

mounted with weapons.²⁰⁵ An additional 27 vehicles were distributed to two SSPDF divisions in Upper Nile State.²⁰⁶

133. Photographs obtained by the Panel indicate that forces under the command of Tito Biel Wich in Mayom, Unity State, also received vehicles.²⁰⁷ Tito Biel Wich is a former SPLA-IO commander who defected to SSPDF in February 2022 and now controls a semi-autonomous SSPDF-allied force that has repeatedly clashed with SPLA-IO forces, including during recent clashes in Nyuelnyuel, Unity State.

C. Past procurement of armoured personnel carriers

134. In previous reports ([S/2022/359](#) and [S/2023/294](#)), the Panel cited the procurement of armoured personnel carriers by SSPDF and police forces. These procurements predated the easing of the arms embargo by paragraph 2 of resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#) and, as such, constituted violations of the arms embargo at the time.

135. New information and documents obtained by the Panel indicate that armoured personnel carriers were procured by the Government of South Sudan on at least three occasions between 2020 and 2022.²⁰⁸ The vehicles, which are all highly modified and armoured versions of civilian vehicles, were predominantly procured from private companies manufacturing and operating in Jordan.²⁰⁹

136. According to sales contracts and other documents reviewed by the Panel, these companies include Apollo Security Vehicles LLC and Shield Armored Vehicles, also known as “SAV”.²¹⁰ Neither company has responded to several written enquiries from the Panel. Apollo Security Vehicles LLC appears, subsequent to the Panel’s enquiries, to have deleted its web page and social media accounts.

137. The Panel has previously reported that government officials have described these vehicles as procured through an unnamed private company.²¹¹ Several independently corroborated documents obtained by the Panel indicate that this is a private South Sudanese company named International Contractors and Developers, or “ICD Ltd.”.²¹² Its operations licence for Central Equatoria State, where Juba is located, appears to have been renewed on 15 January 2020, shortly before the first procurement of armoured personnel carriers.²¹³

138. Documents reviewed by the Panel indicate that, in 2022, for example, ICD Ltd. attempted to purchase 100 armoured personnel carriers, priced at \$105,000 each, from Apollo Security Vehicles.²¹⁴ Later, in January 2023, ICD Ltd. chartered two aircraft, both registered to the Egyptian Air Force, from a private company in Jordan, to transport 12 armoured personnel carriers from Jordan to South Sudan, over three flights, for a total of \$595,500.²¹⁵ The Panel has not been able to confirm how many vehicles were ultimately delivered.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Sudans Post, “SSPDF military vehicles arrive in Upper Nile State”, 1 March 2024.

²⁰⁷ See annex 44.

²⁰⁸ Interviews with confidential sources and confidential purchase orders on file with the Panel.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. The Panel did not receive a response to its letter to the Government of Jordan.

²¹⁰ See annexes 45 and 46. Further corroborated by interviews with private sector actors and security sector officials, April 2022 to January 2024.

²¹¹ See [S/2022/359](#).

²¹² Interviews with confidential sources and confidential purchase orders on file with the Panel. See also annexes 47 and 48.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ See annex 45.

²¹⁵ Confidential document on file with the Panel. Corroborated by information available from commercial aviation databases. There is no evidence that the Egyptian Air Force knew how the aircraft would be used, as they had been chartered through a private company. The Panel did not receive a response to its letter to the Government of Egypt.

D. Additional efforts to procure weapons

139. The Panel has identified several weapons not previously observed in South Sudan.

140. An MP5A5 submachine gun with a retractable buttstock and a three-round burst trigger group was observed in the possession of a security detail for the Governor of Upper Nile State on 11 December 2023.²¹⁶

141. A Micro Tavor X95 submachine gun was identified in the possession of a bodyguard for government dignitaries in Terekeka County, near Juba, on 6 January 2024.²¹⁷

142. The Panel has reviewed additional documents indicating ongoing efforts by the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs to procure lethal military equipment during 2023. In one letter, dated 19 September 2023, the Director of Acquisitions requests quotes from suppliers for weapons including various rifles, machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers, as well as associated ammunition.²¹⁸

143. The letter includes a direction to potential suppliers that, owing to the arms embargo, “which limit the government’s direct import of classified equipment of military nature,” all contracts will be arranged with the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs of Uganda, which will also be responsible for supplying all end-user certificates.²¹⁹

144. There is no evidence that Ugandan authorities were aware of these directives, nor that they facilitated the import of military equipment as described in the letter.

E. Explosion at South Sudan People’s Defence Forces barracks

145. In its interim report (S/2023/922), the Panel noted several recent explosions at SSPDF ammunition depots and weapons stores. The Panel recommended that the Government of South Sudan seek support for weapons and stockpile management. On 12 February 2024, the Government requested support for the training of the Necessary Unified Forces, including on inventory and stockpile management procedures, from the Regional Centre on Small Arms, based in Nairobi.²²⁰

146. Around midnight on 25 February 2024, a large explosion and fire destroyed an ammunition store at the SSPDF barracks in Giada in Juba.²²¹ Several soldiers were reportedly killed, while several civilians were injured.²²² Videos and photographs show substantial damage, as well as rounds of scorched ammunition, rockets and shells.²²³

147. SSPDF officials attributed the blast to hot weather.²²⁴ NAS forces have also claimed that its force attacked the facility with a rocket-propelled grenade after noting

²¹⁶ See annex 49.

²¹⁷ SSBC News, “The presidential advisor on special programs Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel, said government is working to provide basic services to the communities”, 8 January 2024 (available at www.facebook.com/ssbnews/videos/the-presidential-advisor-on-special-programs-dr-benjamin-bol-mel-said-government/340741012062390/). See also annex 50.

²¹⁸ See annex 51.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ See annex 52.

²²¹ Eye Radio broadcast available at www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1558406271613305.

²²² See annex 53.

²²³ See, for example, “8 injured, pregnant woman miscarried in Giada armory fire: army”, Eye Radio, 25 February 2024.

²²⁴ SSGTV News, “The primary suspect in the armoury explosion in Giada military barrack is hot weather”, 26 February 2024 (available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFbwhp_pHDc).

that the facility was poorly secured.²²⁵ The Panel has not been able to independently verify this claim of responsibility.

VI. Finance and natural resources

148. The economy of South Sudan continues to face mounting challenges that now include serious disruptions to the oil exports that account for most of the Government's revenues.

149. On 16 February 2024, for example, the Ministry of Finance and Planning announced that the 400 per cent salary increase that was identified as one of the major achievements of the 2023/24 budget may not be sustainable.²²⁶ Many security forces, civil servants and Members of Parliament have not been paid since September 2023.²²⁷ The Panel has previously reported that the failure to pay security forces is tied to a proliferation of checkpoints that increase the cost of delivering humanitarian assistance, and to the illicit sale of arms and ammunition by military personnel.²²⁸ It has also increased violent competition for revenue-generating land and territory, such as markets, border crossings, river ports and gold mining areas.²²⁹

150. The Security Council has also noted such links, with paragraph 19 (a) of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), renewed by resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), mandating the Panel to report information about individuals and entities who may be engaging in activities that include the "misappropriation and diversion of public resources", which pose "a risk to the peace, security, and stability of South Sudan".²³⁰

A. Disruption to oil exports

151. The economy of South Sudan remains almost entirely dependent on oil. During the first quarter of the current financial year, oil revenues accounted for almost 90 per cent of the Government's revenues,²³¹ with production in 2023 averaging around 140,000 barrels per day.²³²

152. In its interim report ([S/2023/922](#)), the Panel noted that all of the oil exports of South Sudan are transported through two pipelines that traverse Sudanese territory and thus remain vulnerable to disruption caused by the ongoing conflict in the Sudan.

153. On 12 February 2024, the Bashayer Pipeline Company, which owns and operates one of the pipelines, informed the Dar Petroleum Operating Company that a rupture in the pipeline had halted the flow of crude oil.²³³ On the following day, 13 February 2024, Dar Petroleum Operating Company gave notice of force majeure and cancelled

²²⁵ Annex 54.

²²⁶ "Bak says 400% salary adjustment unsustainable", Eye Radio, 18 February 2024.

²²⁷ Interviews with members of security forces, February 2024.

²²⁸ See [S/2023/922](#).

²²⁹ Interviews with South Sudanese officials, international observers and private sector actors, September 2023 to March 2024.

²³⁰ The Panel is also mandated by para. 19 (b) of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), renewed by resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), to gather information relevant to the benchmarks outlined in para. 26 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), including "the implementation of the parties' commitments" which include, under chap. 4 of the peace agreement, extensive public financial management reforms.

²³¹ Expenditure report for the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial year, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, on file with the Panel.

²³² Documents produced by the Ministry of Petroleum, on file with the Panel.

²³³ Annex 55.

the delivery of two cargoes of oil scheduled for the end of February 2024, and suspended the bidding for cargoes scheduled for March 2024.²³⁴

154. The affected pipeline carries Dar blend crude oil from the oilfields operated by Dar Petroleum Operating Company in Upper Nile State²³⁵ to Port Sudan (the Sudan) for export.²³⁶ Dar blend accounts for approximately 75 per cent of the total oil exports of South Sudan,²³⁷ and Dar Petroleum Operating Company alone was projected to generate almost 70 per cent of total government revenues in the 2023/24 budget.²³⁸ South Sudan has not stated how much government revenue has been lost as a consequence of the disruption, but it is likely in the region of \$2.5 million per day.²³⁹

155. Multiple sources with technical knowledge of the oil industry in the Sudan and South Sudan have told the Panel that the breach was likely the consequence of poor maintenance rather than a deliberate attack.²⁴⁰ Dar blend crude oil must be heated in order to flow through the pressurized pipeline, and the pipeline is therefore equipped with periodic heating and pumping stations.²⁴¹ The conflict in the Sudan has severely impeded maintenance of the pipelines as a result of the evacuation of staff and engineers, access limitations and impediments to the supply of tools, chemicals and fuel.²⁴²

156. On 16 February 2024, the Bashayer Pipeline Company informed Dar Petroleum Operating Company that the rupture in the pipeline had been repaired. However, the Company also noted that it had been unable to secure the diesel and chemicals for the Rapid Support Forces-controlled pumping station 4, in Elafon, necessary to restart the flow of oil.²⁴³ South Sudanese officials confirmed that the supply of chemicals, tools and fuel is now the main obstacle to restarting the flow of oil, especially as some of the cooled crude oil has now gelled, or solidified, in the pipeline. Negotiations are ongoing with representatives of both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces in an effort to resolve this challenge.²⁴⁴

157. On 22 February 2024, the Rapid Support Forces published a video from pumping station 3 in Na'imah, near Khartoum, stressing that pumping stations 3, 4 and 5 are under the control of the Rapid Support Forces and that their staff and facilities are being supported by its forces.²⁴⁵

158. This message is consistent with past statements of the Rapid Support Forces in which its commanders have emphasized that they wish to protect oil infrastructure.²⁴⁶ In its interim report (S/2023/922), however, the Panel also noted that the Rapid Support Forces have expressed dissatisfaction with the current system by which

²³⁴ Annex 56.

²³⁵ Dar Petroleum Operating Company comprises the South Sudanese State-owned Nile Petroleum Corporation (8 per cent), the China National Petroleum Corporation (41 per cent), Petronas (40 per cent), Sinopec (6 per cent) and Tri-Ocean Energy (5 per cent).

²³⁶ See S/2023/922.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Approved budget for the 2023/24 financial year.

²³⁹ Current Dar Petroleum Operating Company production is around 100,000 barrels per day, of which the Government is entitled to around 40 per cent. With an oil price of \$80 per barrel, an estimated discount of around \$5 per barrel and fees owed to the Sudan of \$9.1 per barrel, the Government would lose around \$2.5 million per day.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Interviews with South Sudanese officials and private sector actors in the oil industry, February and March 2024.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ See annex 57. See also S/2023/922, annex 3.

²⁴⁴ Interviews with South Sudanese officials and private sector actors in the oil industry, February 2024.

²⁴⁵ See the "X" (formerly Twitter) account of the Rapid Support Forces: <https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1760749517941457125>.

²⁴⁶ See S/2023/922.

payable transit fees primarily benefit the Sudanese Armed Forces in Port Sudan. This has likely been further exacerbated by repeated attacks on fuel depots at the Rapid Support Forces-controlled Khartoum Refinery north of Khartoum.²⁴⁷

159. South Sudanese officials and technical experts also expressed concerns that ongoing leaks and ruptures could become an ongoing problem as a result of poor maintenance.²⁴⁸

B. Government procurement diverting public funds

160. Despite the fall in oil production, competitive oil prices have helped to sustain annual government revenues well in excess of \$1 billion.²⁴⁹ Economic challenges in South Sudan are, therefore, often as much about competing political demands as about resources.

161. A vivid illustration of this took place on 14 February 2024, when a group of “wounded war heroes” entered the Ministry of Finance and Planning and demanded payment of outstanding medical benefits. Their protest turned violent, and the Ministry reported at least three serious injuries.²⁵⁰

162. Soon after, the Minister of Finance and Planning issued a statement explaining that the Ministry had, in November 2023, paid \$2 million to the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs for wounded and ill veterans, followed by a further \$1 million in January 2024.²⁵¹ The Minister noted that these allocations were not included in the budget, but were “an emergency funding.”²⁵²

163. At the same time, documents obtained by the Panel indicate that, in September 2023, seven senior SSPDF officers were paid a total of \$560,000 to seek medical treatment abroad.²⁵³ This sum, equivalent to around SSP 615 million, was more than the SSP 482 million allocated to the entire Ministry of Health during the same month.²⁵⁴

164. Sanctioned individual General Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, received \$150,000. If he secured medical services abroad, as the funds were allocated to facilitate, he did so in violation of the asset freeze and the travel ban.

Oil for roads

165. Since January 2020, the Government has awarded at least seven large road construction contracts, with additional contracts awarded at the state level.²⁵⁵ These contracts are cumulatively worth in excess of \$3 billion, roughly equivalent to two annual budgets for the entire Government of South Sudan.²⁵⁶ Several of these contracts

²⁴⁷ Interviews with South Sudanese officials, private sector actors in the oil industry and international observers, November 2023 to February 2024.

²⁴⁸ Interviews with South Sudanese officials and private sector actors in the oil industry, February 2024.

²⁴⁹ Budget documents on file with the Panel.

²⁵⁰ See annex 58.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² A video of the Ministry of Finance and Planning discussing the incident is available at www.facebook.com/100087049404977/videos/1373734346845574.

²⁵³ See annex 59.

²⁵⁴ Expenditure report for the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial year, on file with the Panel.

²⁵⁵ Previous reports of the Panel (S/2020/1141, S/2021/365, S/2022/884, S/2023/294 and S/2023/922); confidential document prepared by the Ministry of Roads and Bridges, on file with the Panel.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

have been awarded to companies associated with Benjamin Bol Mel, who currently serves as Presidential Envoy on Special Projects and is a senior member of SPLM.²⁵⁷

166. The Government allocates more money to this road construction programme than to any other item of government expenditure. During the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial year, for example, South Sudan spent SSP 251.7 billion on the oil-for-roads programme, 40 per cent more than the SSP 178.1 billion allocated to all other government expenditure combined.²⁵⁸ In 2022/23, around \$420 million, more than 40 per cent of all recurrent government spending, was allocated to the oil-for-roads project.²⁵⁹

167. Several of these contracts have been awarded without public tender, in violation of the procurement laws of South Sudan. An audit conducted by the South Sudan Auditor General of the \$736.5 million Juba to Rumbek road, for example, noted that “public procurement procedures were not properly followed,” that the South Sudan Roads Authority was improperly excluded from the project and that 84 per cent of the road had not been completed within the agreed contract period.²⁶⁰

168. While roads from Juba to Bor, roughly 392 km, and from Juba to Terekeka, roughly 63 km, are complete or nearly complete, government documents indicate that several other roads projects are currently suspended “due to a lack of funds.”²⁶¹

Non-oil revenue collection

169. Since 2019, a group of companies that include Crawford Capital Ltd., Crawford Laboratory Ltd. and Capital Pay Ltd. have signed several contracts and subcontracts with the Government of South Sudan.²⁶² These include the provision of various digital and electronics services and health equipment and the collection of non-oil revenues. A number of South Sudanese sources, corroborated by shareholder information obtained by the Panel, allege that these companies financially benefit close relatives of government officials.²⁶³ In correspondence with the Panel, the company denied any “affiliations with government officials in countries where business is conducted.”²⁶⁴

170. In November 2020, for example, the National Revenue Authority signed a contract for a digitized system for non-oil revenue collection with Crawford Capital Ltd.²⁶⁵ As the Government did not have the funds to pay for this service, it permitted the company to retain a percentage of gross revenues collected through the system.²⁶⁶ According to South Sudanese law, all collected non-oil revenues “shall be paid into a

²⁵⁷ Although Bol Mel is not listed as a direct shareholder, his beneficial ownership is confirmed by interviews with current and former government officials, private sector actors, international observers and civil society. His ownership is also acknowledged in speeches by government officials, including President Kiir. See, for example, “Bol Mel gives residents of Aweil East 25km feeder road”, No. 1 Citizen, 8 March 2023. See also [A/HRC/52/26](#).

²⁵⁸ Expenditure report for the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial year, on file with the Panel; annex 60.

²⁵⁹ Budget overrun for the 2022/23 financial year, on file with the Panel.

²⁶⁰ Performance Audit Report of the Auditor General on Juba – Rumbek road construction, August 2023. Available at <https://nac.gov.ss/document/performance-audit-report-of-the-auditor-general-on-juba-rumbek-road-construction/>.

²⁶¹ Confidential document prepared by the Ministry of Roads and Bridges, on file with the Panel. Partially corroborated by satellite imagery reviewed by the Panel.

²⁶² Interviews with parliamentarians and government officials, opposition politicians, civil society and international observers, September 2023 to March 2024.

²⁶³ Ibid. Corroborated by incorporation documents, on file with the Panel.

²⁶⁴ Correspondence with Crawford Capital Ltd.

²⁶⁵ Documents on file with the Panel. See also video of the National Revenue Authority event, available at www.facebook.com/100064473592921/videos/185435449956030/.

²⁶⁶ Confidential documents on file with the Panel.

bank account of the [National Revenue] Authority”.²⁶⁷ Budget documents confirm that a percentage of non-oil revenues are retained by an external entity and account for this as government spending, but do not name Crawford Capital Ltd.²⁶⁸ In correspondence with the Panel, the company did not deny this arrangement but stressed that “since automating the National Revenue Authority’s services, a growth of revenue collections increased by more than 700% per month.”²⁶⁹

171. In January 2021, the Ministry of Health granted Crawford Laboratory a licence to operate as a coronavirus disease (COVID-19) testing laboratory, and Crawford Capital developed a system for unified electronic certificates. The Government instructed all laboratories to use the certificates, for which they were required to pay \$6 each. An investigative Committee subsequently found that “none of the above objective [of the system] was realized through the implementation of the Unified Electronic Certificate,”²⁷⁰ and recommended to “permanently nullify the six dollars payment.”²⁷¹ Later, in November 2022, Crawford Laboratory and the Ministry of Health signed a \$10 million contract for the purchase of Ebola virus disease prevention and screening equipment.²⁷²

Additional government procurement

172. On 8 April 2022, the Office of the President signed a contract worth \$151,164,886 with Rams for Civil Works and Engineering Consultant Ltd. to construct “new office premises and three Presidential Villas at State House J1.”²⁷³ The award states that the contract was “single source selection” “due to the sensitivity and security nature of the project.” Construction appears to have started in early 2023.

173. In a letter dated 25 March 2022, the Ministry of Finance and Planning noted that, “on perusal, the process was not carried out in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act (2018), by conducting competitive tendering so that value for money could be contained and cost reduced.” The Ministry added that “there is no justification given for resorting to single source method under section 55 of the Act.”²⁷⁴

174. However, the Ministry of Finance issued a letter of no objection “if there are funds for the project to be undertaken by the Office of the President.”²⁷⁵

175. According to official government figures, during the 2022/23 financial year, the Office of the President spent SSP 113.7 billion, almost eight times its approved budget, and more than the Ministries of Health, Education, and Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management combined.²⁷⁶

²⁶⁷ National Revenue Authority Act (2016), chap. IX.

²⁶⁸ See, for example, the approved budget for the 2023/24 financial year.

²⁶⁹ Correspondence with Crawford Capital Ltd. This increase is, however, likely influenced, in part, by the depreciation of the South Sudanese pound during this period.

²⁷⁰ National taskforce on COVID-19, “Report on the genesis of the six dollars charge imposed on COVID-19 private laboratories from September 6th 2021 to December 26th 2021”, 17 January 2022. Available at <https://eyeradio.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/COVID-19-PROBE.pdf>.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Annex 61.

²⁷³ Contract on file with the Panel, corroborated by additional letters and incorporation documents on file with Panel.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Budget outruns for the 2022/23 financial year, on file with the Panel.

C. Government borrowing putting pressure on public finances

176. One way in which South Sudan has attempted to manage its economic challenges is with loans.

177. As the Panel reported in its interim report ([S/2023/922](#)), this has included frequent loans from the Central Bank of South Sudan. The Government's overdraft with the Central Bank more than doubled between March and December 2022, before growing by almost 70 per cent again by October 2023.²⁷⁷ A further SSP 167 billion was added to this overdraft in December 2023 and January 2024.²⁷⁸

178. Analysis by the International Monetary Fund indicates that growing the monetary base of South Sudan in this way by 1 per cent has typically led to a 1 per cent depreciation of the SSP against the US dollar. This, in turn, typically leads to a 1 per cent increase in food prices within six months.²⁷⁹

179. In March 2022, \$1 was worth around SSP 482 at the official rate. By March 2024, \$1 was worth more than SSP 1,500.²⁸⁰

180. Beyond domestic loans, however, commercial oil-backed loans have made up the bulk of the Government's borrowing. Servicing these loans continues to place significant strain on the public finances of South Sudan. Ongoing disruptions to oil exports will likely exacerbate these pressures further.

181. On 5 January 2024, for example, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ruled against the Republic of South Sudan and the Bank of South Sudan and in favour of Qatar National Bank in arbitration hearings that had been ongoing since October 2020.²⁸¹

182. Starting in July 2012, Qatar National Bank provided the Government with a credit facility to support the import of "strategic commodities". The facility was initially worth \$100 million, with a further \$250 million added in February 2014.²⁸² On 5 April 2018, Qatar National Bank agreed to refinance the credit facility, which by then had reached \$614,595,342. It did so by signing a new oil-backed loan agreement with the Government, by which it was required to supply oil worth \$20 million each quarter.²⁸³ South Sudan, however, failed to make the first two scheduled payments, leading Qatar National Bank to seek repayment of the full amount and initiate arbitration proceedings.²⁸⁴ As at 18 August 2022, Qatar National Bank claimed that it was owed \$824,952,613, including interest.

183. While the tribunal of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes found in favour of Qatar National Bank, it has not yet reached a decision on the precise amount that the Government of South Sudan is liable to repay, but the total amount will likely equate to almost a year's worth of future government oil revenues.

184. Section 4.8.1.3 of the peace agreement calls for all loans secured against oil to be identified and recorded for "transparency and accountability." On several occasions, however, the Panel has confirmed the existence of additional oil-backed liabilities.²⁸⁵ The Panel has now also confirmed that the Government owes the Eastern

²⁷⁷ Bank of South Sudan, Statistical Bulletin, October 2023. See also annex 62.

²⁷⁸ Data from the Bank of South Sudan, on file with Panel.

²⁷⁹ International Monetary Fund, "Third Review under the Staff-Monitored Program", March 2023.

²⁸⁰ Official exchange rates from the Bank of South Sudan.

²⁸¹ Judgment on file with the Panel.

²⁸² *Ibid*; audit report into the loan facility, conducted by the Auditor General of South Sudan, on file with the Panel.

²⁸³ *Ibid*.

²⁸⁴ The Government eventually made four partial payments towards the loan.

²⁸⁵ See previous reports of the Panel ([S/2019/301](#), [S/2022/359](#), [S/2022/884](#) and [S/2023/294](#)).

and Southern African Trade and Development Bank \$151.97 million further to the Bank disbursing a total of \$442 million to the Government as “prepayments” for future oil since 2021.²⁸⁶ As this facility was not classified as a loan, this claim on South Sudanese future oil production was not included in the Government’s disclosure of debts, nor in an independent audit of these debts.²⁸⁷

New oil-backed loans

185. Despite the difficulties faced by South Sudan in managing oil-backed debt, the Panel has reviewed documents that indicate that the Government is negotiating what would be its largest ever oil-backed loan.²⁸⁸ Documents signed between December 2023 and February 2024 indicate that the Government of South Sudan is close to securing a loan of 12 billion euros from Hamad Bin Khalifa Department of Projects, a company registered in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.²⁸⁹

186. The loan is split into tranches, with the first payment to be in excess of \$5 billion. The loan documents appear to have been signed directly by the Minister of Finance, and do not appear to have been approved by the Technical Loans Committee nor by the Parliament of South Sudan. According to the loan documents seen by the Panel, around 70 per cent of the loan amount is to be allocated to infrastructure projects.²⁹⁰

187. Servicing this loan would likely tie up most of the country’s oil revenues for many years, depending on oil prices. According to the loan documents, following a three-year grace period, the loan will be secured against the delivery of crude oil for a period of up to 17 years.²⁹¹

188. While the agreed interest rate is lower than many of the country’s existing commercial loans, the agreement also specifies that all oil delivered as repayment for the loan will be valued at a \$10 discount per barrel, substantially reducing the value of South Sudanese oil exports for many years.

VII. Conclusion

189. Elections will mark a significant milestone for South Sudan, but the window is fast closing on the opportunity for the country’s leaders to take decisive measures to ensure that divergent expectations do not fuel further tensions and strife in a political and security environment that remains highly combustible. Both South Sudan and the international community must also take into account that many of the country’s challenges, including an increasingly desperate humanitarian crisis, run far deeper than elections alone can address.

VIII. Recommendations

190. **To the Security Council:**

(a) **Encourage all Member States bordering South Sudan to submit inspection reports further to paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 2428 (2018), renewed by resolution 2683 (2023);**

²⁸⁶ Information confirmed by the Trade and Development Bank pursuant to its information disclosure policy.

²⁸⁷ See annex 63.

²⁸⁸ Confidential loan documents on file with the Panel.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

(b) In considering progress towards the benchmarks enumerated in paragraph 2 of resolution 2577 (2021) in the context of reviewing the arms embargo, and in the context of proposed elections, give special consideration to whether progress has been made towards the development and deployment of unified forces and command structures further to benchmark (b), and to efforts to secure arms and ammunition stockpiles further to benchmark (d).

191. To the Committee:

(a) Encourage the Government of South Sudan to:

(i) Urgently reach and communicate publicly a decision on whether elections will be held in December 2024, and, if so, clarify for which positions elections will be held;

(ii) Ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to the National Elections Commission, the Political Parties Council and the National Constitutional Review Commission;

(iii) Ensure a level playing field for all political parties and commit to providing sufficient civic space for free and unhindered coverage and participation by all communities, the media and civil society;

(iv) Publish an election security plan that clearly specifies where security forces will be drawn from in the absence of fully unified and resourced security forces;

(b) Convene a joint informal consultation of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan on the cross-border implications of the ongoing conflict in the Sudan, and consider inviting a representative of the Government of South Sudan to provide an update on the impact of the conflict on the country's oil revenues and humanitarian situation;

(c) Issue a press release that expresses concern at the proliferation of land-related conflict in South Sudan and advises heightened due diligence from all actors engaged in activities relevant to land-related transactions and policy-making and land rights in South Sudan;

(d) Issue a press release calling on all parties to the conflict in the Sudan to protect oil infrastructure and facilitate the maintenance and repair of such infrastructure;

(e) Issue a press release that encourages all commercial lenders to the Government of South Sudan to ensure that all oil-backed loans are subject to oversight by all relevant South Sudanese institutions and that such loans are recorded further to section 4.8.1.3 of the peace agreement.

Annexes

**Annex 1: Speech by H.E. President Salva Kiir on the extension of transitional period,
4 August 2022**

**The Republic of South Sudan
Speech by His Excellency, the President on the extension of R-
ARCSS**

August 4, 2022

- Your Excellency, Dr. Riek Machar, First Vice President of the Republic
- Your Excellences, Vice Presidents of the Republic
- Right Honorable, Jemma Nunu Kumba, Speaker of R-TNLA
- Honorable ministers of R-TgoNU
- Members of National Legislature
- Members of diplomatic Corps
- Representatives of Civil Society present
- Invited guests.

Ladies and gentlemen

Today, I am informing the people of South Sudan that the political parties who signed the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) have unanimously agreed to a 24-month extension of the interim period. I want you to understand why we reached this decision.

As seen in the unanimous decision across political parties, we are not extending the transition because I want to stay in the government longer. We don't want to rush you into an election that will take us back to war. I have been fighting since I was a teenager when I joined the first Anyanya, and I spent 50 years in the armed struggle so that

you could feel the same dignity that many others worldwide feel. Nothing compares to the happiness I felt as the SPLM/A delivered your independence.

When we founded the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, we had the opportunity to build a country we would all cherish and defend. But, as your leaders, we lost focus after independence. Instead of building an effective state and cohesive nation, we began fighting among ourselves for power. As a result, we took you back to an even more bitter war where brothers fought themselves for seats.

The revitalized agreement was our chance to correct our mistakes, and I do not underestimate or dismiss what we have achieved already through this agreement. We have stabilized the country and established a framework to transform the state by building effective institutions. Due to unforeseen circumstances, we had to finance the agreement alone amid other serious priorities, like a bloated government and catastrophic flooding. As a result, significant issues remain unimplemented. Among these, we must prioritize some to succeed as a country.

I consider the reunification of the army, constitution-making, and the conduct of a census necessary to implement elections and establish a new government without reverting to war. Reunifying the army means we would protect the outcomes of the elections against spoilers who would use it as an occasion for violence. The constitution-making process will determine what type of government we need - decentralized, centralized, federal, parliamentary, presidential, etc. These choices, if wisely decided, will set South Sudan on a course of progress for centuries to come. The census will provide

the evidence upon which we will determine the details of voting, state formation, and nation-building. We will redouble our efforts to complete these to lead you to a successful election and build an effective government.

While Article 8.4 says that two-thirds of the parties can amend the agreement, Riek Machar and others unanimously decided to extend the transition period. Our shared intention is to take you to a peaceful election. While we want to implement the agreement entirely, we must be realistic. We did not even implement the mighty CPA fully, yet it remains a historic accomplishment that none will deny or reverse. Therefore, we have decided to prepare the soil over the next 24 months to plant the seeds of South Sudan's elections with a unified army, visionary constitution, and firm understanding of our country upon which to build a government that can complete the war on poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness.

While we deliver this message with heavy hearts, we nonetheless have clear minds. We know this transitional government is not what you deserve, but it is better than war. So, we extend the transition period as a pragmatic and realistic choice for 24 months of healing and consolidating.

Others, like myself, spent their entire lives struggling for the dignity of the South Sudanese people. I close this message by calling on two of them, in particular, to come back to South Sudan and collaborate with us in creating conditions for a complete political transition from war to lasting peace. Comrades Pagan Amum and Thomas Cirilo should come back home and join hands with us in Juba, like some of their comrades have. We were together in the liberation, and while we have deferred, we need them to join us now to set history on a correct course.

Thank you

Annex 2: PCCA statement on election preparedness, 12 February 2024



The People's Coalition for Civil Action

Juba, South Sudan

Email: thecivilactionssd@gmail.com

12th February 2024

South Sudan is Unprepared for Democratic Elections

The People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA) strongly discourages the conduct of sham elections in South Sudan. President Kiir and his cronies have decided to conduct what they call elections, which are nothing more than treacherous tricks to consolidate dictatorship. Elections, in and of themselves, are very divisive processes even in stable democratic societies. They are explosive and dangerous in divided and poorly governed countries such as South Sudan. The PCCA, therefore, has serious reservations and concerns about hastily organized sham elections in South Sudan. **The PCCA takes a strong position of rejecting the proposed elections on the following grounds:**

1. The Goals of the Elections.

The most important question the people of South must ask is, what was the cause of the 2013 political crises in the country? After all, it followed the 2010 democratic elections. The second important question is, has this issue been resolved? The third question we ought to ask is, have the divisions and bitterness caused by the 2013 crises been addressed? To the extent that the PCCA wants and demands democratic elections, it is important to conduct such elections in an environment free from divisions and bitterness.

Once a nation has experienced major upheavals, the priority must be placed on healing the nation and addressing the fundamental causes of the problem. Many ordinary South Sudanese do not believe that the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has addressed the issue to its roots. Their continued stay in the refugee and displacement camps, including the protection of civilian sites and the prevailing uncontrolled violence in different parts of the country are evidence of this.

Though the Agreement has provisions aimed at healing this nation, including transitional justice provisions, little has been seen in terms of their implementation. Some of the key provisions intended to enhance national unity, peace, and democracy includes the unification of the army, national healing and reconciliation, transitional justice measures, and constitutional making process. So far, President Kiir has decided to sidestep these critical measures and demonstrated bad faith, leaving the country extremely divided. Considering the nature of elections being divisive, South Sudan largely remaining unhealed, it is dangerous to rush elections. The priority should therefore be placed on building national unity and opening of democratic space instead of rushed elections. **The top priority for the people of South Sudan must be national healing and**

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'S. Kiir'.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'R. Machar'.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'J. Juba'.

elections do not heal a divided society, especially elections lacking credibility and fairness could potentially trigger a much more serious civil strife.

2. The Country Remains Extremely Divided.

Civil wars are destructive and very divisive events in the life of any nation. South Sudanese fought a very bitter, atrocious, and ethnically and regionally divisive civil war. The goal of the R-ARCSS was to restore peace, repair broken ethnic and regional cords, and reconstitute the nation and the state. This has not happened. What we have witnessed, despite the Agreement, is the explosion of ethnic based armed violence fueled by the parties to the Agreement or a bye product of the conditions created by these parties.

We have also witnessed the emergence of new rebel groups and non-armed opposition groups since the signing of the Agreement. Both are clear indicators of a country that remains extremely divided and continues to be divided. The refusal of the IDPs and the refugees to return home is another indicator that the underlying reasons for the civil war have not been addressed.

We have seen little to no effort from the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) in fostering peace, promoting national unity, reconciliation, and healing; and creating an environment conducive to freedom and democracy. Instead, the state has become more repressive, political, and civic spaces have shrunk, and kidnapping of political and civil activists continues unabated.

The proponent of elections in such an explosive environment are seeking dismemberment of South Sudan. **South Sudan is unprepared for elections, especially sham elections would destroy the country.**

3. The national army does not exist.

The state is the holding space for democratic government and the nation. The state exists through key rule of law institutions, including the national army, security services, and the courts. These institutions must exist independent of the political authority and influence. In South Sudan, national army was dismembered in 2013 when the political leaders divided it and kept it divided to the present. Each of the political rivals has its own militia to protect political and economic gains. **If the nation is rushed to a sham election without the national army, the battle lines are clear, and the country is more likely to relapse to a civil war than it is to make a transition to peace and democracy.**

There is a very good reason why the R-ARCSS provided for the unification of the armed forces. President Kiir has so far frustrated this process and even if it were to integrate the forces now, such forces will remain loyal to their respective ethno-political leaders, threatening the repeat of 2013 implosion. **The reconstitution of South Sudan national army requires a more robust national process, built on national unity processes.**

4. Political Parties in South Sudan are Undemocratic.

All living things give birth to their own kind because of the genetic codes passed from generation to generation. Democratic institutions also give birth to their own kind. The parties to the R-

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ARCSS are military dictatorship breeds. They did not inherit any democratic genes to pass on and the 2013 conflict was in fact a genetically inherited behavior. It would be an anomaly to expect military dictators to mutate and behave differently just because they have participated in a sham election. If these parties are to be trusted, they must prove their newly acquired democratic genes by exercising internal party democracy. They must show prove of strong internal accountability mechanisms worthy of democratic parties.

Trust in these parties to conduct credible democratic elections, can only come after significant show of democracy within those parties. Considering strings of sham mob endorsement of President Kiir in disregard of SPLM's own constitutions, our fears have just been confirmed. Only democratic parties can organize, participate in, and accept the outcomes of democratic elections even when they lose. Nothing shows these parties are democratic and nothings shows they would accept election outcomes.

5. A New Constitution is a Prerequisite for Elections

The country needs a new constitution because the existing constitution is dictatorial and a newly elected government operating under the same would be a dictatorship, rendering elections redundant. After all, the civil war was a result of deliberate mistakes in the transitional constitution which must be corrected in response to the civil war.

The constitutional making process serves three important purposes: it reconstitutes political consensus after bitter divisions, it restructures power to address the causes of divisions, it recreates lost national unity, necessary conditions for a new dispensation. Lastly, the constitutional making process restores power balance between citizens, the state, and government. **The constitutional making process is a prerequisite to any elections as it will address the fundamental issues that led to the civil war.**

6. Willful Disregard for the Implementation of the R-ARCSS and National Dialogue Resolutions Exacerbated Government Distrust

Considering that President has willfully frustrated the implementation of the R-ARCSS and single handedly trashed the Resolutions of the South Sudan National Dialogue, **his promise to make the constitution after elections cannot be trusted.** What is more is that the mechanism provided for by the R-ARCSS will expire together with the Agreement once an elected government takes over. **It would be a loss of opportunity not to make the constitution now within the given framework which will not be there after elections.** It will be difficult to regenerate a new multi-stakeholder forum after elections, even the RJMEC will come to an end.

Making the constitution within the framework and context of the R-ARCSS provides more guarantees. Unless the government accepts the Roundtable Conference, which will eventually lead to the constitutional conference, it is misguided to put off the making of the constitution. We are giving up too much as citizens. **The constitution will restore people's power visa-vice the state and the dictators.** It is the only thing we need.



7. The country is bankrupt and cannot afford a new election.

Since 2015, South Sudan's government has not been able to meet its financial obligations, especially salaries for the civil servants, foreign service, and the army. The status now is that they have endured nearly half a year without salaries in a currency that depreciates on daily basis. On February 9, the government committed to fund 15% and appealed to the region and the international community to fund 85% of \$228.1 million estimated elections budget.

Frustrated by the slow and inconsistent implementation of the R-ARCSS, most of the major donor funding some aspects of the Agreement have long withdrawn their funding and support. Besides, there is no record indicating that countries in the region have ever committed to fund up to 85% of electoral process of a neighboring state. In terms of the cost-benefit-analysis, borrowing a lot of money to conduct an election that has no promise of peace and stability to the ordinary South Sudanese is a misplaced priority.

What would be directly beneficial to the citizens is to pay all the salary arrears and take measures that stabilize the political situation in the country on which the economy will depend. Among this, is for the government to accept a political dialogue building on the national dialogue and the R-ARCSS that brings on board armed and unarmed oppositions, build new political consensus, hold a constitutional conference, re-establish national army, and undertake deliberate national healing process. These investments would have higher yields and higher returns than a hastily organized sham elections aimed at giving legitimacy to a president who has done everything in his power to show that he is a failure and a divider.

8. President Kiir's Mob Endorsement Portends Sham Elections.

The SPLM Secretariat, under the leadership of Peter Lam Both has abundantly proven itself as an instrument of dictatorship. **The invention of mob endorsement for President Kiir, and soon there will be mob endorsements for state governors and county commissioners, tell a story of a party bent on subverting democracy by maliciously rooting for democracy only to choke it.** Reading the SPLM constitution and the Arusha Agreement, there is no such thing as mob endorsement.

In fact, in democratic politics, there is no mob endorsement, there are individual endorsements. Mob endorsements jumped out straight from dictators' playbook. If Peter Lam Both wants to endorse President Salva Kiir, well and good, but to hold a deceptive rally where people are promised free t-shirts, caps and free money and call it an endorsement is essentially the climax of political deception.

The point is this, the new creation of the SPLM Secretariat—mob endorsement, portends the nature of elections the government plans to conduct, that in which our candidates will be appointed by the President, and we will simply be compelled to endorse them mopishly. This does not sound like a great public investment. We cannot pay for this costly exercise only to get our rag-tag clothes back in return, the next day. Elections must present a clear promise of a new direction, a departure from this gloomy situation and President Kiir and his SPLM Secretariat promise nothing new, but the same, this time with your mob endorsement.

 Three handwritten signatures in blue ink are located at the bottom of the page. The first signature on the left is partially obscured and appears to be 'Sud'. The middle signature is a large, stylized signature that is difficult to decipher. The signature on the right is clearly legible as 'J. Hubert'. To the right of the signatures, the number '4' is printed.

9. Illegality in the formation of the National Elections Commission.

The formation of the National Elections Commission (NEC) contravenes the provisions of the National Elections Act (NEA). Article 11.1 of the NEA dictates that members of the NEC should be endorsed by 2/3 votes of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly, but this was not done. Article 11(2)(c) calls for members of the NEC to be independent, non-partisan, and impartial. However, the commission is composed of active members of the parties to the R-ARCSS, contrary to the law. Therefore, an illegal body can not execute a legal exercise.

10. Conclusions

Considering that the 2013 crisis and its variants since then, remain unaddressed at the roots, given that the country remains bitterly divided, and in light of the lack of change in attitude and mindset of the political leaders, and with the knowledge of the country having a fractured military, and in the absence of a genuine political dialogue and national healing exercise, in absence of a new constitutional process, South Sudan cannot hold democratic elections. To insist on conducting elections while refusing to work toward pulling this nation together, characterize the highest form of political dishonesty.

We therefore call upon the people of South Sudan to reject hastily organized sham elections and instead demand immediate process of national healing and reconciliation starting with the proposed roundtable conference, followed by a constitutional conference, a constitutional referendum and conclude with an election.

We demand immediate cessation of violence, demand internationally supervised unification of the forces and the conduct of general, simultaneous, civilian disarmament, call for the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, and we demand a new transparent economic management system.

More importantly, we demand immediate opening of both political and civic spaces and immediate release of civil and political activists, including the arbitrarily detained military officers accused of non-existent coup d'etat. These measures are necessary in preparing the country for genuine free and fair democratic elections. Absent these steps, the PCCA rejects the call for elections and call upon the people of South Sudan resist any attempts to impose these sham elections on them.

The People of South Sudan Shall Prevail

The PCCA is a non-violent prodemocracy civil rights movement, advocating for peace, democracy, and respect for human rights in South Sudan.



Joseph Akol Makeer




Rajab Mohandis



Abraham A. Awolich

Annex 3: APC Statement on elections, 11 January 2024



AFRICAN PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
"Forward Ever, Backward Never"

AFRICA PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STATEMENT ON THE RAGING DEBATE FOR AND AGAINST
ELECTION IN DECEMBER 2024.

THURSDAY 11TH JAN, 2024.


African People's Congress (APC) is very much aware of the ongoing debate on whether or not election should be conducted around December 2024. First and foremost, African People's Congress want election even today. We are aware of the fact that' South Sudanese are sick and tired of politic of '**Lobby and Decrees**'. They want to elect their leaders especially those with people and Country at heart. APC equally believe that leadership is a national cake just like Oil, Gold and Diamond. It must be shared and the best way to share it, is through competitive, free and fair election.

However, African People's Congress had been carefully monitoring the propaganda put forward by SPLM-IG in regard to the conduct of election this year. We all know' they are not serious about conducting election this year and signs are all there for everyone to see. Firstly, the peace parties are behind schedule in everything in their own Timetable they drew, the so-called '**Roadmap**'. Secondly, the money (**SSP 280,000000**) or (**\$280,000**) allocated to National Election Commission in the last year fiscal budget cannot even pay a rent for NEC Headquarters here in Juba.

African People's Congress would like to seize this opportunity to emphasis' that General Election can't be compared to BCYA Elections. It's a huge undertaking that will require a great deal of resources. We estimate that since it's South Sudan first election ever, it will require not less than **\$500 Million United States Dollars** or more. National Election Commission may also need to hire more than **200,000** South Sudanese as Election Commissioners, Presiding, Returning officers and Polling Clerks etc.

As illustrated above, General Election is not about getting high on **tobacco snuff (Sawut)**, feeling good and say things like "**Whether you like it or not, Election will take place in December 2024**". APC demand sanity from **SPLM-IG cadres** while talking and handling issues of Election. Get serious and deliver for us a free, fair Election so that we in the APC can have a chance to kick you out of public offices once for all.

~THE END~



AFRICAN PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
Tel: +211 921 111 597

Annex 4: COOP statement on elections, 21 January 2024



January 21, 2024

For Immediate Release.

Position of the Coalition of Opposition Parties (COOP) in South Sudan on Controversial Upcoming Elections

We, the leaders of COOP, are calling for expedited funding for the key institutions responsible for a free, fair, and credible election in South Sudan. We request peace grantors to pressure the RTGoNU to release funds for the National Elections Commission, Political Parties Council, and National Constitution Review Commission to enable these institutions to execute their mandate without delay.

In the event that the December 2024 election is not possible, we urge the peace grantors to facilitate an inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders in South Sudan. This dialogue should focus on forming a caretaker government led by the technocrats, including members selected from civil society, professional associations, and academia. This temporary government will work towards creating a conducive environment for future elections that will pave the way for a peaceful transition of power.

COOP remains committed to working towards a peaceful and democratic South Sudan where power belongs to the people. Hence, we call upon all parties involved to prioritize the funding of the above institutions so that they can organize a just and transparent election as provided by the Roadmap.

Finally, we reiterate that we are ready for elections. Therefore, any attempt for another extension of the transitional period is unacceptable.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Gai Chol Paul'.

On behalf of the COOP,
Dr. Gai Chol Paul,
Chairman



Annex 5: PNU statement on elections, 25 January 2024**ENDING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD CONVERSATION**

Conducting elections on 22/Dec/2024 is impossible and extending bloated Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity intact is unacceptable.

Background

On the 4th August 2022, the Parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed the ROADMAP which extended the transitional period for two more years. According to the Roadmap, the transitional period was to end on 22 February 2025 and the general elections were scheduled to be held on 22 December 2024. Now, with only ten (10) months remaining for the date set for the election, it is becoming exceedingly difficult to beat the deadline as many fundamentals for holding the elections remain outstanding. The implementation of these nitty-gritties was the very reason for fashioning the roadmap.

In addition, the timelines set by the National Elections Act and the Political Parties Act for conducting elections add up to 21 months plus. No possible amendment of these two laws can reduce that time frame to suit the remaining period to elections. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to accept the reality that it is not possible any more to conduct a free, fair, credible and peaceful election come December 2024. At the same time a blanket extension of the transitional period with the same government composition, as was done in August 2022 with the roadmap, is not only undesirable but is totally rejected by the South Sudanese and the international community.

A large body of public opinion among our people believe that Parties in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) are determined to stick to power through endless extensions of the life of R-ARCSS. This sensitivity can only be dismissed, when the Parties prove by actions, not just words that they are serious in ending the transitional period as stipulated in the agreement.

Therefore, there must be a method out that offers more time for the implementation of the critical prerequisites but concurrently puts in place procedures that follow up the implementation process continuously for corrective measures to be taken on time. Also, the size of the current bloated, government must be downsized for simplicity of management and save resources that will better be availed to the election-related institutions such as the NEC, NCRC and PPC. Four years of experience have shown that it is one reason for failure to deliver on the tasks of the

Page 1/25 January 2024. Dharuai Mabror Teny/Leader/the Party of National Unity (PNU) No 0926400298

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25/1/2024

agreement. Article 1.4.12 of R-ARCSS commits the Parties to the Adoption of lean government following the end of the power sharing arrangements stipulated in the agreement.

Adequate Preparations for conducting elections so as to hand over power to an elected government is the only way to end the transitional period. This will be the first election of its kind to be held in South Sudan since it became an independent state thirteen years ago. Additionally, the country is coming out of a devastating armed conflict that has taken many years and a lot needs to be done to bring about mending our social fabric, reconciliation and building trust among ourselves. Hence, elections need adequate preparations in advance. This demands enough time and a strong political will from the leaders including being seen united in their resolve to deliver the country into a democratic era. The situation poses a challenge for both the political leaders and the citizens.

Running through these fundamentals, both the population census and the constitution-making process require 24 months to complete. Also the timelines set by the National Elections Act and the Political Parties Act require about the same time scale. These activities can be done concurrently. Adding to this a period of six (6) months needed for the parties that had just registered to campaign for the elections, a minimum of 30 months will be required for conducting the elections two (2) months before the end of the transitional period. Therefore, if, for instance, the starting point is 22 March 2024 then elections could be held comfortably by 22 September 2026. Since this will still be in the rainy season, then elections should be held on 22 December 2026 for the transitional period to end on 22 February 2027.

- Monitoring and Evaluation Committee

Once the leaders of the Parties to the agreement have agreed on the new timelines for implementing of the outstanding provisions of R-ARCSS, they shall form a committee comprising all the Parties to continuously monitor and evaluate the adherence of the Parties to the timelines set. This Monitoring and Evaluation Committee shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the activities of the agreement and report to the leaders on a monthly basis. The report shall, among other things, include identifying the activities whose implementation is behind schedule, finding out the causes of delay and suggestions of counteractive actions.


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Conclusion

This proposal is presented as a way out of the current dilemma of either holding the elections quickly without adequate preparations or going for a blanket extension of the transitional period with the current power arrangements intact. Both courses of action are seen by the South Sudanese as desperate attempts by the parties to cling to power indefinitely.

Here it is suggested that enough time be availed for implementing the requirements that lead to a free, fair, credible and peaceful election the outcome of which shall be acceptable to all. This extra time must be tightly controlled to deliver the desired results. This is our focus and should never be missed or lost. Lack of proper follow-up from the Parties on the implementation of the agreement's tasks was one of the main reasons of failure to deliver in the last four years of transition. The other was trust deficit that can only be eliminated by continuous interaction between the Parties as partners in the agreement.


The proposal lays emphasis on that the Parties should recommit themselves to implement the peace agreement in good faith. To do so, they need to adopt dialogue, cooperation, and transparency in resolving the issues that arise from time to time. It is hoped that they will discuss this proposal in this spirit as soon as possible so that a consensus is built on ending the transitional period. Attached is the summary (1&2) of the downsize R-ARCSS proposal.


 25/01/2024

Dharuai Mabor Teny
 Leader/THE PARTY OF NATIONAL UNITY (PNU)
 National Agenda Group IN /ITGoNU-THE R-ARCSS

- Cc. HE. Salva Kiir Mayardit – president of the Republic of South Sudan and Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
- Cc. HE. Dr. Riek Machar Teny – First vice president and Chairman of the Sudan people liberation in opposition (SPLM-IO).
- Cc. Excellencies the Vices President.
- Cc. Hon. Dr. Lam Akol- National Democratic Movement- (NDM).
- Cc. Hon. leaders of the parties to the R-ARCSS.
- Cc. Smil Wais PHD, IGAD special Envoy to South Sudan.
- Cc. civil society organizations.
- Cc. R-JMEC.
- Cc. file

Page 3/25 January 2024. Dharuai Mabor Teny/Leader/the Party of National Unity (PNU) No 0926400298



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Attachment (one-1)

Downsizing the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU)

As mentioned earlier, no extension of the elections time that keeps the current power sharing arrangements intact is acceptable. Hence, the only way out is to downsize the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) and the suggestion is that the parties to the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) should have a political will and except reality to downsize, the Transitional Government of National Unity and the suggestion are as follows.

- 1- The Presidency.
 - a- **HE. Salva Kiir Mayardit** shall remain as the president of the Republic of South Sudan during the downsize National Unity government.
- 2- Vices president, there is a need to reduced (four-4) vices president to (one-1) vice president.
 - a- **Dr. Riek Machar Teny** shall remain as vice president during the downsize National Unity government
- 3- The four (4) vice presidents affected by downsize to be appointed as follow
 - a- **Dr. James Wani Iga**- to go back to Parliament as speaker-TNLA
 - b- **Taban Deng Gai**- to go back as Governor of UNITY STATE or to be appointed Advisor
 - c- **Hussien Adhalbagi Akol**- to be appointed as Governor of NORTHERN BHAR EL GHAZEL or Advisor
 - d- **Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior**- to be appointed as Governor of JONJELI STATE or Advisor
- 4- The Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) of the 550 members be reduced to 332 members as stipulated in the act, with only (one-1) deputy speaker and downsize shall be applied in the specialize committees of the TNLA.
- 5- The council of ministers be downsize to 25 members' from the current 35 cabinet so that to reflect (the lean government as stipulated in the R-ARCSS.
- 6- The deputy minister's be reduced to 7 from the current 10 deputies only to reflect the lean government.
- 7- The council of states shall be reduced to 66 members from the 100 members, with (one-1) deputy speaker and the speaker shall go to SSOA parties.
- 8- Governor's and Chief Administrator, and commissioners shall not be affected during downsizing
- 9- The state legislative Assembly to be downsize to 60 members from the current 100 members
- 10- The states council of ministers be downsize to 12 ministers from the present numbers.

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Attachment (two-2)

On the basis of the above downsize new power sharing arrangement, the following table is prepared:

Current Government, R-TGoNU old arrangement					Downsized Government, R-TGoNU new arrangement			
Party	Ministers	D/Ministers	TNLA	C of S	Ministers	D/Ministers	TNLA	C of S
ITGoNU	20	5	332	55	13	3	201	33
SPLM-IO	9	3	128	27	4	1	77	16
SSOA	3	1	50	10	4	1	30	6
OPP	1	1	30	8	2	1	18	5
FDs	2	-	10	-	2	1	6	6
Total	35	10	550	100	25	7	332	66

NB/ this table shall applied at states level of government during downsize new power sharing arrangement. The membership of these institution were doubled beyond what they were before war erupted in Dec/15/2013,

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Attachment (three-3)

The downsized Council of Ministers shall comprise twenty-five (25) ministries as follows:

- 1- Presidential Affairs and National Security
- 2- Cabinet affairs
- 3- Parliamentary Affairs
- 4- Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation (including
- 5- East African Community Affairs)
- 6- Interior
- 7- Finance
- 8- Economic Planning
- 9- Defense and veteran affairs
- 10- Energy and Mining
- 11- Justice and Constitutional Affairs
- 12- Health and Humanitarian Affairs
- 13- Agriculture and forestry
- 14- Animal Resources
- 15- Transport, Roads and Bridges
- 16- Information, Communication Technology and Postal Services
- 17- Higher Education, Science and Technology
- 18- Labor, Public Service and Human Resources Development
- 19- Industry, Commerce and Investment
- 20- Water Resources and Irrigation
- 21- General Education and Instruction
- 22- Environment and climate affairs
- 23- Wildlife Conservation and Tourism
- 24- Social Welfare, Gender and Child Affairs
- 25- Culture, Youth and Sports

Deputy Ministers:

1. Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation
2. Interior
3. Finance and National Economy
4. Defense
5. Agriculture and Animal Resources
6. Labour, Public Service and Human Resources Development
7. Justice and Constitutional Affairs

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Annex 6: Open letter on reunification of SPLM, by former MP, 8 February 2024

President Salva Kiir Mayardit,
J1 Juba,
South Sudan
date 08/02/2024.

Dear President Salva Kiir Mayardit,

Subject: Open Letter on Reunification of SPLM

I hope this letter finds you well. First, I would like to express my appreciation for your efforts in seeking dialogue with the holdout groups to achieve peace in our beloved country. In light of resonating with your clarion call for dialogue, I write to you today to appeal to your good conscience and urge you to prioritise the reunification of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) under the Arusha Agreement.

The reunification of the SPLM is likely to mitigate the crashing situation South Sudan is about to encounter. I believe that our country's current political situation can be likened to a crash-landing scenario with the potential for significant losses and a widening of the social fabric. I am convinced that disintegration due to a crash could be averted by reuniting the files and the ranks of the SPLM. Essentially, reunification could provide a country with a soft landing and pave the way for a brighter future for South Sudan.

During the liberation struggle and the subsequent independence of our nation, we witnessed how the unity of the SPLM facilitated our successes. Furthermore, our country was born against the backdrop of this unity, and it was much stronger during those times. However, since the split within the party, we have experienced a decline in our nation's strength and prosperity. It is disheartening to see civil servants going for months without salaries, a situation that was unheard of before the split that led to political violence.

While it is true that there have been reports of corruption among the leaders of the liberation struggle, the level of corruption has escalated since the split. This has resulted in diplomatic missions, organised forces, and civil service employees suffering due to a lack of public funds to pay their salaries. Consequently, our country has regressed while other nations in the region continue to progress. It is also evident that none of the belligerent parties in the divide has won against the other. However, the result has meant the innocent South Sudanese, expectant of the SPLM promises of the liberation struggle, became the victims of the power struggle between the leaders of the SPLM currently at the different aisles of political divides. You may agree with me, Mr President, that such a victory, if there is any perception of it, in such a situation is not a victory that any well-meaning leader could be proud of because it is a total loss, in my view. And I hope you share this view with me.

Furthermore, we have failed to protect our international borders with Sudan in accordance with international boundaries as of 1956 agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). We have also witnessed the occupation of our borders, previously uncontested, prior to occupation by the neighbouring countries occupying them. These issues have largely gone

unaddressed due to the internal politics and divisions within the SPLM. The SPLM war or splinter factions at both sides of the aisles have not even sought answers from the parties occupying our land but instead, appeased the leaders of foreign countries occupying our land to garner their support. Mr. President, I invite you to reflect on the above assertion and discern for yourself if there is no truth in it. Please, Mr. President, let your country win this conflict, not you!

Our reputation in the international arena has suffered greatly since the split. We have become the recipients of disrespectful comments, and our standing in the global community has hit an all-time low. It is evident that the politics of violence, an escalated level of corruption, and petty division within the SPLM have only caused harm to our nation.

History has shown us that the SPLM, even during its weakest points, had the ability to reunite under the leadership of Dr John Garang. Late Dr Garang demonstrated his level of maturity and selflessness when he put his ego aside for the progress of the liberation struggle. Mr. President, you are now in a similar position. You have the power to put an end to the immaturity and division that the leaders of the SPLM have collectively demonstrated to the world. Reuniting the SPLM would be a significant step towards re-establishing our nation's unity and strength.

Reunification under the Arusha Agreement means reinstating Dr Riek Machar Teny as the deputy chairperson of the SPLM, along with Dr James Wani Igga and Pa'agan Amum Okiech as the Secretary-General of the SPLM and the senior members once exiled reinstated in their respective positions in the party's political bureau. The SPLM may then organise a convention where the party members would decide who holds positions within the party. As the leader of our nation, Mr. President, you could bring your years of sacrifices for our country to a successful and glorious end.

If the SPLM leadership fails to seize the opportunity to reunite the ranks and files of the SPLM, assuming you decided to step aside, even the slightest disagreement over succession would result in a state of anarchy. You would not want that for your legacy! Please, Mr President, put SPLM back together.

Thank you

Sincerely,



Wol Deng Atak,
Former Member of Parliament,
wolatak@gmail.com

Annex 7: SPLM-IO statements on peace agreement violations, and removals and reshuffles of opposition officials

In addition to the statement below by SPLM-IO officials, the Panel has documented additional cases of the removal or reshuffle of opposition officials through presidential decree, including:

- Two national MPs from SSOA in April 2023²⁹²
- Four SPLM-IO officials in Rubkona County, Unity State, in September 2023²⁹³
- Two national SPLM-IO legislators in November 2023²⁹⁴
- Several SPLM-IO officials across four states in January 2024²⁹⁵
- At least one SPLM-IO official in Western Bahr el Ghazal in February 2024²⁹⁶

²⁹² Radio Tamazuji, Kiir revokes appointment of two national MPs, 15 April 2023.

²⁹³ Radio Tamazuji, Kiir fires four SPLM-IO TNLA members, Rubkona County commissioner, 16 Sep 2023. See also, Sudans Post, Kiir revokes appointment of Rubkona commissioner, names replacement, 16 September 2023

²⁹⁴ Radio Tamazuji, TNLA: Kiir revokes appointment of 2 SPLM-IO legislators, names new MPs, 23 November 2023.

²⁹⁵ Radio Tamazuji, Kiir reshuffles SPLM-IO state officials, 30 January 2024.

²⁹⁶ Reports by international observers, February 2024.



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
SPLM (IO)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**



**THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) POLITICAL BUREAU EVALUATION OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROADMAP TO A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC
END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
(R-ARCSS)**

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on 11th September, 2023, in Juba, Republic of South Sudan, marking the Fifth Anniversary of the R-ARCSS, to review and evaluate the status of the implementation of the Roadmap. The Political Bureau consulted reports from the Peace Implementation Mechanisms namely: RJMEC, NCAC, SDSR, CTSAMVM, JDB, JMCC, JTSC, SSM and DDR. The Political Bureau also received reports from the members of SPLM/SPLA(IO) assigned in the R-TGoNU. After extensive deliberations, the Political Bureau observed the following:

I. ON THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ROADMAP

1. **Recalling** that the Roadmap is an extension of the Transitional Period by 24 months in order to complete the then pending tasks in the R-ARCSS;
2. **Mindful** of the fact that the extended Transitional Period ends by 22nd February 2025;
3. **Noting** the stagnation in implementation of the Roadmap as follows:
 - a) Dissemination of the Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS)
 - b) Reconstitution of independent Commissions and Institutions
 - c) Security Arrangements
 - d) Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons
 - e) Conduct of Population Census
 - f) Transitional Justice Mechanisms
 - g) Permanent Constitution Making Process
4. **Reiterating** that R-ARCSS is the only viable option to end political violence in the country as it addresses the root causes of the conflict and provides a system of governance that undertakes transformative reforms and transition to democracy;
5. **Cognizant** that R-ARCSS is to lay the foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous society based on constitutionalism, justice, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law for South Sudan to emerge as a viable state capable of protecting and serving its citizens;
6. **Urging** the parties to abide by and reaffirm their commitments to the implementation of R-ARCSS through the Roadmap which will pave the way for the establishment of a federal and democratic system of governance that reflects the diverse character of the Republic of

*SPLM/SPLA(IO) Political Bureau Evaluation of the Status of Implementation of R-ARCSS
through the Roadmap 11th September 2023*



RMTD

- South Sudan and conduct peaceful, free, fair, transparent and credible elections (60) sixty days before the end of the extended Transitional Period;
7. **Appreciating** the progress in the unification of the Middle Echelon Commands of the unified services of the National Security, Wildlife, Prisons and Civil Defense;
 8. **Concern** of lack of progress in the unification of the Middle Echelon Commands of the Unified Military Forces and Unified Police Service;
 9. **Concern** of the delay of deployment of the graduated Unified Security Forces;
 10. **Urging** for the immediate start of unification and training of phase II of the Military and Other Organized Forces;
 11. **Aware** of the fact that the Roadmap stipulates that elections be conducted as from 22 December 2024, about fifteen months from now, however, the activities related to the conduct of elections have not been budgeted for in the current Financial Year 2023/2024;

In the light of the fact that this is the fifth anniversary of the R-ARCSS, the Political Bureau met and evaluated the implementation of the Roadmap and the findings are as follows:

II. VIOLATIONS OF THE R-ARCSS DURING THE ONE YEAR PERIOD OF THE ROADMAP

The Political Bureau registered during the one (1) year of the implementation of the R-ARCSS since the signing of the Roadmap, the following major incidences of violations have occurred :

1. Unilateral dismissal of the Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs (unresolved);
2. Unilateral swapping of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs with the Ministry of Interior (unresolved);
3. Unilateral dismissal of the Speaker of Jonglei state Assembly (resolved);
4. Unilateral dismissal of the Commissioner of Twic County (resolved);
5. Arbitrary arrest of Commissioner of Tony East County without due process by the Governor of Warrap State (resolved);
6. Arbitrary arrest of SPLM (IO) state member of parliament for distributing SPLM (IO) T-Shirts (resolved);
7. Arbitrary arrest of SPLM (IO) County Secretary of Ikwoto County of Eastern Equatoria State (unresolved);
8. Continuous arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and forced disappearances of members of SPLM/SPLA (IO) (Art. 2.1.10), e.g. arrest and detention of SPLA (IO) four (4) senior officers and two (2) bodyguards in Torit town of Eastern Equatoria state and are currently being detained in Juba (unresolved);
9. Continuous arrest and intimidation of SPLM (IO) members in Warrap and Northern Bahr El Ghazal States (unresolved);
10. Refusal of participation of SPLM/SPLA (IO) and other parties in the governments of the three Administrative Areas (Art. 1.16.2 read together with Article 162(1) (a) of the Constitutional Amendment Act No. 7, 2020 and Article 164(1) of the Constitutional Amendment Act No. 8, 2021) and in the Agreement on structures and allocation of responsibility sharing in the three Administrative Areas in accordance with R-ARCSS (January 18th, 2021) (unresolved);
11. Delay in the formation of County and Municipal Legislative Councils (unresolved);

2



12. Encouraging hostile propaganda and hate speeches against SPLM/SPLA (IO) and its leadership using state media (Art. 2.1.10) (unresolved);
13. Lack of political space and civil liberties manifested by continuous obstruction of other parties from freely assembling and holding public meetings (Art. 2.1.10) (unresolved);
14. Obstruction and denial of freedom of movement of the leaders of SPLM/SPLA (IO), including the Chairman and Commander-In-Chief (unresolved);
15. Continuous harassment, arrest and detention of media personnel, civil society, etc. (Art. 2.1.10) (unresolved);
16. Denying SPLM/SPLA (IO) forces from joining cantonment and training in Pantitit Training Center in Northern Bahr El Ghazal State (unresolved);
17. Refusal to discuss the proposal by the Chair of IGAD (the Sudan) to resolve the above mentioned issues.

III. STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ROADMAP

Chapter I: Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU)

The following pending tasks are not yet implemented:

1. Dissemination of the R-ARCSS to the people of South Sudan (Art. 1.4.3.1).
2. Process of national reconciliation and healing (Art. 1.4.3.3).
3. Security Arrangements activities not completed (Art. 1.4.3.4).
4. Reviewing and drafting of the necessary bills not completed (Art. 1.4.3.6).
5. Devolution of powers and resources to the lower levels of government (Art. 1.4.3.7).
6. Failure to establish Pre-transitional Period Implementation Fund (Art. 1.4.8.).
7. The NCAC has not completed review and amendment of laws and legislation relevant for the implementation of the Agreement due to lack of support for the national members;
8. Lack of financial support of national members in CTSAMVM, DDR, SDSR, JDB, JTSC, JMCC, SSM, JRC, and medical doctors and trainers in the training centers;
9. Failure to reconstitute the governments of the three Administrative Areas in violation of (Art. 1.16.2 read together with Article 162(1) (a) of the Constitutional Amendment No. 7 Act, 2020 and Article 164(1) of the Constitutional Amendment No. 8 Act, 2021) and the Agreement (January 18th, 2021) on Structures and Allocation of Responsibility Sharing in the three Administrative Areas in accordance with R-ARCSS;
10. Failure to reconstitute national independent Commissions and other independent institutions (61 in number including those institutions mentioned in other chapters);
11. Failure to establish local government councils. As of today, the Government of Central Equatoria State is the only state that has completed on 23rd February 2022 establishment of its local government councils;
12. Reinstatement of civil servants who fled the country during the war. Not done.
13. Participation of members of other parties in the foreign service. Not done.
14. Appointment of Undersecretaries and Directors General at the National and State level respectively without recommendation from the concerned ministers (Art. 1.6.2.5).
15. The Constitutional Court is not yet established (Art. 1.17.7).
16. The Political Parties Council has not been reconstituted (Art 1.20.2).
17. National Elections Act, 2012 has not been enacted (Art. 1.20.3).

3



Political Bureau Evaluation of the Status of Implementation of R-ARCSS through the Roadmap 11th September 2023

18. The National Elections Commission not reconstituted (Art. 1.20.4).
19. National Elections to be conducted sixty (60) days prior to the end of Transitional Period in accordance with the Permanent Constitution (Art. 1.20.5).
20. R-TGoNU has not addressed the challenges of reconstruction, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of IDPs and returnees as critical factors affecting peacebuilding and elections (Art. 1.20.7).

Chapter II: Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA)

1. The unification of Middle Echelon Commands of the Unified Forces, not completed.
2. Deployment of Phase I of the Unified Forces not done.
3. Cantonment, Screening, Unification of forces of Phase II not started;
4. Funding of the security mechanisms' activities is inadequate and not consistent.
5. NTC is not functioning, it has not met for the one year period of the Roadmap;
6. Due to lack of funding, DDR has not established any of the 8 Transition Facilities/Centers and, therefore, is unable to implement its mandate.

Chapter III: Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction

1. Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF), not established (Art. 3.2).
2. Board of the Special Reconstruction Fund (BSRF), not established (Art. 3.2.1);
3. R-TGoNU has not provided the SRF with initial funding of not less than USD 100 million per annum. (Art. 3.2.7);
4. The IGAD, Troika, China, African Union, United Nations, European Union, World Bank, IGAD Partners Forum and African Development Bank have not nominated their respective members to BSRF (Art. 3.2.5-13);
5. The international community within BSRF has failed to appoint the chairperson of BSRF (Art. 3.2.3-4);
6. South Sudan Pledging Conference has not been convened. Responsible bodies are: BSRF Chairperson, Chairperson of IGAD, Chairperson of African Union Commission and Secretary General of the United Nations (Art. 3.2.8).
7. IDPs and refugees have not been repatriated, resettled, reintegrated and rehabilitated (Art. 3.1.1.2, 3.1.1.5 and 3.1.2.1).
8. Non-Governmental Organizations Act 2016 was reviewed by NCAC but not enacted (Art. 3.1.2.5).

Chapter IV: Resource, Economic and Financial Management

The following new institutions are yet to be established:

1. Economic and Financial Management Authority - EFMA (Art. 4.16.1).
2. Board of Economic and Financial Management Authority (Art. 4.16.2).
3. EFMA Advisory Committee (Art. 4.16.5).
4. Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Authority (Art. 4.6.1.1).
5. Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Art. 4.6.1.2).
6. Environmental Management Authority (EMA) (Art. 4.6.1.3).

4



SPLM/SPLA(10) Political Bureau Evaluation of the Status of Implementation of R-ARCSS through the Roadmap 11th September 2023

7. Research and Development Center for Natural Disasters (Art. 4.6.1.4)
8. Research and Development Center for Strategic Studies (Art. 4.6.1.4)
9. Development Center for Scientific Research (Art. 4.6.1.4)
10. Health Care Support Fund (Art. 4.6.1.5)
11. Students Support Fund (Art. 4.6.1.6)
12. Youth Enterprise Development Fund (Art. 4.15.1.4)
13. Women Enterprise Development Fund (Art. 4.15.1.5)
14. Micro-finance Institutions (Art. 4.15.1.6)
15. Social Security Fund (Art. 4.15.1.8)
16. Oil Stabilization Account (Art. 4.8.1.11)
17. Future Generations' Fund (Art. 4.8.1.11)

The following institutions have not been restructured and reconstituted:

1. Bank of South Sudan (Art. 4.2.1).
2. The National Audit Chamber (Art. 4.5).
3. Anti-Corruption Commission (Art. 4.4).
4. Fiscal and Financial Allocation Monitoring Commission (Art. 4.11.2).
5. National Petroleum and Gas Commission (Art. 4.8.1.14.14).
6. National Petroleum and Gas Corporation (NilePet) (Art. 4.8.1.14.14).
7. National Revenue Authority (Art. 4.10.1.4)
8. Constituency Development Fund (4.3.1.5)

The following national legislation, inter alia, have not been reviewed:

1. Investment Promotion Act, 2009 (Art. 4.7.1.1).
2. Telecommunication and Postal Service Act, 2016 (Art. 4.7.1.3).
3. The Transport Act, 2008 (Art. 4.7.1.4).
4. Petroleum Revenue Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.8).
5. The Mining Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.9).
6. Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.10).
7. National Pensions Fund Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.11).
8. National Revenue Authority Act, 2017 (Art. 4.7.1.12).
9. Land Act, 2008 (Art. 4.8.2.1.1).
10. Code of Ethics and Integrity of Public Officials (Art. 4.1.3).

Failure to establish and reconstitute the institutions mentioned above as well as non-devolution of powers and resources to the states and counties (Art. 4.1.6 and 4.1.5) defeats the mandate of the R-TGoNU to reform South Sudan's economic and public sector (Art. 4.14.10) and is tantamount to non-implementation of critical tasks of R-ARCSS.


Chapter V: Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing

The following institutions have not been established:

1. Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) (Art. 5.1.1.1 and 5.2).
2. Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) (Art. 5.1.1.2 and 5.3).
3. Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) (Art. 5.1.1.3 and 5.4).

5

*SPLM/SPLA(IO) Political Bureau Evaluation of the Status of Implementation of R-ARCSS
through the Roadmap 11th September 2023*



4. Compensation and Reparation Fund (CRF) (Art. 5.4.2.5).

The AU Commission has failed to establish the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) (Art. 5.3.1.1).

Chapter VI: Parameters of Permanent Constitution

The following institutions and processes have not been done or pending:

1. National Constitutional Review Commission (Art. 6.6).
2. National Constitutional Conference (Art. 6.6).
3. Preparatory Sub-Committee (Art. 6.6).
4. Constitutional Drafting Committee (Art. 6.9).
5. Constituent Assembly (Art. 6.5 and 6.11).
6. Amendment of the National Elections Act 2012 as amended (Art. 1.20.6) and reconstitution of National Elections Commission accordingly.
7. The constitution making process is envisaged to be completed not later than 24 months following the establishment of the Transitional Period and shall be in place to guide the elections toward the end of the Transition (Art. 6.5).
8. National Elections to be conducted sixty (60) days prior to the end of Transitional Period in accordance with the Permanent Constitution (Art. 1.20.5).

Chapter VII: Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC)

Article 7.3 provides for IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in consultation with IGAD-Plus Partners to appoint a prominent African personality to chair RJMEC. SPLM/SPLA (IO), therefore, urges IGAD to confirm or appoint the Chairperson of RJMEC.

IV. THE WAY FORWARD

Given the fact that the above mentioned activities are not implemented or pending, we urge the Parties, Stakeholders and Guarantors to the Agreement to fast track full implementation of the Agreement through the Roadmap for the remaining duration in order to conduct peaceful, free, fair and credible elections on time.

Signed,






Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, PhD
Chairman and Commander-In-Chief, SPLM/SPLA(IO), and The First Vice President of the Republic.
11th September 2023

6

SPLM/SPLA(IO) Political Bureau Evaluation of the Status of Implementation of R-ARCSS through the Roadmap 11th September 2023



Annex 7 (cont.): SPLM-IO statement on violations of the peace agreement, 6 December 2023



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
SPLM (IO)
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN**

Date: 06/12/2023

PRESS STATEMENT


**ON THE OCCASION OF THE END OF THE SECOND SESSION OF
PARLIAMENT, 2023 AND THE CONTINUOUS VIOLATIONS OF
THE AGREEMENT (R-ARCSS) IN THE TRANSITIONAL
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (TNLA) AND THE
STALEMATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS**

The SPLM-IO Parliamentary Caucus of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States would like to update the general public, the Parties to the Agreement, the R-JMEC, the IGAD, Partners and the Guarantors at the end of the second Session of Parliament, 2023 on the continuous violation of the R-ARCSS by the SPLM-IG in and through the TNLA and the Stalemate in the Peace process in the Republic of South Sudan.

Firstly, we are saddened and disappointed to inform the General Public of the unilateral decision by the SPLM-IG to renege from the decision of the principals to the Agreement, the Parties, Stakeholders, Council of Ministers, resolving the outstanding issue of Sections 54 and 55 of the National Security Act 2014 (Amendment Bill, 2023) which unconstitutionally arrogated *powers to arrest and detain suspects without trials by the National Security Service*. A decision was reached on the 3rd March 2023 by the two principals to repeal the said Sections pursuant to the Constitutional requirements of Article 159 (e) which states that, “*the National Security shall be professional and its mandates shall focus on information gathering, analysis and advice to the relevant authorities*” and consequently, to the legal advice of the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs who is also the legal advisor and the Attorney General of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.

We would like to note and highlight that, the decision to repeal Sections 54 and 55 of the National Security Service Bill was formally communicated to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 28th April 2023 by Hon. Justice Reuben Madol Arol, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs who reported to the TNLA that, “**This issue was solved by the leadership of the Parties subsequently the Council of Ministers also resolved it in its regular meeting No. 5, 2023 held on Friday 24th**”

Page 1 of 4



March 2023 abolished the power of the National Security to arrest or detain with or without warrant” and subsequently adopted by the TNLA in the First and Second Reading Stages. The National Security Service Act 2014 (Amendment Bill, 2023) has stalled in the Third Reading Stage due to insistence by the SPLM-IG to retain Sections 54 and 55.

The decision to renege on the resolution on Sections 54 and 55 of the Bill therefore not only tantamount to the violation of the Agreement but also undermines the security sector reforms towards democratic governance in the Republic of South Sudan. It implies the SPLM-IG is determined to continue using the National Security Service as a coercive paramilitary force to restrict Political space, civil liberty through intimidation, arrest, trial and detention of citizens with impunity contrary to the Constitution.

The Parliament was expected to proceed with the enactment of the National Security Service Bill as such, pursuant to Articles 1.18.2 of the R-ARCSS in its **Third Reading Stage** in order to reform and bring its provision into conformity with the Agreement, the Constitution and best practices. By overturning the decision of the Parties and Stakeholders to the Agreement, the SPLM-IG has unequivocally derailed the TNLA from its Transitional Mandates under Articles 1.14.7 and 1.14.8 which states that, *“the functions and mandates of the TNLA shall remain as stipulated in the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan as amended unless otherwise specified by the terms of this Agreement...”*, *“ the reconstituted TNLA shall, in the conduct of its business support this Agreement and enact legislation that enables and assist the Transitional Processes and reform described in this Agreement”*.

In light of the above development, the SPLM-IO Parliamentary Caucus condemns in no uncertain terms the continuous violation of the Agreement and disregard of the resolutions to repeal Sections 54 and 55 of the National Security Service Amendment Bill. We urge the principals to the Agreement, R-JMEC and the Guarantors to intervene and resolve this matter as soon as possible to restore the function and roles of the TNLA.

Furthermore, we would like to register the following difficulties in the implementation of the Peace Agreement which has entered into its final year of the *Agreement on the Roadmap to a Peaceful and Democratic end of the Transitional Period of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)*:

1. We have encountered resistance in the amendment of the Political Parties Act 2012 to make it democratic and create a platform for multiparty political system in the Republic of South Sudan.
2. We have encountered resistance in the amendment the National Elections Act 2012 to ensure the conduct of democratic, free, fair and credible elections in the Republic of South Sudan.



3. We have encountered resistance in the allocation of budget for Peace Implementation in the FY 2022/2023 and FY 2023/2024 for the following critical institutions and mechanism relevant to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in the Republic of South Sudan:
 - a. National Election Commissions (NEC)
 - b. National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC)
 - c. Political Parties Council (PPC)
 - d. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
 - e. Security Arrangement Mechanisms (JDB, JMCC, JTSC, SDSR, NCAC, CTC, CTSAMVM and DDR, etc)
 - f. Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF), Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of IDPs.
 - g. Transitional Justice Mechanisms;
 - Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS)
 - Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH)
 - Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA)
4. We continue to encounter mismanagement of public resources as follows:
 - a. Lack of transparency in the production, sale and the management of oil revenues. There is no definite figures of the amount of crude oil produced per day, the revenue generated thereof and how these revenues are appropriated to various spending agencies of government and services for the people.
 - b. Misappropriation of public resources by financing the Secretariat and political activities of the SPLM-IG
 - c. Lack of funds for the accountability institutions including the National Audit Chamber and Anti-corruption Commission. This has crippled these institutions from executing their constitutional mandates leading to widespread impunity and corruption in the government.
 - d. Lack of budget discipline and reforms aggravating the poor living condition of public servants including low salaries and delays/lack of payments to institutions.
5. We continue to encounter the lack of Political Space and Civil liberty throughout the country and consequently;
 - a. Continuous restriction on the freedom of movement within and outside the country on the First Vice President and Chairman and Commander-In-Chief of the SPLM/A-IO.
 - b. Rejection of members of our Party from participating in the three Administrative Areas of Pibor, Ruweng and Abyei.
 - c. Dismissal and swapping of SPLM-IO Constitutional Post holders and positions in the government at the National, State and Local government levels in contravention of the Power sharing agreement of the R-ARCSS.
6. We continue to encounter State-sponsored violence and inter-communal conflict in our constituencies as a result of incentivized defections of our Political and Military personnel.



7. The lack of progress in the peace process and stalemate in the Rome talks under the auspices of saint Egidio presents further insecurity and lack of stability in the Country.

In light of the above critical challenges facing the implementation of the Peace Agreement, particularly in its final year of the Transitional Period, the SPLM-IO Parliamentary Caucus urges the principals and the Parties to the Agreement, R-JMEC, the office of the Special Envoy (OSE) and the Guarantors (IGAD, TROIKA, AU, EU, UN, CHINA) to intervene and ensure the foregoing critical outstanding issues and tasks pertaining to the peace process in the Republic of South Sudan are addressed without further delay.

Oy Nathaniel

Sign.....
Rt. Honorable Oyeth Nathaniel Pierino
First Deputy Speaker of the JPLA and SPLM-IO Deputy Chairman
Juba
RSS



Annex 8: SPLM-IO position paper on elections, 13 February 2024





H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit
President,
Republic of South Sudan

Re: The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on The Implementation of The "Roadmap To A Peaceful And Democratic End Of The Transitional Period Of The Agreement On The Resolution Of The Conflict In The Republic Of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)" And The Way Forward

I am forwarding to your Excellency the position of SPLM/SPLA(IO) entitled above. The SPLM/SPLA(IO) reviewed and evaluated the status of the implementation of the Agreement through the Roadmap timelines, outlined the fundamental milestones achieved, the prerequisites for conducting the elections and required timelines for implementation of pending tasks of the R-ARCSS and prerequisites.

I am also forwarding this position to others including the Peace Agreement Partners, and IGAD Guarantors.

Yours truly,



Riek Machar Teny-Dongon, PhD
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/SPLA (IO) and The First Vice President of the Republic

February 13, 2024

CC

1. R-ARCSS Partners
2. Interim Chairman of RJMEC
3. IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan
4. IGAD R-ARCSS Guarantors
5. AU Representative
6. CS Representative
7. TROIKA
8. EU Representative



SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
SPLM (IO)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS



THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) POSITION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "ROADMAP TO A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN (R-ARCSS)" AND THE WAY FORWARD

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on 13th February, 2024, in Juba, Republic of South Sudan to evaluate the prospects for conducting elections by December, 2024. The Political Bureau reviewed and evaluated the status of the implementation of the Agreement through the Roadmap timelines and consulted reports of the Peace Implementation Mechanisms namely: RJMEC, NCAC, SDSRB, CTSAMVM, JDB, JMCC, JTSC, SSM and DDR and also reports from the members of SPLM/SPLA(IO) assigned in the R-TGoNU. After extensive deliberations, the Political Bureau observed the following:

I. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ROADMAP

1. **Recalling** that the Road-map is an extension of the Transitional Period by 24 months in order to complete, before 22nd December, 2024, the pending tasks in the implementation of the R-ARCSS to ensure a peaceful and democratic end of the Transitional Period by 22nd February, 2025, in order to usher in a new political dispensation in the country;
2. **Underscoring** the fact that the following fundamental milestones in the implementation of the R-ARCSS have been achieved, including;
 - a) Establishment of the major institutions of R-TGoNU at the National, State and Local Government levels.
 - b) Ongoing Security Arrangements Implementation i.e the Permanent Ceasefire, Cantonment, Training, Graduation and Deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), (Phase I).
 - c) Review and enactment of the Constitutional Amendment Bills and some key reform legislations.
 - d) Opening up humanitarian corridors for humanitarian access and intervention all over South Sudan including receiving some returnees and refugees from the neighboring countries.
 - e) Conducting Transitional Justice Mechanism Conference aimed at establishing the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) and the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS).
 - f) Reviving the oil production in GPOC and SPOC oilfields.

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on The Implementation of The Roadmap: Political Bureau Meeting on 13th February 2024

RMTD

- g) Introduction of major reforms in the oil sector such as Cost Recovery Audit, Environmental Audit, Unified Human Resource Policy Manual and Local Content Regulations.
 - h) Conducting of National Economic Conference aimed at ushering in economic reforms including establishing of relevant institutions such as the Economic and Financial Management Authority (EFMA) and its Board (BEFMA) led by the President of the Republic.
 - i) Reconstitution of important democratic institutions such as the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), the Political Parties Council (PPC) and the National Election Commission (NEC) marking the commencement of political transition and reform processes.
 - j) Engaging the hold-out groups through the Rome Talks in order to achieve Sustainable Peace throughout the country and Inclusive Elections.
3. **Noting** that the prerequisites for conducting peaceful, transparent, democratic, free, fair and credible elections at the end of the transition in the Republic of South Sudan have not yet been fully implemented, namely;
- a) Completion of Security Arrangements (Phase I and Phase II)
 - b) Permanent Constitution Making Process
 - c) Conduct of Population Census
 - d) Judicial Reforms
 - e) Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons
 - f) Transitional Justice Mechanisms (CTRH, CRA and Hybrid Court)
 - g) Dissemination of the Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS)
 - h) Reconstitution of other independent Commissions and Institutions
 - i) Pre-elections activities
 - j) Political and civic space
4. **Reiterating** that the implementation of the R-ARCSS is the only viable means to end political violence and the cycle of political transitions in the country, as the R-ARCSS addresses the root causes of the conflict and provides a federal system of governance that undertakes transformative reforms in a multi-party democracy;
5. **Cognizant** that the R-ARCSS is to lay the foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous society based on constitutionalism, justice, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law, for South Sudan to emerge as a viable state capable of protecting and serving its citizens;
6. **Concerned** of the fact that the Road-map comes to an end in twelve months without the pending tasks and the critical prerequisites for elections mentioned above being fully implemented.

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Furthermore, the Political Bureau evaluated the implementation of the Road-map and the findings are as follows:

II. VIOLATIONS OF THE R-ARCSS DURING THE ROADMAP

The Political Bureau registered during the implementation of the R-ARCSS since the signing of the Road-map the following unresolved major incidences of violations:

1. Taking over of the SPLM-IO allocated Ministry of Petroleum by the SPLM-IG through the Republican Order No.3/2024, stripping the Minister of his powers and arrogating the same to the Undersecretary and the Director General of Petroleum Authority.
2. Continuous harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and forced disappearances of members of SPLM/SPLA (IO) in the States (Art. 2.1.10). For example, the continued arrest and detention of SPLA (IO) four senior officers and two bodyguards in Torit town of Eastern Equatoria State and have been in detention for over a year in Juba without trial;
3. Denial of participation of SPLM/SPLA (IO) and other parties in the governments of the three Administrative Areas (Art. 1.16.2 read together with Article 162(1) (a) of the Constitutional Amendment Act No. 7, 2020 and Article 164(1) of the Constitutional Amendment Act No. 8, 2021) and in the Agreement on structures and allocation of responsibility sharing in the three Administrative Areas in accordance with R-ARCSS (January 18th, 2021);
4. Encouraging hostile propaganda and hate speeches against the SPLM/SPLA (IO) and its leadership using state media (Art. 2.1.10);
5. Lack of political space and civil liberties manifested by continuous obstruction of other parties from freely assembling and holding public meetings and rallies (Art. 2.1.10);
6. Showing hostility to and attacking the R-ARCSS and its institutions publicly in the State media. For example, public statements by senior SPLM-IG political leaders referring to the R-ARCSS as neither the Bible nor the Quran.
7. Obstruction and denial of freedom of movement of the leaders of SPLM/SPLA (IO), including the Chairman and Commander-In-Chief;
8. Continuous harassment, arrest and detention of media personnel, civil society, etc. (Art. 2.1.10);

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The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on the Implementation of The Roadmap: Political Bureau Meeting on 13th February 2024

9. Encouraging and incentivizing military defections and receiving the defectors officially at the SPLM-IG Party Headquarters by its senior party leaders as well as broadcasting the event on the state-owned media.
10. Renewed attacks on the SPLA-IO assembly areas and cantonments in Unity (Nyuel-Nyuel of Rupkotna County), Central Equatoria (Kawori and Namurle in Terakeka County)
11. Creation of parallel structures outside the agreed structures in the Military (Assistant Chief of Defense Forces for Procurement), Police (splitting the Training Department into Training and Human Resource Development Departments, Social Welfare Department into Social Welfare and Investment Departments) and National Security (splitting the offices of the deputies for Internal Security Bureau and General Intelligence Bureau, each into two deputies, for Operation, and Administration and Finance.)
12. Failure to adhere to the implementation matrix of the R-ARCSS Road-map timelines.
13. Refusal to pass the National Security Act, 2014 (Amendment) Bill 2022, (Art. 1.18.1.2) despite the consensus reached in the NCAC, Council of Ministers and the two Principals.

III. STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R-ARCSS ROADMAP

Chapter I: Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU)

The following pending tasks are not yet implemented:

1. Dissemination of the R-ARCSS to the people of South Sudan (Art. 1.4.3.1).
2. Process of national reconciliation and healing (Art. 1.4.3.3)
3. Security Arrangements activities have not yet been completed (Art. 1.4.3.4). Given resources, this task can be completed within 8 months.
4. Devolution of powers and resources to the lower levels of government (Art. 1.2.15), (Art. 1.4.3.7), (Art 4.1.6) and (Art. 4.11.4). The parties to the Agreement to negotiate and implement this provision within 3 months.
5. Lack of financial support of national members in CTSAMVM, DDR, SDSRB, JDB, JTSC, JMCC, SSM, JRC, NCAC and medical doctors and trainers in the training centers (there should be a clear budget for such activities);
6. Failure to reconstitute the governments of the three Administrative Areas in violation of (Art. 1.16.2 read together with Article 162(1) (a) of the Constitutional Amendment No. 7 Act, 2020 and Article 164(1) of the Constitutional Amendment No. 8, Act 2021) and the Agreement (January 18th, 2021) on Structures and Allocation of Responsibility Sharing in the three Administrative Areas in accordance with the R-ARCSS (this requires political will only and can be done within a week);
7. Failure to reconstitute national independent Commissions and other independent institutions (58 in number including those institutions mentioned in other chapters)



- except the NCRC, NEC and PPC (this also requires political will and can be done within one week).
8. Reinstatement of civil servants who fled the country during the war (this can also be done within 3 months).
 9. Participation of members of other parties in the Foreign Service (this should take 2 weeks).
 10. Appointment of Undersecretaries and Directors General at the National and State levels respectively without recommendation from the concerned ministers (Art. 1.6.2.5) (this can be done within 1 month).
 11. The Constitutional Court is not yet established (Art. 1.17.7) (expedite the enactment of the law and the subsequent formation of the Constitutional Court within 3 months).
 12. R-TGoNU has not addressed the challenges of reconstruction, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of IDPs and returnees as critical factors affecting peacebuilding and elections (Art. 1.20.7) (this process can be completed within 8 months).
 13. Continuous forceful occupation of houses of war displaced victims which has made them continue to remain in the POCs (the identification and evacuation of such houses can be done within 3 months).
 14. The National Security Act, 2014 (Art. 1.18.1.2) has not yet been amended to conform with the Agreement (this can be done within one week)

Chapter II: Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA)

1. The unification of Middle Echelon Commands of the Unified Forces has not been completed (this can be done within 1 month).
2. Delay in the deployment of Phase I of the Unified Forces (this can be finished within 1 month).
3. Cantonment, Screening, Unification of forces of Phase II has not started (this can be completed within 8 months);
4. Funding of the security mechanisms' activities is inadequate and not consistent (they should be clearly budgeted for).
5. NTC has no separate budget for its activities and therefore inadequately financed (clear budget is required).
6. Due to lack of funding, DDR has not established any of the 8 Transition Facilities/Centers and, therefore, is unable to implement its mandate (provide funds for DDR to execute its mandate within 8 months).

Chapter III: Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction

1. Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF), not established (Art. 3.2) (enact legislation and establish it within 3 months).
2. Board of the Special Reconstruction Fund (BSRF), not established (Art. 3.2.1) (can be put in place one month after the establishment of the SRF);

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The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on the Implementation of The Roadmap: Political Bureau Meeting on 13th February 2024

RMTS
5



3. R-TGoNU has not provided the SRF with the initial funding of not less than USD 100 million per annum. (Art.3.2.7) (should be included in the next Financial Year 2024/2025 budget);
4. The IGAD, Troika, China, African Union, United Nations, European Union, World Bank, IGAD Partners Forum and African Development Bank have not nominated their respective members to BSRF (Art. 3.2.5-13);
5. The international community within BSRF has not appointed the chairperson of BSRF (Art. 3.2.3-4);
6. South Sudan Pledging Conference has not been convened. Responsible bodies are: BSRF Chairperson, Chairperson of IGAD, Chairperson of African Union Commission and Secretary General of the United Nations (Art.3.2.8).
7. IDPs and refugees have not been repatriated, resettled, reintegrated and rehabilitated (Art. 3.1.1.2, 3.1.1.5 and 3.1.2.1) (this should be completed within 8 months).
8. Non-Governmental Organizations Act 2016 was reviewed by NCAC but not yet enacted (Art 3.1.2.5) (this can be completed within 1 month).

Chapter IV: Resource, Economic and Financial Management

The following new institutions are yet to be established:


1. Economic and Financial Management Authority (EFMA) (Art. 4.16.1).
2. Board of Economic and Financial Management Authority (BEFMA) (Art. 4.16.2).
3. EFMA Advisory Committee (Art. 4.16.5).
4. Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Authority (Art. 4.6.1.1).
5. Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Art. 4.6.1.2).
6. Environmental Management Authority (EMA) (Art. 4.6.1.3).
7. Research and Development Center for Natural Disasters (Art. 4.6.1.4)
8. Research and Development Center for Strategic Studies (Art. 4.6.1.4):
9. Development Center for Scientific Research (Art. 4.6.1.4):
10. Health Care Support Fund (Art. 4.6.1.5).
11. Students Support Fund (Art. 4.6.1.6).
12. Youth Enterprise Development Fund (Art. 4.15.1.4).
13. Women Enterprise Development Fund (Art. 4.15.1.5).
14. Micro-finance Institutions (Art. 4.15.1.6).
15. Social Security Fund (Art. 4.15.1.8).
16. Oil Stabilization Account (Art. 4.8.1.11).
17. Future Generations' Fund (Art. 4.8.1.11).

All the above-mentioned institutions can be established within the next 6 months.

The following institutions have not been restructured and reconstituted:

1. Bank of South Sudan (Art. 4.2.1).
2. The National Audit Chamber (Art. 4.5).
3. Anti-Corruption Commission (Art. 4.4).
4. Fiscal and Financial Allocation Monitoring Commission (Art. 4.11.2).

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on the Implementation of The Roadmap: Political Bureau Meeting on 13th February 2024



5. National Petroleum and Gas Commission (Art. 4.8.1.14.14).
6. National Petroleum and Gas Corporation (NilePet) (Art. 4.8.1.14.14).
7. National Revenue Authority (Art. 4.10.1.4)
8. Constituency Development Fund (4.3.1.5)

The restructuring and reconstitution of the aforementioned institutions can be done within 2 months.

The following national legislations, inter alia, have not been amended;

1. Investment Promotion Act, 2009 (Art. 4.7.1.1).
2. Telecommunication and Postal Service Act, 2016 (Art. 4.7.1.3).
3. The Transport Act, 2008 (Art. 4.7.1.4).
4. Petroleum Revenue Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.8).
5. The Mining Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.9).
6. Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.10).
7. National Pensions Fund Act, 2012 (Art. 4.7.1.11).
8. Land Act, 2008 (Art. 4.8.2.1.1).
9. Code of Ethics and Integrity of Public Officials (Art. 4.1.3).

The enactment of the legislations above can be completed within 3 months.

In summary, no reforms in the economic sector have been done due to failure to establish and reconstitute the institutions mentioned above as well as non-devolution of powers and resources to the states and counties (Art. 4.1.6 and 4.1.5). This defeats the mandate of the R-TGoNU to reform South Sudan's economic and public sector (Art. 4.14.10) and is tantamount to non-implementation of critical tasks of the R-ARCSS.

Chapter V: Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing

The following institutions have not been established:

1. Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) (Art. 5.1.1.1 and 5.2) (since the required law has been enacted, the Commission can be formed within 1 month. The work of CTRH transcends the Transitional Period, 6 years according to the Act).
2. Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) (Art. 5.1.1.2 and 5.3) (the A.U to provide the guidelines for the legislation within 3 months. The work of the Hybrid Court goes beyond the Transitional Period provided that the process has been started).
3. Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) (Art. 5.1.1.3 and 5.4) (works concurrently with the CTRH).
4. Compensation and Reparation Fund (CRF) (Art. 5.4.2.5) (Works concurrently with CRA and CTRH).

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The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on the Implementation of the Roadmap: Political Bureau Meeting on 13th February 2024

RMTD
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The AU Commission is urged to provide the required guidelines for legislation of the Act establishing the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) (Art. 5.3.1.1).

Chapter VI: Parameters of Permanent Constitution

The following institutions and processes have not been done or are still pending (Art.1.25 and Art. 1.20.5, Art. 6.1, Articles 6.4 and 6.5):

1. National Constitutional Conference (Art. 6.6).
2. Preparatory Sub-Committee (Art. 6.6).
3. Constitutional Drafting Committee (Art. 6.9).
4. Constituent Assembly (Art. 6.5 and 6.11).
5. Amendment of the National Elections Act 2012 as amended, 2023 (Art. 1.20.6) and reconstitution of National Elections Commission accordingly.
6. The constitution making process is envisaged to be completed not later than 24 months following the establishment of the Transitional Period and shall be in place to guide the elections toward the end of the Transition (Articles 6.4 and 6.5).
7. National Elections to be conducted sixty (60) days prior to the end of Transitional Period in accordance with the Permanent Constitution (Art. 1.20.5).

IV. Other Matters of National Concern That Affect the Peace Process

1. Prevalence of Sub-national Violence among communities, and organized forces versus the communities, namely in Warrap State, Abyei Administrative Area, Western Bhar-El-Ghazal State, Pibor Administrative Area, Jonglei State, Upper Nile State, Lakes State, Eastern Equatoria State, Western Equatoria State, Central Equatoria State and Unity State.
2. Lack of transparency in the use of oil money.
3. The Rome Talks with the hold-out groups.
4. The conflict in the Sudan.
5. The impact of Climate Change.

There is a need to discuss these foregoing issues as they affect the Peace Implementation and the conduct of elections in South Sudan.

V. The Way Forward

In light of the above, the timelines for critical tasks that are prerequisites to the conduct of elections are as follows;

- a) Completion of Security Arrangements (Phase I and Phase II) (to be completed within 8 months);
- b) Permanent Constitution Making Process (to be completed within 24 months);
- c) Conduct of Population Census (to be carried out within 16 months);
- d) Judicial Reforms (to be completed within 8 months);

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Position on the Implementation of The Roadmap: Political Bureau Meeting on 13th February 2024

RMTD



- e) Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons (to be completed within 8 months);
- f) Transitional Justice Mechanisms (CTRH, CRA and Hybrid Court) (must be established within 4 months from now but their activities will transcend the Transitional Period);
- g) Dissemination of the Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) (to be completed within 6 months);
- h) Reconstitution of independent Commissions and Institutions (to be completed within 1 month); and
- i) Pre-elections activities (require a minimum of 11 months especially voter registration).

Given the above-mentioned prerequisites, it is the Constitution Making Process which has the longest timeline that will determine the end of the Transitional Period and the other concurrent activities including setting the time for elections. In the light of this, it is imperative that the parties to the Agreement must dialogue among themselves in order to chart the way forward to allow for the implementation of these critical activities that are extremely important for peaceful and democratic end of the transition.

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) reiterates its full commitment to the implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable option for peaceful and democratic transition.


Signed,


Riek Machar Teny-Dhungor, PhD
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/SPLA(IO), and The First Vice President of the Republic.



13th February, 2024.

Annex 9: SPLM-IO statement on attack on SPLA-IO spokesperson, 21 February 2024




plots within the National Security Services and the Military Intelligence Unit of the SSPDF to temper with my personal security, and security of my offices and facilities. Consequently, there have been a number of incidences of harassment of my office staff and bodyguards, arrest and detention, vehicles seizures and searches, and disarmament just to humiliate and intimidate my office. This is displaying the highest level of hostilities in violation of the Cessation of Hostilities' Agreement (CoHA) signed in 2017, and therefore threatening the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement (PCA) signed in 2018.

Furthermore, over the past few months, there have been increase in military activities and build-ups in and around Juba and other parts of the country with clear intentions of violating the Permanent Ceasefire. While we have managed to foil some violations, others have gone under the bridge. The SSPDF has committed more violations of Security Arrangements in Nyuel-nyuel of Rubkotna County of Unity State, Nasir County of Upper Nile state, Kowari and Namurle payams of Terekeka County of Central Equatoria state, we are also getting reliable information that there are plans to attack and destabilize SPLA-IO Cantonments of Wuniliet (CES), Aswa (EES) and Irube (EES) respectively.

In light of the above violations and hostilities, I am writing to report this critical and unfortunate incident and developments which is threatening the very foundation of the Peace Agreement, as such, reversing the critical milestones we have so far achieved since 12 September 2018.

I would like to reiterate to your Excellency our unwavering commitment to the R-ARCSS and its implementation.

Yours sincerely,



Rt. Hon. Oyet Nathaniel Pierino
Deputy Chairman of the SPLM/SPLA-IO &
First Deputy Speaker -TNLA



Cc. Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon,
Chairman and Commander-In-Chief, SPLM/SPLA-IO
Cc. Dr. Ismail Wais, OSE
Cc. RJMEC
Cc. JDB
Cc. File

Annex 10: SSOA position paper on elections, February 2024



SOUTH SUDAN OPPOSITION ALLIANCE (SSOA)

Date: 24 February 2024

SSOA'S POSITION ON THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS

The Chairperson of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), **Hon. Josephine Lagu Yanga**, convened a SSOA Leadership Council meeting on Saturday 24 February 2024 to discuss the position of SSOA on the upcoming elections scheduled for December 2024. The meeting was attended by the leaders of the constituent parties of the alliance as per the attached list.

After an extensive exchange of views, the meeting resolved as follows.

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has brought to an end the devastating armed conflict that engulfed our country for years. Its objective was to bring about sustainable peace and usher in the country into a democratic era. To achieve this objective a number of activities with definite timelines were to be implemented in a transitional period of three years to effect reform and create a conducive atmosphere for democratic and peaceful elections; elections characterized to be free, fair and credible. Therefore, the transitional period was to end with the conduct of the elections in which the South Sudanese will elect their leaders.

For one reason or the other, the Parties could not implement the activities in the three years stipulated in the agreement. Hence, we agreed to push forward the time of the election towards the end of the transitional period by two more years from December 2022 to December 2024 in what became known as the Roadmap.

All Parties to the agreement are in the RTGoNU to implement the peace agreement, to get the tasks accomplished on time. If you look at the implementation matrix, all

FDP - NAS - NDM - PDM - SSNMC - SSPM - SSLM - SSUM - UDRA
ssoa2018b@gmail.com / +211 920 607 065

the activities are done by all the Parties together. Therefore, there is an urgent need for dialogue that brings together all the signatories to R-ARCSS 2018.

SSOA contends that:

- 1- Our people are fed up with endless transitions and are yearning for elections to take place so that they can choose their leaders;
- 2- Elections are a requirement of the R-ARCSS and failure to hold elections is a violation of the same;

The position of SSOA is that we should aim at holding the elections as stipulated in the roadmap. For sure, there are prerequisites that can be implemented to render the elections in December 2024 worthy of the name. However, there certainly are others that must be discussed so that the Parties agree together about what can be done. Let us dialogue to see together how the transitional period can be ended peacefully in the way it should. Our people have suffered enough and they need a new beginning.




Hon. Josephine Lagu Yanga
Chairperson of SSOA.



SOUTH SUDAN OPPOSITION ALLIANCE (SSOA)

SSOA LEADERSHIP COUNCIL MEETING

DATE 24th Feb. 2024

VENUE Imperial Hotel

Attendance list

S/N	NAME OF LEADERS	NAME OF ORG.	SIGN.
01	Hussein. A. Akol	SSPM	
02	Denay Jock Chagor	SSUM	
03	Moro Isaac Genesis	SSNMC	
04	Ulcele Eddy	SSNMC	
05	Samuel Chan Mut	SSLM	
06	Lam Akol	NDM	
07	Josephine Lagu	PDM	
08	Julius Tabulay	NAS	
09	Charfkuoth B. Relk	FDP	
10	Dei Tut Weang	UDRA	
11			
12			
13			

FDP - NAS - NDM - PDM - SSNMC - SSPM - SSLM - SSUM - UDRA
ssoa2018b@gmail.com / +211 920 607 065

Annex 11: UJOSS statement on closure of Al Watan newspaper, 5 December 2023



December 05th 2023

PRESS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

UJOSS demands for unconditional re-opening of Al-Watan Arabic Daily Newspaper

(Juba December 05, 2023) On November 24th, 2023, at around 3pm, some personnel from the National Security Service went to the office of Al-Watan Newspaper, ordered journalists to vacate the building, the personnel then locked-up the office.

The Newspaper was ordered not to publish until further notice, this act has now left 10 journalists jobless, let alone distributors. The consumers of the Newspaper are denied access to information.

According to the management of the Newspaper, on November 11th 2023, it received an advertisement that was paid for by a then South Sudan's National Minister, the advertisement was placed in the Newspaper the following day and some members of National Security Service raised concern about that advertisement.

UJOSS thus calls for unconditional re-opening of the newspaper and urges any aggrieved party to take his/her case to the National Media Authority which is a body constitutionally mandated to handle any issue regarding media in the country.

The closure of the Newspaper is a violation of Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011, as amended, Article 24 on Freedom of Expression and Article 32 on Access to Information.

OYET PATRICK CHARLES



Chairperson, Union of Journalists of South Sudan.

oyet@u-joss.org

oyetpatrick12@gmail.com

oyetp@featurestory.com

+211925440019/+211915130165

UNION OF JOURNALISTS
OF SOUTH SUDAN



Annex 12: AMDISS press release concerning media equipment, 11 August 2023



Media Advocacy & Resource Centre, Kokora Road, Juba-South Sudan. Tel: +211 (0) 929 807 807
E-mail: info@amdiss.org Website: <http://www.amdissmedia.net>

Press Release

AMDISS is concerned over the confiscation of media equipment

Juba, August 11, 2023—AMDISS is deeply concerned over the confiscation of the media equipment that belong to Eye Radio and City Review Newspaper.

This afternoon, AMDISS learned with dismay the incident that took place at the parliament where media equipment were confiscated from two reporters, one from Eye Radio and another from City Review.

This action amounts to violation of the media freedom guaranteed and enshrined in the National Transitional Constitution of South Sudan amended 2011 and the Media Authority Act 2013.

AMDISS calls for immediate intervention from the Media Authority to ensure that the equipment are returned to the said media houses.

If there is any disputes, AMDISS requests that it should be resolved through dialogue.

AMDISS is a member-based media organization in South Sudan formed in 2003 to work towards creating an enabling environment for media freedom through advocacy and dialogue with stakeholders.


For more information on this press release, contact us on info@amdiss.org or call +211922814414



Developing the Media in South Sudan

Annex 13: Circular by Jonglei State Government on media restrictions, 8 January 2024

For further details, also see: Eye Radio: Jonglei official gags unapproved public announcements, 9 January 2024



Annex 14: NUF deployed from Luri on 15 November 2023

On 15 November 2023, the government announced that a first group of Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) was being formally deployed. In a public ceremony held at a military facility in Luri, near Juba, a “battalion sized”²⁹⁷ force of several hundred soldiers departed for deployment to Upper Nile State. According to reports received by the Panel, forces started arriving in Malakal, by air and boat, as of 22 November 2023. Photographs indicate that the deployed forces included several women with young children.

The NUF forces, deployed as a battalion of the SSPDF, were drawn from training centres in the Equatorias and Jonglei State.²⁹⁸ One SPLA-IO officer told the Panel that several hundred of the deployed forces were SPLA-IO forces drawn from the Maridi training centre in Western Equatoria.²⁹⁹ The same officer told the Panel that the SSPDF forces in Maridi had, however, remained in Western Equatoria, as had fighters under the command of General James Nando.

²⁹⁷ The number of NUF deployed has varied considerably, generally ranging from 750 to 1,000. See, for example, journalist covering the event, 15 November: <https://twitter.com/PonnieSheila/status/1724766572353405314>; Radio Tamazuj, First group of 1,000 unified forces deployed to Upper Nile State, 15 November 2023. Sudans Post, South Sudan deploys first 750 troops from unified forces to Tonja, 15 November 2023.


²⁹⁸ Statement released by the SSPDF, 16 November 2023, on file with the Panel.

²⁹⁹ Interview with an SPLA-IO officer in Western Equatoria, November 2023.





Source: images gathered from South Sudanese media outlets that attended the graduation ceremony

Annex 15: Governor of Eastern Equatoria State recruitment order, 13 December 2023

Greater Kapoeta Committee


1. Hon. Charles Lokonoi – Chairperson
2. Hon Minister of Health – Deputy Chairperson
3. Hon. Chairperson Peace Commission and Conflict Resolution - Secretary
4. All County Commissioner of Greater Kapoeta - Members

They can coapt other members if deemed necessary

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Mobilize, register and screen people who are fit for the recruitment of Border Unit
2. Ensure all the Payams and Bomas are included in the exercise
3. Register and submit the list to the Governor as soon as possible

Issued under my hand and the seal of Eastern Equatoria State, this 13th day of December the year 2023 A.D.



Louis Lobong Lojore
The Governor
Eastern Equatoria State-Torit



Annex 16: Police graduation ceremony, Juba, February 2024



Annex 17: Thonyoor Declaration by the Juba Declaration Faction, 7 October 2023**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**7TH.OCTOBER. 2023**PRESS STATEMENT****SUBJECT: DECLARATION TO WITHDRAW OUR SUPPORT FROM SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY – IN OPPOSITION (SPLM/A - IO) TO THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE' DEFENSE FORCE/SPLM.**

This declaration serves to bring into your attention my fellow compatriots and comrades that we the undersigned High-Ranking Officers, Officials and soldiers have fully taken a bold decision to Leave SPLM/A – IO under Leadership of Dr. Riek Machar Teny to the SSPDF/SPLM under Leadership of H.E Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan from the effect of today 7th October 2023.

In regard to the above-mentioned subject, the recent re-appointment of Hon. **Angelina Teny as National Minister of Interior**. This move exacerbated our humiliation and frustration which in this way has found us disappointed and we do think about it a lot.

My dear comrades, fellow country men and women; we the High-Ranking Officers proudly served in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition for the right cause over the past decade under the Leadership of Dr. Riek Machar Teny. We do hereby politely remind you that, the contribution of my colleagues and I and everyone in the Movement was measured in lives of people. We served under Dr. Riek Machar's Leadership for 70% of our lives and we were satisfied during the struggle.

Now, the peace was revitalized in 2018 reinstated him as First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan. And thank God we are in the midst of the Implementation Processes in a search for a lasting peace. However, my comrades! My fellow compatriots! We felt disappointed in our service, we felt overlooked in our tireless effort, and we felt betrayed in our loyalty.

With my colleagues and everyone under Dr. Riek Machar's Toxic Nepotism Leadership, we realized how waste of unrecovered effort and time that we regret ever

with substantial proved based - evidence looking-back how Dr. Riek used us as granted tools to protect his personal interest. Ladies and Gentlemen, my former boss has a character of never considering our professions and values to have equal right to enjoy the privileges of the Country we fought for. My dear comrades, where is the vision of the party? In my thought, I reckon the vision is blown away with the wind. It is indeed unfortunate for the party Leadership to lose the Direction and Vision to simultaneously practice Dictatorial Tendency leaving the party's cadres out heartbroken in his nepotism devolution of powers.

Lastly but not the least, as far as I am concerned, as High-Ranking Officers and others whom felt the same edge of sharp sword of humiliation; today we have decided to Switch Off our Loyalty from the SPLM/A-IO to SSPDF/SPLM in which I was one of the founders as shield one(1) of Jamus Battalion with the effect from today's 7th.October.2023.

Without hesitation, with due all the respect; on behalf of my comrades and on my behalf we deserve the right to have disagreed due to the following mentioned grievances and reasons which led our break away from SPLM/A -IO to the SSPDF:

❖ **POLITICAL AND MILITARY MARGINALIZATION:**

Dr. Riek does not empower others thinking they could be at the same level with him and he fears that anyone he empowered would out weighted him. He only prioritizes Junior Officers over Senior Officers which is the **violation of political and military hierarchy.**

❖ **NEPOTISM IN THE SPLM/A-IO:**

Dr. Riek Machar is a man who only favors assigning or deploying his close relatives. He made the national movement as his family affairs with the aim of making himself richer.

❖ **POWER GREED:**

Dr. Riek is power greed. He only worries about his position and his wife Angelina's position. He does not care about others getting positions as well.

❖ **IGNORING THE HEALTH OF HIS PEOPLE:**

Dr. Riek does not care about the suffering of his supporters from sickness unless they are dead and then he helped in the transfer of the dead body as well as funeral rites

❖ **DICTATORIAL TENDENCY:**

Dr. Riek has got a character of not being liberal. He does not accept the opinion of others except his wife. He fears the truth and he dislikes you more when you try to correct his opinion.

❖ **ILLUSIVE VISION:**

Dr. Riek Machar has been deceiving the entire Nuer Community that he was prophesied by Prophet Ngundeng Bong to rule the Republic of South Sudan when the time is right.

❖ **LACK OF MONITORING, EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY:**

Dr. Riek Machar can give you power and do whatever you wish with it. He cannot follow you up, neither does he evaluate your actions and if you are found guilty of mismanaging the movement's resources he does not hold you accounted.

Lastly but the least, on behalf of others; I pledge and promise to support SSPDF/SPLM together with the right of our country men and women under Leadership of H.E Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, president of the Republic of South Sudan to take the Country to the next level and support the upcoming national general elections to be exercised without fear.

Despite our grievances that led to switching off our loyalty, we continue urging all peace Partners, our Forces in their respective bases and all Citizens to remain calm as we believe to work toward addressing outstanding matters in the signed peace agreement. We do also stress our common Citizen to live with hope to restore love, peace, Unity and live in harmony with each other in our beloved nation.

God bless South Sudan!

God bless the people of South Sudan!

General Salva Kiir Mayardit oh yee!

South Sudan oh yee!

Thanks,




LT. GEN. SIMON MAGUEK GAI MAJAK

FORMER SECTOR TWO COMMANDER-


UNITY STATE SPLM/A-IO


HEAD OF SPLM/A-IO JUBA DECLARATION FACTION

Annex 18: MSP statement concerning violence against civilians in Leer County, 28 November 2023



Annex 19: Unity State Government Ministerial Order, 4 November 2023


Republic of South Sudan
 Unity State – Bentiu
 Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement Agencies
 Minister's office



Ref: USB/SMOLG/LEA/50/D/1 Date: 04/11/2023

THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITY STATE.
 The Ministerial Order No (06) 2023 for the immediate relocation of Division 4A Commander back to Tong Cantonment Site and the relocation of two (2) Generals to the specified Military bases.

TITLE AND COMMENCEMENT.
 This order shall be cited as Ministerial order No: (06) 2023 AD for the immediate relocation of Division 4A Commander back to Tong Cantonment Site and the relocation of two (2) Generals to the specified Military bases. with an immediate effect from the date of its signature by the Acting Governor and Hon. Minister, in the State Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement Agencies in the Government of Unity State.



1. THE ORDER
 In exercise of the powers and function conferred upon me by the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan Article (50) (A) and Local Government Act 2009, Section (66) (4) and (125) (C). I **Hon. William Dak Koch Manykuer**, the Acting Governor and Hon. Minister, in the State Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement Agencies in the Government of Unity State-Bentiu. Do hereby issued this Ministerial order No (06) 2023 AD for the Immediate relocation of Division 4A Commander back to Tong Cantonment Site and the relocation of two (2) Generals to the specified Military bases. This is only to avoid violent and military confrontation. With an immediate effect from 4th day of November 2023 AD.

Their names and locations are hereunder:-

S/N	Rank	Name in full	Location	Remark
1	Maj.Gen	John Turuk Khor	Tong Cantonment Site	
2	Maj.Gen	Wun Tiep	Guit County Headquarter	
3	Brig.Gen	Gatluak Kuol	Tong Military Base	

This made under my hand in Bentiu on 4th day of November 2023 AD.

Sign.....
Hon. William Dak Koch Manykuer
 The Acting Governor,
 Minister, in the State Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement Agencies
 Government of Unity State-Bentiu

cc: H.E. The Governor
 cc: Peace and Security Advisor
 cc: 4th Infantry Division Commander
 cc: SPLA IO Sector Commander
 cc: Acting Police Commissioner
 cc: Director of National Security, Unity State
 cc: Acting HOFO UNMISS
 cc: CTSAM
 cc: File

Tel: +211914442477/+211929384147

Annex 20: Letter from his H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya, inviting mediations in Kenya, 5 January 2024



STATE HOUSE

P.O. Box 40500

NAIROBI, KENYA

5th January, 2024

Dear Hon. Unvu,

I am honoured to convey to you, on behalf of the Government and the people of the Republic of Kenya, New Year's greetings and best wishes for 2024.

The Government of Kenya is in receipt of a letter from the President of the Republic of South Sudan, His Excellency Salva Kiir Mayardit, sharing with me, as the leader of a brotherly nation, the progress of the mediation talks between the Government of South Sudan and members of the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) that have been hosted by the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome, Italy since 2020.

I take this early opportunity to thank you for showing remarkable leadership and commitment towards peace and stability in South Sudan. Through your participation in the Sant'Egidio peace talks, major milestones have been achieved in the search for lasting peace and inclusive development in South Sudan and our region as a whole.

In his letter under reference, President Mayardit has kindly requested me to continue the talks from where the Community of Sant'Egidio has reached and to host the remaining phase of the process in Kenya. I have already written to the Community of Sant'Egidio thanking them for their generous support and seeking their partnership and cooperation with us in concluding the talks.

It is for this reason that I am writing to kindly inform you of this development and to seek your concurrence and support in bringing the talks to Kenya, which remains your second home. As soon as we hear back from you, we shall make the necessary arrangements towards welcoming you to Nairobi for pre-negotiation consultations. I look forward to working with you towards achieving a fair and just conclusion of the process to the satisfaction of all the parties and the people of South Sudan.

The Government of Kenya renews to you the assurances of its highest consideration.

**WILLIAM SAMOEI RUTO, PhD
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA**

**HON. VAKINDU UNVU
CHAIRMAN, SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE**

Annex 21: Response to President Ruto from NSSOFG, 27 January 202427th January 2024**His Excellency, Dr. William Samoei Ruto****President of the Republic of Kenya****Dear President Dr. Ruto,**

We the leaders of the National Salvation Front (NAS), National Democratic Movement - Patriotic Front (NDM-PF), and the South Sudan National Movement for Change (SSNMC) are honored to convey to you, on behalf of the peace-loving people of South Sudan, our best wishes for the New Year 2024.

Excellency,

We acknowledge receipt of your letter **dated 5th January 2024** in which you offered to mediate and host peace negotiations between us, the **Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSOG)** and the Government of South Sudan.

Your Excellency,

We would like to first thank you and appreciate your gesture to contribute to the quest for peace and stability in South Sudan by your offer to mediate and host negotiations. It is a true reflection of the Kenyan spirit of solidarity and altruism that our people appreciate. Kenya has always opened its borders to South Sudanese in their times of great need for many decades and continues to do so at present.

Your Excellency,

The **Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSOG)** are committed to genuine dialogue as the best means of resolving the conflict in the country. The NSSOG hold the conviction that sustainable peace in South Sudan can only be achieved by addressing **the root causes of the conflict in the country** in such a dialogue. Because of this conviction, the NSSOG responded positively to the initiative of the Community of Sant'Egidio to mediate in the conflict and host peace negotiations in Rome. The Rome Initiative, which was launched in 2020, has been on-going, bringing together the opposition groups and the Government of South Sudan in frank and genuine discussions, in an environment conducive to all the parties. In our last meeting, the Government Delegation requested time for them to return to Juba to consult but unfortunately to date, we have not heard from them. It is very unfortunate that instead of returning to the negotiations table after consultations, they decided to turn their back on the negotiations.

Excellency,

Your acceptance to mediate and host negotiations in search of peace in South Sudan is indeed a commendable gesture. While we appreciate this gesture, we would also like to inform you that we were surprised by it as the President of the Government of South Sudan has not presented to us or the Community of

Sant'Egidio his intention towards the Rome Initiative prior to making his request to you. During the several rounds of discussions between us and the Government, our differences have always been on the substantive issues under discussions and nothing on the mediation and the venue.

Lastly, we wish to assure you of our readiness to participate in pre-negotiation consultations which we prefer to be convened in Rome, Italy.

We avail to you the assurances of our highest consideration.




Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka
Chairman and Commander-in-
Chief,
National Salvation Front
(NAS)



Amb. Emmanuel Ajawin
Chairman,
National Democratic
Movement - Patriotic Front
(NDM-PF)



Mr. Alex Yatta Lukadi
Chairman,
South Sudan National
Movement for Change
(SSNMC)

Annex 22: NAS Statement on defections, 8 February 2024

SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/03 8th February, 2024

Statement on the on-going Propaganda against NAS

The Leadership of the National Salvation Front (NAS) would like to alert its members, sympathizers, the people of South Sudan and the International Community of propaganda documents being manufactured and circulated in media outlets by a gang of disgraced former members of NAS who have recently been dismissed and are now in the service of the enemies of the people of South Sudan.

The gang of disgraced NAS officers comprising Maj. Gen. Robert Lado Marko, Brig. Gen. Loku Mario Thomas Jada (aka Loku lo Laja), and Colonel Stephen Lukaja were demoted and dismissed in a letter with reference **GHQS/001/2024** dated **25th January 2024** signed by the NAS Acting chief of Staff, Gen. Kamilo Otwari Aleardo. The gang of disgraced officers were, according to NAS Army Act 2017, demoted to the rank of privates and dismissed from the ranks and files of the NAS Army and Movement. They have been proven, beyond any reasonable doubt to be involved, in activities of treachery and subversion against the Movement.

On 5th February 2024, the gang of dismissed privates, organized under the tutelage of National Security Service (NSS) in Juba, released a document dubbed a declaration of the so-called National Salvation Front (Revolutionary Command Council) and purporting that Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka was dismissed as the leader of NAS.

The Leadership of NAS would therefore like to state the following:

01- The documents being circulated in the media is part of the regime's strategy in fighting the Movement through cheap propaganda targeting the Leadership in a smear campaign using deserters and collaborators. The regime is desperately hoping that this type of propaganda will sow disunity and help weaken NAS. The Leadership of NAS calls on all to ignore and treat the propaganda and lies from this gang with the outmost contempt that they deserve.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk


- 02- The National Salvation Front is strong and united in its political, military, civil administration and diplomatic structures under Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of NAS/Army. All NAS organs inside and outside the liberated areas are functioning normally in pursuing their revolutionary duties.
- 03- The Leadership of NAS is aware that the failed regime of Salva Kiir is trying hard to divide the opposition, especially NAS, to achieve the objective of maintaining the status quo in the country. The regime is desperately hoping that the Movement will split and it will present the sell-outs, masquerading as NAS, in negotiations to sign yet another flawed agreement with them. The disgraced gang is now holed up in their hideouts waiting to be staged in Nairobi peace talks as NAS representatives and eventually end up in Juba. The regime has time and again tried this strategy for the last six years against the Movement but NAS remains formidable and growing stronger.
- 04- The on-going propaganda is part of a sinister strategy to back the regime's pursuit of unjust peace. The regime's tactic of the sudden intention to change the mediation and venue of the current peace initiative from Santi'Egidio in Rome Italy to Kenya is the replica of an old script used when peace talks were shifted from Addis Ababa to Khartoum in 2018 where negotiations were conducted by use of threats and intimidations and the opposition camp was raided and split up.
- 05- The Leadership of NAS has credible intelligence that the gang is now being supported by some South Sudanese opposition figures including a Nairobi-based senior South Sudanese opposition figure who helped draft their so-called declaration and their letter to H.E. President William Ruto where they were begging to be invited to negotiations in Kenya.
- 06- NAS Leadership assures its members, sympathizers, the people of South Sudan, the region and the International Community that no amount of cheap propaganda, blackmail, lies or intimidation can deter the Movement of its resolve in pursuing the noble cause of the struggle for freedom, rights and dignity of our people.
- 07- The recent actions and behavior of the regime of Salva Kiir indicates how frail and exhausted the regime is and for this reason its desperation soliciting for political bail-out to survive. NAS urges its members to be vigilant and steadfast in the struggle at this critical moment. What we are witnessing now are the last kicks of a dying regime!

08- The National Salvation Front is committed to achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan by peaceful resolution of the root causes of the conflict through an inclusive dialogue in genuine and credible negotiations.

Suba Samuel Manase

Spokesperson,

National Salvation Front (NAS)



Annex 23: South Sudanese ties to the ongoing conflict in Sudan

The Panel has confirmed that a number of South Sudanese have engaged in the ongoing conflict in Sudan, with some South Sudanese fighting both for the RSF and the SAF. Most of these South Sudanese fighters, including some senior officers, appear to have joined the conflict opportunistically³⁰⁰ and are not operating in any official capacity or as part of any officially sanctioned operations. Others appear to have been forcefully recruited by the warring parties in Sudan.³⁰¹

One senior South Sudanese officer, fighting under General Hemedti's RSF command in Khartoum, indicated that dissatisfaction with the political and military situation in South Sudan has also played a role in motivating some South Sudanese fighters. He told the Panel that the war in Sudan provided a clarity of purpose that had long eluded him in South Sudan's politics.³⁰² Separately, the Panel was told about several young South Sudanese men who were recruited to join various units while fleeing violence,³⁰³ or who volunteered to participate, and were largely driven by revenge and "looking for ways to settle their issues."³⁰⁴

While it is challenging to assess the overall numbers, senior South Sudanese government officials have confirmed the participation of several "mercenaries"³⁰⁵ of South Sudanese origin in the Sudan conflict and have cautioned that this may trigger further illicit movement of firearms across the Sudan-South Sudan border.³⁰⁶

Concerns about further recruitment and the movement of fighters have persisted across the length of the Sudan-South Sudan border. Significant mobilisation³⁰⁷ and diversion of food aid³⁰⁸ in support of the fighting in Kurmuk, in Blue Nile State of Sudan has, for example, occurred in the Doro refugee camp in Maban in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Representatives of the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the armed group SPLM-North, a group that actively engaged in fighting in Sudan, now hold key leadership positions in at least one of Maban's four refugee camps. This has, according to some, given the faction opportunities to mobilise Sudanese refugees in at least one location in Upper Nile State.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁰ Video of captured South Sudanese individuals, on file with the Panel, dated April 2023. Interview with a South Sudanese commander in Khartoum, August 2023. See also, Sudans Post, Ex-South Sudan lawmaker, others fighting alongside RSF in Sudan, 30 August 2023: <https://www.sudanspost.com/ex-south-sudan-lawmaker-others-fighting-alongside-rsf-in-sudan/>

³⁰¹ Interviews with humanitarians and local analysts in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2023.

³⁰² Interview with a South Sudanese commander in Khartoum, August 2023.

³⁰³ Interview with two local analysts in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State and Western Bahr el Ghazal State who conducted focus group discussions and interviews with returnee households, October 2023. Interviews with government officials in Raja County in Western Bahr el Ghazal, conducted by observers, reviewed by the Panel, September 2023.

³⁰⁴ Interview with a local humanitarian observer in Western Bahr el Ghazal operating on the Sudan border, October 2023.

³⁰⁵ Radio Miraya interview with South Sudan's Minister of Interior, Angelina Teny, 30 November 2023:

<https://www.facebook.com/radiomiraya/videos/1518205712359908>

³⁰⁶ Ibid. See also, Sudans Post, Interior minister admits involvement of South Sudanese in Sudan conflict, 4 December 2023:

<https://www.sudanspost.com/interior-minister-admits-involvement-of-south-sudanese-in-sudan-conflict/>

³⁰⁷ Interviews with four humanitarian observers based in Maban, September to October 2023.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has also largely unravelled the Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020, a South Sudanese-led peace effort to reconcile former Darfuri rebel groups, as several signatory commanders have announced their decisions to join the fighting in Sudan.³¹⁰ This has, in turn, emboldened some South Sudanese non-signatory parties, such as the South Sudan People's Movement/Army. The group's commander, Stephen Buay, believes there is now "a market"³¹¹ for new military partnerships with holdout groups like his. Even though several of Buay's officers were extradited to South Sudan by RSF soldiers in 2022, which eventually led to their extrajudicial killings,³¹² Buay stated that "rebellion is about surviving in different ways."³¹³

For others like sanctioned individual Simon Gatwech Dual (SSi.002) and Johnson Olony, both representing different Kit-gwang factions with historical ties to Khartoum, the conflict in Sudan has meant losing critical access to logistical support. Forced to reset, Olony transferred his loyalties to Juba. Gatwech, on the other hand, stated that the Sudan conflict has "created opportunities as well as challenges"³¹⁴ and that his group's overall priorities vis-à-vis South Sudan remain "unchanged."³¹⁵ He also confessed that many of his Sudan-based fighters have returned to South Sudan as part of the mass exodus of returnees.³¹⁶ Several of Gatwech's senior officers were recently detained near the border after joining the RSF, and were handed over to South Sudanese officials in Upper Nile State.³¹⁷

³¹⁰ SudanDarfur movements: "We renounce our neutrality", 16 November 2023: <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/darfur-movements-we-renounce-our>

³¹¹ Interview with Stephen Buay, October 2023.

³¹² See the Panel's interim report S/2022/884 published 1 December 2022.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Interview with Simon Gatwech Dual (SSi.002) and several senior representatives from his faction, September 2023.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Correspondence with Gatwech's military spokesperson and other senior representatives of his group, December 2023. Reports by observers in Upper Nile State, December 2023, reviewed by the Panel. See also, Sudans Post, South Sudan rebel generals detained and deported from Sudan over alleged RSF links, 12 December 2023: <https://www.sudanspost.com/south-sudan-rebel-generals-detained-and-deported-from-sudan-over-alleged-rsf-links/>

Annex 24: Condemnation letter by Twic Mayardit community, 16 November 2023



TWIC MAYARDIT COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP
IN JUBA

Date: 16 Nov, 2023

Sub: Condemnation Letter on the barbaric and cowardice attack by armed Ngok Dinka of Abyei of Kordofan on SSPDF Base in Ayuok Village of Twic County.

Twic Mayardit Community Leadership in Juba is deeply shocked and saddened by the Ngok Dinka of Abyei barbaric and cowardly attack on SSPDF base in Ayuok village of Twic County on the 13th /11/2023.

Twic Mayardit Community Leadership hereby condemns in the strongest terms possible this heinous and cowardice attack on our National Army. We express our deepest condolences and our sympathy with the families of the fallen heroes who were killed by same people they had sacrificed their lives to protect since 1983. In same note, we stand in solidarity with the general headquarters of SSPDF in Juba on the lost of their comrades.

Twic Mayardit Community Leadership in Juba hereby renews its call to the two administrations of Warrap state and Abyei to adhere, obey and implement the orders of H.E the President of Republic Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit issued in Akon Warrap State on the 20th March, 2023 for creation of a buffer zone between the two areas and that, the Abyei Administration must relocate to the North of Kiir River.



Since the orders of H.E the President are not being implemented and the Abyei Administration continue to illegally operate South of Kiir River where they have been launching attacks on Twic villages and SSPDF bases, the Twic Mayardit community will be left with no choice rather than moving back to all its areas of South of Kiir River.

As a law- abiding community, and in respect to the directives of H.E the President of the Republic, we requested our people to evacuate Aneet on 10/10/2022 to give chance for SSPDF to create the buffer zone and deploy forces accordingly. On this and because of the continued aggression by Ngok Dinka of Abyei, we warn that any further attacks on our villages and SSPDF bases on the South of River Kiir, will lead to the closer of Agok airstrip which is used by the so called Abyei Brigade to receive the ammunition.



CC. UNISFA


CC. Troika

CC. AU





CC. IGAD

CC. File


Annex 25: Letter by Northern Bahr el Ghazal government on attack in Twic, 17 November 2023




Annex 26: Press release by the Abyei authorities, 19 November 2023

	<p>REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN</p> <p>ABYEI SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREA</p> <p>MINISTRY OF INFORMATION CULTURE YOUTH & SPORTS</p> <p>MINISTER OFFICE</p>	
ASAA/MOICYCS/19/11/2023		
DATE: 19/11/2023		
<u>Press Release</u>		
<p>Today at around 5:00 A. M. Militia forces of Titweng (Twic armed youth) backed by Gai Macheck militias attacked villages of Angot, Wuncuei and Nyiel north east of Agok Town in Rumamer County, followed by another attack to the areas of Wauecin and Wunpeth in Rumamer and Mijak Counties by men in SSPDF uniform, at around 8:00 A. M., Malual Aleu and Athony, villages came under attack by Titweng and elements of SSPDF Division three (3) under command of MAJ. Gen. Akuei Ajou.</p>		
<p>In all these attacks, thirty-two (32) people were killed including women and children burned into their huts, and more than twenty (20) people wounded, the wounded are being treated in hospital in Abyei town, also killed is one UNISFA soldier and one injured in Malual Aleu.</p>		
<p>These barbaric attacks on civilians are continuation of last week attacks in Makuac Lueth and Ayoak villages of Alal County in Abyei Special Administrative Area by Titweng and elements of SSPDF; these forces are responsible of killing of civilians and soldiers in Ayoak of Alal County they rushed to the media and blame it on Ngok Youth.</p>		
<p>Abyei Special Administrative Area Government, condemn in strongest terms possible this heinous and unprovoked attack on civilian as well as the cold blood killing of SSPDF member and their families in Ayoak by the same rouge elements in Division three (3), hence Abyei Special Administrative Area is calling for immediate investigation to urgently find out the facts of these criminal attacks.</p>		
<p>Abyei Special Administrative Area, convey it heartfelt condolences to Ngok Dinka families killed by these criminals.</p>		
<p>19/11/2023  Hon. Bulis Koch Aguar Ajith Minister of Information, Culture, Youth and Sport; Abyei Special Administrative Area; Abyei Town.</p>		
Page 1 of 1		


Annex 27: Letter by Aweil community association in Abyei, 17 November 2023



Annex 28: Letter by Twic county commissioner refuting allegations by Abyei representatives, 20 Nov. 2023



Annex 29: Letter by a civil society organization in Twic, 23 November 2023




Twic Mayardit community is working with governments at National, State and county level to stop fighting and use peaceful means of acquiring it ancestry land enacted to what so call Abyei Box at south Kiir River. stop blaming SSPDF soldiers and accusing its Generals.

The only solution, Dinka Ngok must cross to north of kiir river and lifting Abyei Box from Twic Mayardit Land, we also caution the use of Agok airstrip for transporting ammunitions.

Twic Mayardit civil society organization- Turalei.

Serving civilian is priority

Sign:



- Cc. Warrap State Government (TMCOSOT)
- Cc. UNMISS Kuajok Field Office
- Cc. Twic County Government
- Cc. All Peace Partners
- Cc. File

Galaxy A23

Annex 30: Population Census

In April 2023, South Sudan’s National Bureau of Statistics released a population estimate, disaggregated by state and county. No systematic door-to-door population census has been conducted in South Sudan, but the distribution and size of the population influences the distribution and division of political seats, representation at various levels of government, and the delivery of services. The census is, therefore, one of the most contentious issues ahead of elections in South Sudan.

The Bureau’s population estimate for Warrap State, the President’s home state, is greater than all of the Greater Upper Nile region combined, including Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States, and double that of Central Equatoria, home to the capital Juba. The Bureau’s estimate, which it says is based on a survey conducted by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in 2021, was subject to widespread criticism.³¹⁸ Several South Sudanese analysts and government representatives expressed concern that the estimates appeared to be “deliberately inflated ... [for] political expediency”;³¹⁹ and “[defy] logic.”³²⁰ Some called them “a clear case for gerrymandering through and through”³²¹ and “inaccurate.”³²² A study conducted by a South Sudanese thinktank described the Bureau’s findings “scientifically troubled”³²³ and concluded that the population estimate results are “useful for neither of the government exercises – politics [or] development”.³²⁴

³¹⁸ Interview with a civil society representative, April 2023. See also: Sudans Post, NDM official says gov’t population estimates was “prepared in darkness”, 10 March 2023. Sudans Post, Machar ally dismisses gov’t population estimates as ‘dangerous scheme’ to destroy South Sudan, 9 April 2023.

³¹⁹ Correspondence by South Sudanese representative 1 in private chat forum, April 2023, obtained by the Panel.

³²⁰ Correspondence by South Sudanese representative 2 in private chat forum, April 2023, obtained by the Panel.

³²¹ Correspondence by South Sudanese representative 3 in private chat forum, April 2023, obtained by the Panel.

³²² Correspondence by South Sudanese representative 5 in private chat forum, April 2023, obtained by the Panel.

³²³ Sudd Institute, The 2021 Population Estimation Survey: Scientific, Political, and Policy Implications, 11 April 2023; available from: https://www.suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/643696da7f3b4_ThePopulationEstimationSurveyScientificPoliticalAndPolicy_Full.pdf

³²⁴ Ibid.

South Sudan Population Estimation Survey 2021: Summary Report Modelled Estimates



April, 2023 Juba, South Sudan



Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction	3
1.1 Background	3
1.2 The Population Estimation Survey in South Sudan	3
1.3 The specific objectives of the PES were to;	4
1.4 Expected benefits	4
1.5 Methodology	4
1.6 Technical partners for PES	5
1.7 Financial and Logistical Support	5
2.0 Challenges for PES	5
3.0 Results	6
3,1 Population Estimates for the 10 States and 3 Administrative areas	6
3.2 Population Modelled estimates by Counties	6
3.3 PES Payam modelled population estimates 2021	9

Forward

It is my pleasure to present this booklet of Population Estimation Survey (PES) 2021. The booklet is intended to serve today's Launch of Modelled Population Estimates from the PES by the Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan and Chairman of Economic Cluster, HE. Dr James Wani Igga. This launch follows the recent approval of PES results by the Council of Ministers chaired by H.E Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President of the Republic of South Sudan, in its regular meeting held on 10th March, 2023. The conduct of the PES came as a result of an urgent need for high-quality, timely and credible evidence-based statistics necessary for decision-making and policy-formulation for implementing the Revitalized Agreement on Conflict Resolution in South Sudan (R-ACRSS).

You may be aware that the last National Population and Housing census was conducted in 2008 and the Country has been relying on the population projections to inform development planning. However, the data from the census was outdated and overtaken by events. Due to lack of resources and insecurity, the country has not conducted a recent population and housing census. It is against this background; the PES was undertaken to provide the much-needed population data and information. The PES used the recent advances including satellite imagery, geo-positioning tools and other statistical methods that have computational power which enables the development and application of approaches that can estimate population distributions at spatial scales across entire country. This booklet is a summary of modelled population estimates at national, state, county and payam levels.

The NBS lends gratitude to the National Government, State and Administrative Area Governments for their support and cooperation in conducting the survey as well as the government institutions represented on the technical committee for providing technical oversight during the whole process of the survey. The NBS greatly values the technical and financial support particularly from United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and other UN Agencies (UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNWOMEN, UNAIDS, UNICEF) for financial and in-kind contribution in form of tablets as well as bilateral donors like Sweden, Norway, Irish Aid that provided financial support through UNFPA. The NBS is particularly grateful to all field staffs at Headquarters and State levels for their relentless efforts in making the PES 2021 a reality. The support from UNFPA Hqs, Bill and Melinda Gates, UKaid, WorldPop/Flowmider.org for supporting the Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development (GRID³) project that resulted in the conduct of the PES is highly appreciated.

Without your collective efforts, I must sincerely acknowledge, the PES 2021 would not have seen the light of the day. This PES data and information, therefore, will be available for policy makers and other end users to access and use data so as to make South Sudan a better place to live and work. The next step will be the compilation of the detailed report that provides analysis of demographic and socio-economic characteristics, dissemination and use of the data to generate user cases, including the demographic dividend modelling.

Isaiah Chol Arual,
Chairperson National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
Juba, South Sudan



1.0 Introduction

Population numbers at local levels are fundamental data for many applications, including the delivery and planning of services, election preparation, and response to disasters. National population and housing censuses are the primary source for such data, but in resource-poor settings and when facing security challenges, recent and reliable demographic data at subnational levels can be a challenge to collect. National population and housing census data can be outdated, inaccurate, or missing key groups or areas, while registry data might be lacking or incomplete. Moreover, at local scales, accurate boundary data are often limited, and high rates of migration and urban growth make existing data quickly outdated. Here we review past and ongoing work aimed at producing local-scale population estimates, and discuss how new technologies are enabling robust and cost-effective solutions.

Recent advances in the availability of detailed satellite imagery, geo-positioning tools for field surveys, statistical methods, and computational power are enabling the development and application of approaches that can estimate population distributions at fine spatial scales across entire countries. This document outlines a proposal for a new data collection and population modeling effort to support South Sudan.

1.1 Background

The Republic of South Sudan was formerly Southern Sudan, an autonomous region of Sudan during the period 2005 to 2011, formed as a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became an independent country, after the historic referendum on self-determination on January 9, 2011, when people of the region voted overwhelmingly for separation. According to the 2008 Census, the population of South Sudan was 8.26 million. Of this, 4.29 million were male and 3.97 million were female (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012).

The population distribution of South Sudan has substantially changed in recent years, including displacement internally and externally across borders, and particularly in the period following the renewed outbreak of conflict in 2013 and 2016. The Revitalized Peace Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, signed in late 2018, has created a new dynamic in terms of population movement. There are now indications that displaced populations are returning to previously abandoned areas and other parts of South Sudan. Conflict and insecurity have long limited large-scale data collection activities in the country. The scarcity of population data has resulted in significant uncertainty about the number of current and future populations, and a greater need for intercensal estimates.

1.2 The Population Estimation Survey in South Sudan

The Government of South Sudan through the National Bureau of Statistics and support from UNFPA and other partners conducted a National Population Estimate Survey from 28th May to 15th June 2021 in all 10 States and three Administrative Areas with Survey reference night was midnight of 27th May 2021. The Survey was to provide accurate population estimates and other demographic and Socio- economic characteristics of the inhabitants. The information generated would contribute to evidence-based decision-making in matters of national and sub-national development planning.

1.3 PES Objectives

The specific objectives of the PES were to:

- Generate reliable Modelled population estimates on population density and basic demographic characteristics for all levels of administration;
- Generate indicators for monitoring and evaluation of programs prior to population and Housing census, Demographic & Health Survey and Demographic Dividend Study are conducted in South Sudan;
- Strengthened the capacity of NBS in the use of Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) applications & high-resolution satellite imagery and how to analyze large datasets obtained from such Surveys;
- Provide information to be used for development of advocacy materials for policy makers.

1.4 Expected benefits of PES

The Modelled Population Estimates will provide data and information that can be used for:

- Determining census frame for the 2020 round of national census and other national surveys;
- National and sector planning for decision making on provision of services;
- Monitoring the performance of National Development Strategy as well as the Sustainable Development Goals;
- Drafting policy briefs for policy makers;
- Reference points for Research and dissemination.

1.5 Methodology

A total 1,536 sample sites have been selected in areas across South Sudan using a two-stage stratified random sampling. The Population Estimation Survey was designed based on satellite-derived information and a system of equally sized grid squares. Densely settled and sparsely settled sampling domains are created based on the density of building structures extracted from satellite imagery in order to provide the most up-to-date definition of densely settled areas. The target population will be all households, household members and residents within the bounds of the sites. The population estimate is a combination of a baseline population modelled from the PES household data and the estimates of internally displaced persons from Displacement Tracking Matrix.

The population estimation approach used in South Sudan is a two-step method (Bottom-up) to first predict a baseline population and then adjust that distribution to reflect the likely internal displacement:

- Baseline population model- to estimate the population in a location before the addition of IDPs, hence only counts of usual residents;
- Predicting the population outside the small sites enumerated during the PES draws on information in the structure of the statistical models as well as from the modelled relationships with covariate data;
- Adjusted population estimate-This is a baseline Pop model that additionally accounts for the IDPs;

- ✦ Aggregate population totals-The baseline population predictions and IDP adjustments were made on a regular grid at a spatial resolution of approximately 100 m x 100 m (Densely settled) where in sparsely settled (200mx200m) to account for the larger population area;
- ✦ Age and sex distribution- In addition to the total population, the age and sex structure were statistically modelled.

1.6 Technical partners for PES

Under the leadership of the National Bureau of Statistics and other partners that provided technical inputs into the design, conduct and analysis of the PES include:

- ✦ Ministries Departments and Agencies of the Republic of South Sudan
- ✦ Academic institutions (University of Juba, University of Upper Nile)
- ✦ University of Southampton
- ✦ World Pop
- ✦ UNFPA and other UN Partners
- ✦ Columbia University

1.7 Financial and Logistical Support

Financial support for the PES was provided by UNFPA, Sweden, Irish Aid, Norway, UNDP, UN Women, UNAIDS, WFP. Other UNG agencies, including UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, IOM and UNFAO provided logistical support in form of tablets and vehicles.

2.0 Challenges of PES

The challenges encountered by the PES include:

- ✦ Insufficient budget from government and development partners led to the delay in the finalization of the population estimation process;
- ✦ Flooding, local insecurity posed challenges related to EAs accessibility during the data collection;
- ✦ During PES data collection, some technical, logistical, security boundary and political hitches affected timely finalization of the Survey.

3.0 Results

3.1 Population Estimates for States and Administrative areas

State/Administrative Area	Modelled Population Estimates
Upper Nile State	790,147
Jonglei State	791,105
Unity State	892,780
Western Bhar El Ghazal State	562,555
Northern Bar El Ghazal State	1,924,342
Warrap State	2,639,484
Lakes State	1,265,473
Western Equatoria State	663,233
Central Equatoria	1,324,521
Eastern Equatoria	981,902
Greater Pibor Administrative Area	240,102
Ruweng Administrative Area	234,416
Abyei Administrative Area	133,955
Total for South Sudan	12,444,018


3.2 Population Modelled estimates by Counties

State	County	Modelled Population Estimates
Upper Nile State	Akoka	7,823
	Baliet	21,927
	Fashoda	52,384
	Longachuk	44,205
	Luakiny/Nasir	71,781
	Maban	267,494
	Maiwut	35,840
	Malakal	76,231
	Manyo	19,859
	Melut	65,141
	Panyikang	29,778
	Renk	38,976
	Ulang	58,708

Total Upper Nile		790,147
Jonglei State	Akobo	90,840
	Ayod	114,077
	Bor South	160,878
	Pigi	29,720
	Duk	56,186
	Nyirrol	63,179
	Old Fagak	109,657
	Twic East	51,269
	Uror	115,297
Total Jonglei		791,105
Unity State	Guit	49,581
	KOch	55,477
	Leer	92,228
	Mayendit	66,163
	Mayom	181,438
	Panyijiar	189,209
	Rubkuna	308,684
Total of Unity		892,780
Greater Pibor Administrative Area	Pibor	219,745
	Pochalla	20,357
Total of G. Pibor Admin. Area		240,102
Ruweng Administrative Area	Abiemnhom	40,766
	Pariang	193,650
Total of Ruweng Admin. Area		133,955
Western Bhar El Ghazal State	Jur River	245,724
	Raja	108,344
	Wau	208,487
Total of Western Bhar El Gazal		562,555
Northern Bhar El Ghazal State	Aweil Center	124,989
	Aweil East	807,041
	Aweil North	362,132
	Aweil South	239,810
	Aweil West	390,370
Total of NBG		1,924,342
Warrap State	Gogrial East	273,977
	Gogrial West	582,379
	Tonji East	405,663
	Tonj North	651,354
	Tonj South	292,316
	Twic	433,795
Total of Warrap		2,639,484
Lakes State	Awerial	144,680
	Cueibet	296,844
	Rumbek Centre	134,572
	Rumbek East	227,973
	Rumbek North	73,963

	Wulu	69,428
	Yirol East	136,988
	Yirol WEST	181,025
Total of Lakes		1,265,473
Abyei Administrative Area		133,958
Central Equatoria State	Juba	690,918
	Kajo-keji	86,973
	Lainya	82,153
	Morobo	39,644
	Trerkeka	242,992
	Yei	181,841
Total of Central Equatoria		1,324,521
Western Equatoria State	Ezo	49,341
	Ibba	34,992
	Maridi	87,140
	Mundri East	80,189
	Mundri West	52,385
	Mvolo	65,339
	Nagero	26,738
	Nzara	69,045
	Tambura	59,088
	Yambio	138,976
Total of Western Equatoria		663,233
Eastern Equatoria State	Budi	101,474
	Ikotos	61,228
	Kapoeta East	319,112
	Kapoeta North	103,175
	Kapoeta South	67,826
	Lafon/Lopa	85,212
	Magwi	145,384
	Torit	98,491
Total of Eastern Equatoria		981,902

Annex 31: Press released by the Office of the Speaker of the Central Equatoria State Parliament, 15 February 2024



With the above enumerated challenges, we never expected a policy dealing with a resource so sensitive like land that touches the emotions of people could be brought for discussion at this trying moment where the country's unity and that of its people is at stake and much need more than any time before. If anything, we expect that the preoccupation of the Nation Government now should be the quest to solutions for resolving the country's huge socio-economic and political problems but not adding more on an issue like land.

We are further concerned about the draft Land policy because, we strongly believe that it will be subjected to abuse at this material time, where there is less regard to the rule of law, and where some powerful politician leaders and high ranking officers of the law enforcement agencies behave as if they are the law themselves. They use their positions of power to grab people's lands by use of force. This reality has been admitted in parts for the Draft Policy document on page 32 and it becomes a mind boggling why the National Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development decided to table the policy for deliberation and possible adoption by the TNLA with full cognizance of the challenges communities are facing in the hands of powerful land grabbers. Currently, large scale land grabbing is taking place in Central Equatoria State, especially, in Juba City and its environs and it is being done with impunity, a fact that is practically occurring and it cannot be denied. We are just pondering what will happen if this policy is passed by the National legislature given the fact that it is developed under the policy which states that 'all lands in South Sudan belongs to the people of South Sudan' as enshrined in Article 170 of TCoSS which in our view is deliberately meant to justify the carnage being unleashed on community lands by the powerful land grabbers. In the historical significance of land in South Sudan on page 11 of the draft policy, it was clearly stated that *"the history of South Sudan has been in many ways shaped by struggle over its land and natural resources"* and ironically, the struggle of some communities in Central Equatoria over their land is even worse than what has been described in the historical narrative which featured in the Draft Land Policy and the perpetrators of the forceful land acquisition are not people from Khartoum or foreigners anymore but fellow South Sudanese who are trying to institutionalize taking of land by force from selected regions of the country by the powerful ruling elites. The provision of Article 170 of TCoSS 2011 as amended, declaring that 'all land of South Sudan belongs to the people of South Sudan is in reality copying the 1998 law enacted in the Sudan, declaring that ***"all land in the Sudan belongs to Allah and giving the Islamic State as the representative of Allah on Earth , the power to dispose of land owned by non-Moslems"***. In the case of South Sudan, the difference between the 1998 land law of the Sudan and the provision of Article 170 of the constitution is replacing the name Allah with the people of South Sudan and non-Muslims which is silent but may refer to certain ethnicities in some selected regions of the country, while the Islamic State are the powerful land grabbers who do it with open impunity.

Considering the foregoing and after thorough scrutiny of the Draft National Land Policy therefore, the members of the State Transitional Legislative Assembly of Central Equatoria State hereby presents their position on the summarized points hereunder:

1. Categorically reject the part of the Draft National Land Policy which proclaims that 'All Land of South Sudan belongs to the people of South Sudan'. Although this it is in accordance with the provision of Article 170 of Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 as amended, nonetheless, we strongly believe that the inclusion of this particular provision in the supreme law of the

country was done in bad faith and meant to institutionalize and legalize land grabbing. Our argument is based on the premise that, the TCoSS was hurriedly passed without any involvement of the citizens to have a say on it and gave those with oppressive political tendencies and ill intentions towards others in this country, to take that opportunity and included such regrettable provision in the supreme law of the land with imputed motives.

2. Considering the reasons cited in item (1) above, the issue of land governance and for that matter the Draft National Land Policy should be suspended, pending the Permanent Constitution making process, where wider consultation with all communities of the country and stakeholders will be carried out effectively.
3. Because of its sensitivity, the issue of whether land belongs to the community, which is the most popular as opposed to the ambiguous 'all the land of South Sudan belongs to the people of South Sudan' must be subjected to a nation-wide plebiscite or referendum to galvanize popular opinion over the matter.
4. The Draft National Land Policy could be in good faith, but some of its parts are meant to justify and institutionalize the crime of land grabbing and migration of some communities to specific targeted areas in selected regions in the country under the pretext of conflict and natural disasters as stipulated in section 2.1.3. of the policy. This is not a hidden secret because many unscrupulous individuals including some in position of leadership in National Government in their utterances especially, the social media pundits in clubhouses are openly bragging and quoting the provision of Article 170 of Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCoSS) 2011 as amended for justifying their illegal actions on land. Due to the ambiguity in the provision of Article 170 of the National Constitution, those involved in land grabbing and illegal settlement especially by some particular communities are openly talking that, they no longer need any permission from any person to acquire land or to settle anywhere they desire because the constitution is clear on this matter, referring to Article 170 of TCoSS 2011 as amended.

In the context of Central Equatoria State, this argument is being proven by the rampant and unprecedented land grabbing being carried out with impunity and perpetrated by well-placed and powerful people in government including community leaders, especially, in Juba County of Central Equatoria State. This we strongly believe epitomizes what is coming ahead of us especially if the Draft Land policy is approved by the National legislature whereby it will be used as a license and legal basis for committing the crime of land grabbing even in more massive and aggressive way, which is currently happening without any government intervention to restrain the culprits despite the highly publicized outcry of the affected communities. The struggle against land grabbing is left in the hands of the powerless State government authorities, who lacks effective law enforcement agents, where as the grabbers are being guarded by regular forces with heavy machineguns mounted on land Cruiser vehicles.

5. We demand that the National Ministry of Housing, Lands and Urban Development and the National Land Commission should provide unequivocal interpretation of the difference between the two phrases '**Land belong to the**

Community' and the ambiguous "All Land of South Sudan belong to the people of South Sudan" Furthermore, there should be clear explanation to citizens as to why the National Government abandon the former policy of Land belong to the Community which though not officially adopted or entered into any of the country's legal statutes, yet it was and still it remains the most popular among majority of the citizens, because it was applied by the SPLM/A as tool of negotiation with the government of Sudan while negotiating the CPA. It's against this backdrop that the citizens of South Sudan and Central Equatoria State in particular should be educated on the reasons why our National Government opted to the latter, which is a very controversial policy and could be a potential recipe for conflict and abandon the former. This policy paradigm shift worries most citizens and it demands satisfactory explanation from the authors of the Draft Nation Land Policy document.

- 6. We call upon our President H.E General Salva Kiir Mayardit being a peace loving leader to have watchful eyes to check on individual in this country who come up with ideas and policies that would ignite conflicts and be sources of dissensions and social or political disharmony and upheavals in the country. And where possible, restrain them from disturbing the country with unpopular ideas that could temper with the peace and unity of the people of South Sudan at a time it is need more than ever.
- 7. We strongly urge members of the Transitional National Legislature, (TNLA and COS) across the political and ethnic divide who are imbued with nationalistic spirits, the members of the Civil Society Organizations and all South Sudanese of good will to reject and block the passing of the said National Land Policy, pending the processes of the permanent constitution where the issues of land governance will be adequately addressed with full and effective involvement of all stakeholders

God bless the Republic of South Sudan and its people

Handwritten signature
15/02
2024

RT. Hon Peter Wani/Elia Kulang
Speaker,

State Transitional Legislative Assembly, Central Equatoria State, Juba
on behalf of the Hon Members.



Annex 32: Letter from the Head Chief of the Gondokoro Payam, 3 January 2024Date: January 3, 2024

To: Director,
Gondokoro Payam,
Juba County Council

**Subject: Unlawful arrest, Harassment, Torturing, Beating of people and looting
Of Property by Joint Operations during House to House Search on 31st
December, 2023, 1st, 2nd January, 2024 in Mononyik Boma Of Gondokoro
Payam**

The people of Gondokoro did not celebrate Christmas festival and New Year peacefully compared to the previous years because On the Christmas Eve Sunday 24th Dec. 2023 at around 1500 hours, the joint operations entered Gondokoro Island through Alfalata river port at Jebel Nyoka by riverine motor boats under the command of **Big. Gen. Dominic, Maj. Dau and Cpt. John** to conduct a house to house search for armaments as part of the security measures and precaution to secure and protect populations in celebrating the Christmas festival, a measures welcome by not only people of Gondokoro but by the populations in Juba and beyond. When the forces arrived into the Island, they settled at Gondokoro 'B' Primary school. On the same day when they arrived, they started the operation by closing all the roads and started the search going from house to house on date 24th, 25th, 26th 27th and 28th December, 2023. They stayed for five days, the community warmly welcome the forces and they provided some foods stuffs a gesture demonstrating a good civil military relation

On date 28th December, 2023, the join operation forces left the island. The populations did not witness and experience anything bad accept minor incidences caused by soldiers who were drunk during the nights. The incidences such as threatening and ordering people out from the house and requesting money from the people whom they had ordered them out victim Regina keji and her daughters and Juan Primo were force to pay 15,000 SSP to soldier who threatened them. This incident was reported to Commander and the issue was handled by the force commander and Executive Chief of Mononyik Boma. The soldiers conducted the search operations successfully. The community thank the forces through the Head Chief of Gondokoro Payam and Executive Chief of Mononyik Boma. And the people were happy hoping that they are going to celebrate the New Year since their Christmas celebration was interrupted by search operation.

On date 31st December, 2023, the populations of Mononyik in particular and Gondokoro at large were surprised by seeing riverine motor boats full of soldiers returned to Gondokoro Island under the command of **Maj. Malik, Cpt. And 1st Lt.** They landed at **Yorja Sub-Boma** a place known as Murkuku and **Kuda Sub-Boma** and upon their arrival, they immediately started arresting, beating the people in these places. They moved to **Dokabur, kilikkilik area** arresting, harassing, and beating every male person. They dragged all the people who were arrested to the place where they assemble in Yorja Sub-

Boma (Murkuku), the number of people arrested includes youth, children and elders. When the soldiers reached assembly area, all the people arrested were ordered to sit down and the commander asked each and every one to give them the guns peacefully but because people whom they had arrested were civilians, some were students they do not have guns, they started taking those arrested one by one to another location and they started beating them one after the other. After beating, they (the soldiers) confirmed that these people really do not have guns. They ordered the victims to pay 50,000 SSP for each them to be released.

On the 1st and 2nd January, 2024, they went to Mononyik, Murung where they arrested, beating, harassed, forcefully taking goats and money from the people, those who were found to be students and children their relatives had to secure either 50,000 SSP or 30,000 SSP for the released of their loved ones. Those who do not have money were taken to the military base in Mulubur. The soldiers during their operation do not allowed populations in Gondokoro to celebrate Christmas and New Year like other people in other areas. Those who managed to escape spent their time in the bushes.

Number of People who were arrested in Yorja, Kuda, and Mononyik Sub-Bomas on the 31st December, 2023, 1st and 2nd January, 2024 and amount of paid for those who were released either on the same day or on the following days and number goats, smart and cell phones and others are detailed on the below table as here under:

Kuda and Yorja Sub-Bomas

S/N o	Names of arrested persons	occupati on	Property taken				Detain person
			money	Goats	Phone	others	
01	Patrick Nyombe	Sub-Chief		4 goats	Tech. 01		detained
02	Richard Swaka		50,000 SSP				
03	Emmanuel Wani		50,000 SSP				
04	Nelson Swaka		50,000 SSP				
05	Nelson Lako		50,000 SSP				
06	Victor Ladu Sule	Police	50,000 SSP				
07	Mandella Musa		50,000 SSP				
08	Richard Ladu Sule		50,000 SSP				
09	Boutris Gore Victor		50,000 SSP				
10	James Wani Victor		50,000 SSP				
11	Charles Belong Victor		50,000 SSP				
12	Emmanuel Nyombe	Student	30,000 SSP				
13	Samuel Wani Marcello		50,000 SSP	4 goats	Tech. 01		detained
14	James Pitia Arkolano		50,000 SSP				
15	James Wani Modi		30,000 SSP				
16	Emmanuel Pitia Victor		50,000 SSP				

17	Emmanuel Tombe Lino	50.000 SSP			
18	Samuel Morbe Justin	30.000 SSP			
19	Samuel Morbe Tongun	50.000 SSP			
20	James Wani Alex	30.000 SSP			
21	Joel Tombe Alex	30.000 SSP			
22	Joseph Gore Anthony	30.000 SSP			
23	Dominic Boutris	50.000 SSP			
24	Taban Wani James	50.000 SSP			
25	Paul Ladu Karjoe	50.000 SSP			
26	Pater Tombe Victor	30.000 SSP			
27	Justin Jada Sule	30.000 SSP			
28	John Lokolong	50.000 SSP			
29	Rita Sukoji	150.000 SSP			
30	Stella Dwoki	50.000 SSP			
31	Santo Nyombe	30.000 SSP			
32	Samuel Pitia	50.000 SSP			
33	William Modi Wani	50.000 SSP			
34	Dominic Wani Alfred	30.000 SSP			
35	Emmanuel Tongun	30.000 SSP			
36	Luka Mogga	30.000 SSP			
37	Alex Ladu	30.000 SSP			
38	Henry Swaka	30.000 SSP			
39	Richard Doggale	50.000 SSP			
40	Stephen Wani	30.000 SSP			
41	Jackson Wani Arkolan	50.000 SSP			
42	Luka Wani Anthony	50.000 SSP			
43	Amos Nyongera	50.000 SSP			
44	Patrick Burudi	50.000 SSP			
45	Stanly Nyongera	50.000 SSP			
46	Vincent Wanjala	50.000 SSP			
47	Delvin Makofia	50.000 SSP			
48	Kennedy Wafula	50.000 SSP			
49	Abraham Wamukota	50.000 SSP			
50	Jacob Wamukota	50.000 SSP			
51	Daniel Wanjala	50.000 SSP			
52	Denis Wafula	50.000 SSP			
53	Moli	50.000 SSP		smart phone 01	
	Total amount	2,450,000 ssp	8 goats	3 phones	2 person detained

Mononyik Sub-Boma

S/No	Names of arrested persons	occupation	Property taken				Detain person
			money	Goats	Phone	others	
01	Martin Ladu Swaka	Executive Chief	450,000 SSP	01 goat			detained
02	John Ladu Andrea	Sub-chief		06 goats			detained
03	Doggale Gore		50,000 SSP				
04	Amato Pio		50,000 SSP				
05	Ladu Amato		30,000 SSP				
06	Yohana Ladu		30,000 SSP				
07	Stand Ladu		50,000 SSP				
08	Paulino Doggale		50,000 SSP				
09	Terensio Jubek		50,000 SSP				
10	Cusmiro Ladu		50,000 SSP				
11	Masmino Swaka		30,000 SSP				
12	Juma Morbe		30,000 SSP				
13	Hassen Bashir		50,000 SSP				
14	Joice Keji		50,000 SSP				
15	Emmanuel Tombe Anthony		30,000 SSP				
16	Cosmas Pitia					5 crates of beer	
17	Julia Poni		30,000 SSP				
18	Yunis Puru Victor		50,000 SSP				
19	Thomas Ladu Christopher		50,000 SSP				
20	Christopher Legge		50,000 SSP				
21	James Pitia		50,000 SSP		Smart phone 01		
22	Marino Pitia Legge		50,000 SSP				
23	Thomas Jada Marino		50,000 SSP				
24	Nemensio Gore		50,000 SSP				
25	Zachariah Wani		50,000 SSP				
26	Clement Ladu		50,000 SSP				
27	Wani Clamant		30,000 SSP				
28	Emmanuel Ladu		30,000 SSP				

29	Bean Ladu		30,000 SSP				
30	Richard Pitia		30,000 SSP				
31	Marko Tombe		30,000 SSP				
32	Emmanuel Tombe		30,000 SSP				
33	Pitia Legge		30,000 SSP				
34	Charles Swaka		50,000 SSP				
35	Emmanuel Morbe		50,000 SSP				
36	Martin Modi		30,000 SSP				
37	Denis Ladu	Soldier	400,000 SSP			5 creates of Beer	detained
38	Ferjallah Ismail		50,000 SSP				
39	Zakeyo Legge		50,000 SSP				
40	James Tombe		50,000 SSP				
41	James Wani		30,000 SSP				
42	Vinansio Wani		30,000 SSP				
43	Thomas Tombe Geri		50,000 SSP				
44	Stephen Tombe		50,000 SSP				
45	Thomas Jada Faustin		50,000 SSP				
46	James Rondiang		50,000 SSP				
			2,200,000 SSP	7 goats	01 smart phone	10 creates of beer	3 persons detained

Sexual assaults at Mononyik

1. Juan Lako Marko
2. Lipo Charles Swaka

In summary:

Number of people arrested and the property taken in three sub-Bomas are as follows:

Kuda and Yorja Sub-Bomas

- 53 people arrested
- 51 persons released after paying money
- 02 persons detained
- 08 goats
- 03 phones: 2 cell phones and 01 smart phone
- 02 persons detained
- 2,450,000 SSP collected from individuals for their released

Mononyik Sub-Boma


- 46 people arrested
- 43 persons released after paying money
- 03 persons detained
- 07 goats taken from individuals as fine for them to be released
- 35 goats were raided from the grazing area
- 01 smart phone
- 10 creates of beer
- 4,850,000 SSP was collected from individuals and 900,000 SSP was demanded for the released of 5 detained persons making the total amount to be 3,100,000 SSP

Grand total of the money and property taken was 5,550,000 South Sudanese Pounds, 04 phones, 50 goats, 10 creates of beer and 5 persons detained: Executive Chief, Martin Ladu Swaka, Sub-chief, John Ladu Andrea, Sub-Chief Patrick Nyombe, Samuel Wani Marcello and Denis Ladu Gaistano.

In the light of the above, I would like to condemned in strongest term possible those who committed those crimes and I am appealing to the government to intervened and investigate those who carried out those inhuman and degrading act to the people of Gondokoro Payam be brought to book.

In this note, I would like to assure the public that people of Gondokoro are peace loving people since time immemorial we had been living in peace with our neighbors.

In conclusion, people of Gondokoro will never be happy if they do not see accountability for those who committed these acts, we will never be happy if we do not see justice being delivered to the victims, return of the goats and money taken and the release of five people who are still in detention. Lastly, let us work for peace and build trust and this can be realized in good civil military relations.

Sign 
Ramadan Juma Wani
 Head Chief, Gondokoro Payam
 Juba County Council
 Central Equatoria State/Juba



Cc: Hon. Miriela Poni Tartizio, Member of State Transitional Legislative Assembly
 Cc: Chairman of Elders and Intellectuals, Gondokoro Payam
 Cc: File

Annex 33: Statement by Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), 3 January 2024

SOUTH SUDAN: SSPDF DISARMEMENT OPERATION IN JUBA COUNTY, RAISES CONCERNS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

JANUARY 3, 2024

Juba..... The Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) has expressed deep concern over the ongoing civilian disarmament operation taking place in Gondokoro payam of Juba County, Central Equatoria state. Evidence emerging from the exercise indicates clear cases of human rights violations, prompting CEPO to strongly condemn these unlawful acts committed by certain military forces. The organization is demanding a public apology from the military leadership.

CEPO is particularly alarmed by the taking of children by the military forces, detaining individuals including community chiefs, and forcefully displacing the civilian population while subjecting them to assaults. These actions, in violation of child rights as stated in the bill of rights, the South Sudan Child Act of 2008, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, are unacceptable and demand immediate attention.

In light of the situation, CEPO is calling for the immediate return of the children to their parents in Gondokoro, without any preconditions, including the release of the detained individuals. The organization urges the Juba County Commissioner and the leadership of Central Equatoria state to intervene without delay, particularly in addressing the issues concerning the children, the detained persons, and the prompt return of the forcibly displaced population. Hon. Charles Joseph Wani, the commissioner of Juba County, has expressed his dismay at the misconduct exhibited during the disarmament operation. He emphasized that the initial policy was focused solely on disarmament, without resorting to violence, harassment, or confiscation of property. The commissioner called for government intervention and an investigation into the matter, highlighting the beatings of children, assaults on women, and unlawful detention of youth and chiefs.

Mr. Edmund Yakani, the Executive Director of CEPO, acknowledges the importance of civilian disarmament in curbing armed violence within communities. However, he stresses that human rights violations during the process are not acceptable. Yakani questions why the military has failed to learn from past experiences where forceful disarmament led to violence and deadly confrontations between the military and civilians.


Among the reported unlawful acts committed by the military are the taking of children hostage, detaining 19 individuals (including four chiefs), and forcefully displacing the civilian population while subjecting them to assaults. These actions violate child rights and the right to an adequate standard of living, as stipulated in the bill of rights, the South Sudan Child Act of 2008, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Multiple victims in Gondokoro payam have provided testimony supporting these claims.

Mr. Yakani is urging the political leadership in Central Equatoria State and the national government to swiftly intervene in the situation and address the violations that have occurred during the civilian disarmament in Gondokoro payam.

The joint operations for disarmament began in December 2023, aiming to reduce crime in Juba and across the country. However, the recent events in Gondokoro payam have raised concerns about the manner in which the operation has been carried out and the resulting human rights violations.

As the situation unfolds, it is crucial that the authorities address the grievances raised by CEPO and take immediate action to rectify the injustices committed during the disarmament operation, ensuring the safe return of the displaced population and the release of the detained individuals.

Annex 34: Bari (Equatorian) community Statement, 8 January 2024



Bari Community
Juba - South Sudan

8th January, 2024

For Immediate Press Release

CONDEMNATION OF THE ATROCITIES METED OUT AGAINST THE JUBA COUNTY'S BARI COMMUNITY, KONDOKORO PAYAM, UNDER THE GUISE OF DISARMAMENT.

The Bari Community (BC) Executive and Bari Elders are again informing you: the International Community, the United Nations (UN), Troika (USA, UK & Norway), IGAD, AU, the Community of Saint 'Egidio, the Greater Equatoria Communities and the peace loving people of the world, that the Governments of the Republic of South Sudan and of Central Equatoria State have singled out the Bari Community for persecution, a price for hosting the Country's Capital in Juba.


The all too familiar heinous acts of killing, torture, cattle rustling, looting of properties, displacement, land grabbing and occupation, etc. are not enough to guarantee and satisfy the lust for Bari Land. The Disarmament of civilians is now the new lethal weapon of brutalization by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) against the Bari Community.

On 24th December 2023, the SSPDF entered Kondokoro Island with a pretext of providing security during Christmas Celebration; but their mission was to conduct Civilian Disarmament. During the process of disarmament, the SSPDF started by harassing, arresting, beating, torturing and demanding ransom from the youths, elders and chiefs. The SSPDF terrorized, displaced and agonized the people of Kondokoro who were celebrating the Christmas and New Year 2024. They lastly left the Island on the 2nd January 2024, then on 3rd January 2024, following the press conference by the Community, the Commissioner of Juba County appeared to address the displaced people at Jebel Nyoka.

We present the following futile Disarmament Program:

I. THE DISARMAMENT ORDER

Page 1 of 5



BC/HQs Juba: Jubek Square - South of Ivory Bank - Juba Branch, Tel: +211914 642 552 - +211929 992 230

Civilian Disarmament for all the Ten States of South Sudan. The President tasked the State Governors with support of the SPLA (now SSPDF) to collect civilian weapons within six months.

II. THE EXECUTION OF THE DISARMAMENT ORDER

It is now evident that the Government is executing the Disarmament Program selectively. In some states, it is Voluntary Disarmament for instance in Greater Bahr El Ghazal, (i.e. Lakes State, Warap State, etc.) while in others such as Central Equatoria State, it is Compulsory/Forced Disarmament conducted by SSPDF.

III. THE DISARMAMENT IN JUBA COUNTY, CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE (CES)

The menace of conducting Civilian Disarmament Program in Juba County has deplorably manifested human rights violations against the Bari people of Lodu, Mangalla and Kondokoro Payams, respectively.

On 24th December 2023, the SSPDF forces entered the Island of Kondokoro on the pretext of providing security during Christmas Festival. However, the main purpose is to carry out Civilian Disarmament Program.

In the morning of Christmas Festive (25th December 2023), the SSPDF ordered the Wildlife Force who was deployed to Kondokoro by then to surrender their arms peacefully, otherwise they would use force. They claimed and accused the Wildlife Force of being a Bari force and not Government force. Thus, the Wildlife Force surrendered all their guns to SSPDF to avoid loss of lives.

On 26th December 2023, the SSPDF Forces declared to the population of Kondokoro their program of disarmament. The civil population must surrender their guns, in reply, the civilians told the SSPDF that, they did not possess guns.

In the morning of 27th December 2023, the SSPDF started harassing, arresting, beating and torturing the youths, elders and Chiefs of Kondokoro, intentionally believing that, the people of Kondokoro have guns. Unfortunately, the entire civilians living in Kondokoro don't possess arms. They were terribly terrorized and displaced from the Island to Jebel Nyoka at Western Bank of River Nile (Juba). The SSPDF illegally levied ransom of SSP 50,000 for youths and foreigners



working in the farmers (Kenyans, Ugandans, Burundians, Rwandans, and others), and SSP 240,000 & a goat for elders, Sub-chiefs and SSP 1,000,000 for chiefs. Whereas in Böri Boma, Lodu Payam, the SSPDF committed sexual harassment, raping, beating, looting and torturing of the host community.

IV. THE STICKING POINTS

1. The selective implementation of the Disarmament Order where the Bari Community is targeted for Compulsory Disarmament which included looting properties, beating elders, youths & under ten children, detention of youths & chiefs and payment of ransom.
2. We concern of the absence of the Central Equatoria State Authorities in the execution of the Disarmament Order, even though the State Governor with the support of SPLA (SSPDF) is tasked to collect civilian weapons.
3. The disarming of Bari Community while Dinka Cattle Herders are openly roaming Bari farm lands with different types of weapons.
4. The lack of respect for the Customary Law Authorities (Chiefs, Sub-chiefs and Headmen) by the SSPDF not acceptable.
5. The irresponsible and inciting utterances of Dinka notables that they will take over all Bari Land by force if deemed necessary.
6. The continuous grabbing of Bari Land (in Rejaf, Mangalla, Kondokoro, Lodu & Luri), forceful displacement, presence of cattle and their heavily armed Herders, and insecurity caused by Dinka and Nuer.
7. Condoning the forceful settlement of Dinka Bor and Nuer on the Eastern Bank of the Supiri/River Nile (Bahr El Jebel) at Mangalla, Kondokoro and Rejaf Payams; and Dinka Bahr El Ghazal and Nuer on the Western Bank at Rejaf, Luri and Lodu Payams.
8. The difficulty of reconciling accepting Juba to continue to be the Capital City and participation in the up-coming December 2024 Elections while being brutalized.
9. The unfortunate linking of Bari People with the National Salvation Front (NAS).
10. We refute the claim of collecting more than 300 guns from the civilians of Kondokoro Island as reported by SSBC Radio on Saturday 6th of January 2024.

V. THE WAY FORWARD

Page 3 of 5



1. The BC Executive and Bari Elders condemn the atrocities committed by the SSPDF particularly on the people of Kondokoro Payam in the strongest terms possible. An enemy force would no exact more.
2. We are aware that the Disarmament Order is for General and complete Disarmament i.e. the abolition of all kinds of weapons in the hands of civilians. Thus, the methods used whether voluntary and/or compulsory should apply equally to all the South Sudanese Communities.
3. The never ending land grabbing, displacements, looting of properties, the presence of marauding armed cattle herders and their cattle, etc. must be stopped.
4. The scenario of beating and detention for ransom by the SSPDF must not prevail.
5. We demand the refund of ransom money and return of looted goats, sheep and properties by the SSPDF.
6. Chiefs are the link between the Government and Community, they hold special status in their Communities and have immunity before the Law. They must be accorded the respect they deserve.
7. Land grabbing and forced settlement of Dinka and Nuer must be stopped if peace is to prevail.
8. Condoning atrocities against the Bari Community and, indeed the Greater Equatoria Communities, will not augur well for the Capital to remain in Juba; for the Endorsement of President Salva Kiir Mayardit as the SPLM Flag Bearer; and the up-coming December 2024 Elections.
9. To identify and bring to book the SSPDF Commanders responsible for the atrocities.
10. The Government must desist from linking the Bari Community with NAS.

In conclusion, the Bari Community reiterates its position of relocating the Capital City from Juba to Ramciel as presented to the Government of South Sudan on 14th March 2011 by the former BC Chairman, Hon. Gen. Alfred Lodu Gore to the Former National Minister of Investment, Hon. Gen. Oyai Deng Ajak, at Tokiman B-Court Kator. And the resolution of National Council of Ministers presided by H.E Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit on the relocation of Capital City to Ramciel as press briefed on 3rd September 2011 by National Minister of Information Dr. Barnaba Marial.



We are urging the President of the Republic H.E Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit to intervene to resolve the above cited issues, if not the Bari Community will not participate in the up-coming December 2024 Elections.

Kind Regards,

SP
31/1/24



Hon. Stephen Pitia Lako
Mor Lo Bari (BC Chairman)
Bari Community (BC)
Juba – South Sudan

CC: Office of the President, RSS

CC: Diplomatic Missions

CC: Troika (USA, UK & Norway)

CC: UNMISS

CC: IGAD

CC: Office of the Speaker, R-NTLA

CC: Office of the Speaker, CS

CC: Governors of Greater Equatoria States

CC: Office of the Speaker, CES-RTLA

CC: Office of the Commissioner, Juba County


CC: Chief of General Staff


CC: DGs, NSS/ISB

CC: IGP

CC: Media Houses

Annex 35: Statement by Dinka Marial Bai on attack on Jur River County, 7 November 2023



Annex 36: Letter from Apuk Graduates Congress representative, 13 November 2023

- G) Protection of students who are approaching for their examinations on 20th/November/2023.
- H) An immediate release of Gen.Mading Duor's vehicle which was detained by an IO Brig.Gen. Bol Wek last week.




.....
SANTINO LUACH AGOK
CHAIRPERSON OF APUK
GRADUATES CONGRESS (A.G.C)
(A.G.C) JUBA/0921698899/0924420700

**Annex 37: Letter by Apuk representatives against SSPDF Division 5 commander,
15 November 2023**




Annex 38: Statement by Marial Wau youth, 17 November 2023



MARIAL WAU YOUTHS' ASSOCIATION IN JUBA

"UNITY IS OUR STRENGTH"



Ref: MWYA-J/OC/D15/23AD Date: 17 of Nov. 2023

Ago:


Response to the two condemnations letters written by the so called Apuk Graduate Congress Dated 13 & 14 Nov. 2023 respectively.

Maluach Awein Majok Chan (Santino Maluach Agook), the Chairperson of the said Graduate congress, a graduate of 3rd Class degree of LLb Evening Programme of University of Juba,1

"Can anyone remind Maluach Agook that he was once a bodyguard to Gen. Agiu Adhieu, his former boss to whom they are now killing his innocent family on Daily Basis, "can anyone too, remind our brother Maluach Agook that, the community of Marial-Wau to whom he called (IO) army are the very people to where his beautiful belly (Atuok) had grown from within their land? Well, Marial-Wau community would Like to Assure the so called Apuk Graduate congress and their Chairman Maluach that, No Body is happy with what is happening in our Land now, Both innocent people who are dying now are all our people, whether from Apuk or Marial-Wau, still they are brothers from one father of Mighty (Dinka), and we don't Know to why you people are encouraging this senseless war despite the fact that you used to call your selves as a graduate congress.

With this end, we would like to response to you as follows: ...

- (1) You peoples Knows clearly that, you are the one who Started this war, killing our people, burning our properties and Again begin to condemn the war you started, this uncivilized mindset cannot reconcile with this action completely.
- (2) You named Marial-Wau as an (IO) army, but to Educate you further, IO is not an insult as you think but, it is a political party registered under the South Sudan political parties act 2011 amended 2016 and a party to the Agreement of revitalized transitional government of national Unity(R-TGNU) signed in Khartoum 2018, However, despite being a right of Any individual to Joint whatever organization of its Choice, still No any single Marial-Wau sons or Daughter has rebeled Against SSPDF or South Sudan Government not even a mere rat or chicken of Marial-Wau is a member of (IO) Rather Than SPLM.
- (3) You have called for the maximum protection of Apuk Sons in Wau, where in the real sense no body is threatening the safety of Apuk brothers in Wau, you are just scared about the brutal killing you guys committed against our people and you thought that we will prepare to revenge the same killing in town, this evil thinking of yours will not happen and as we



MARIAL WAU YOUTH ASSOCIATION
17 NOV 2023
john.ay...@gmail.com, +211926121111, +211923333368, +211922297771

speak, I am staying in our house with more than (5 people) of Apuk Son specially Buoyar section and we are staying peacefully as brothers, if you want, I will mention their name.

- (4) no any checkpoint created along Wau Kuacjok Highways or Wau Luanyaker highways accept the two different borders checkpoints in Manyang and therkueng Respectively, unlike Warrap State where you find more than (30 checkpoint) created for looting only.
- (5) Gen. Mading Duor to whom you claimed his car's confiscation, is the son to our daughter and that no body had ever confiscated his car but, it was just a fear from some element who came along to Achongchong market where the found the huge number of people gathered at the scene of the incident and upon seeing people, they dump the car and ran away thinking that they will be captured for the crime committed by buoyar youth. In that matter, the car was taken care off and it was given back peacefully.
- (6) Know that Marial-wau community didn't and will not generalize this war to all Apuk sons, we know the criminals that are disturbing our people, these are the Buoyar Uncivilized villagers.
- (7) Yaa Mr. evening Molana, Maaluu Asa, it seems like you have no clue about the laws of South Sudan, how can You Condemned Gen. Dau Aturjong and even we heard you Quoting SPLA Act 2009, Does APLA act 2009 doesn't have an Article that granted powers to the SSPDF commander to protect the Civilian and their properties from Criminals and any other form of Aggression?? This is an Absolute Madness from you bro.

Gen. Dau Didn't came there before but, your Gelweng and your (Division 11) in Majaktiit which is fully and 100% purely occupied by sons of Apuk headed by the Muonyapuk too are terrorizing our innocent unarmed Civilian of marial Wau and that is why Gen. Dau Aturjong is there to keep laws and orders.

The End.

For God and our Land


Sign:.....

Christopher Manut A. Ayei

A/Chairman of Marial-Wau Youth Association in Juba



Annex 39: Letter by Marial Wau youth, 18 November 2023



both parties agreed to exchange back the cows to their respective owners and it was implemented successfully, though Buoyar(Apuk) youth did not bring back the same numbers of cows raided.

- 3) **On Date 29/8/2023** Buoyar youth(APuk Giirthiik) infiltrated to our territory secretly at night and kidnapped our nephew, Called Door Door, A citizen of Kuach community and later found lying dead slaughtered on the ground the following morning, we have the photo of the deceased for evident if needed.
- 4) **On Date 30/8/2023**, buoyar youth (Apuk Giirthiik) of Gogrial east county of Warrap state start shooting randomly in the area called Riangalek where they successfully shot and wounded the small boy and later we rushed him to the hospital and he was treated well, thank God!
- 5) **One month and half later, On Date 18/10/2023.** Buoyar youth had massively started the war of properties where the successfully burned down the houses in the area called Kuelek, north west of Manyang! Goats were stolen and some farm products were successfully looted in those areas too, well.
- 6) **On Date 7/11/2023** a well-coordinated intentional attack was organized by the said Buoyar community of Apuk Giirthiik of Gogrial east county of Warrap state to our area called Achongchong, in this attack, one person was shot dead by these criminals and the other one was wounded and a number of 12shops were burned to ash. We wrote the first condemnation on this and the photos of the deceased are there for justification.
- 7) **On Date 11/11/2023** the worst day ever, Buoyar youth had massively attacked our peoples in the areas called Geirich, Kuelek and Ahot respectively, many Marial-Wau innocent civilian were murdered in a cool blood including two paramount chiefs with their entire families and because we are civilian and we don't have guns to defend ourselves, our peoples were just killed as they want together with their Division 11 tribal army till they got satisfied with the killing and evacuated back alone.

Marial-Wau community is bleeding and let the world know the number of our innocent civilian killed as follows :...

s/n	Names in full	Status	remark
1	Sultan Kuol Agiu Ngor	p/chief	Dead
2	Sultan Mading Adhieu Akech	Ex/cheif	Dead
3	Mading Agiu Ngor	Brother to p/cheif	Dead
4	Agiu Bol Thiep (Kuac South)	Ordinary p	Dead
5	Door Door (kuac South)	Ordinary p	Dead
6	Kuach Akuith (Kuac south)	Ordinary p	Dead
7	One small boy name unidentified	Child	Dead
8	Another small boy name unidentified	Child	Dead
9	Akol Majok (Akol Awut) Iuo of rocrocdong	Businessman	Dead


10	Akech Anyar Deng	G/Master degree	Dead
11	Makuach madut yel	Ordinary	Lost to date
12	Anyar Akech Machtoch	Cattle keeper	Dead
13	Wol Wol (Wol Madoot)	Ustaz	Dead
14	Makom Manut Mabeek	Ustaz	Lost to date
15	Kuach Jongamel	Great Spear master ex/chief	Dead

We once again send our condolences to our imidiate family and the family of our brothers from Apuk sons who lost their life too, May God rest their saul in peace.

The end.

For God and our Land

Sign.....



Christopher Manut A. Ayei

A/chairman of Marial-Wau Youth in Juba

Cc/security concern

Cc/judiciary

Cc/Western Bhar el Ghazal State coordination office


Cc/Marial-wau Community in Juab

Cc/Marial-Wau community in Wau

Cc/Media

Cc/File

Annex 40: Statement by SPLM youth league in Warrap, 13 November 2023



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
YOUTH LEAGUE
WARRAP STATE
CHAIRPERSON'S OFFICE**

Date: 13/11/2023.

Ref: Statement on the ongoing crisis between Gogrial East and Jur River Counties of Warrap and Western Bhar El Ghazal States and, the recent barbaric incident on Wau-Kuajok road.

While the Country is enjoying peace dividend and gearing towards elections, the SPLM Youth League is grieved by Ther-Kueng (Wau-Kuajok) road inhuman incident where a graduate, former Youth leader and humanitarian worker, late James Akeen Majak among others were killed after repeated clashes at Manyang area that befallen people's lives of the two sisterly States of Warrap and Western Bhar El Ghazal.

Thus, the SPLM Youth League leadership is gravely agonized by, and condemned in strongest terms possible the inhuman, barbaric and senseless killings of innocent civilians, Youth leader and humanitarian worker on Wau-Kuajok road dated 11/11/2023 by criminal road ambushers.


The SPLM Youth League joins the families of the victims and the people of Warrap State at large for the loss of their beloved ones and expresses its deepest condolences to the families and friends of victims and, sends its outrage at such cruelty committed by criminals and, may Almighty God rests their souls in eternal Peace.

The continuous crisis over Manyang area between Gogrial East and Jur River Counties of Warrap and Western Bhar El Ghazal causes a worrying escalation of violence as the Country prepares for Elections next year and no cause justifies such brutality and senseless killings. With this, SPLM Youth League appeals to the two conflicting communities to cease hostilities and resort to peaceful means of resolving this dispute.

Lastly, the SPLM Youth League is hereby calling on governments of two States and national to swiftly intervene to contain the situation from escalating and permanently resolve the conflict of disputed areas between the two Counties and, arrest the culprits or the killers of Ther-Kueng incident and bring them to book.

End of Statement.

**Cde. Adhar Powut Barac,
Interim Chairperson,
SPLM Youth League,
Warrap State-Kuajok.**





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Tel. +211 (0) 929107407/ (0) 929407001.

Annex 41: Green Book resolutions, December 2024




The Green Book document was produced from a major peace conference held in December 2023 to address the multiple conflicts occurring across Warrap State.³²⁵ Its resolutions have been widely endorsed.³²⁶



The Green Book slides are listed below.



³²⁵ The City Review, Warrap officials conclude consultative meeting with resolutions, 14 December 2023

³²⁶ The City Review, Warrap adopts resolutions to end inter-communal conflict, 25 January 2024





Findings from Apuk Giir (Gogrial East)

Issues/Problem:

- Land (Nyin-Akok / Manyang)
- Marial-baai youths attacked the Apuk community
- Marial-baai formed a group and armed themselves

Causes of the conflict:

- Land disputes due to resources
- Some politicians from Western Bahr El Ghazal State (Wau)

Legal issues


- Special courts to be established to preside over land disputes among the communities.
- Judiciary to establish mobile courts to try cases without delay.
- Perpetrators to be brought to the book immediately to mitigate escalation of violent conflict.

Findings from the Gogrial West (Aguok, Kuac and Awan)

<p>Issues/Problems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">➤ Fighting between Kuac and Aguok community in the disputed place called Muonyjeng➤ Houses were burned➤ Poor governance in the state➤ Social media instigators➤ Alcohol consumption	<p>Causes of the conflict:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">➤ Land disputes between Aguok and Kuac➤ It started in the Cattle camp, Muony-Jeng➤ Cattle raiding➤ Uncivilized politics among the communities➤ unresolved disputes within the community➤ unclassified rumors that instigate violence among the communities.
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
Legal Issues

- ❖ Chief Justice to constitute courts and appoint judges to try criminal cases in Warrap State.
- ❖ State laws should be enacted in compliance to the national constitution to ensure rule of law.
- ❖ The national government must establish laws to regulate the use of guns.
- ❖ The perpetrators of destruction of property should be made to compensate what they have destroyed.
- ❖ The accused that triggered that conflict between the two communities should be brought to book.

Annex 42: Presidential decree RSS/RO/J/01/2024, 16 January 2024

2. The relevant Security Institutions of the Country MUST deploy neutral forces to the conflict affected areas with clear operational orders to restore law and order.
3. The Security Forces MUST ensure that Mr. Gai Machiek, the Nuer Spiritual Leader is expelled from Ajak Kuac area in Warrap State and peacefully returned to either Unity State or moved to another state of his choice within the Bahr el Ghazal Region, other than Warrap State and Abyei Special Administrative Area.
4. The Security Forces MUST also ensure that the Nuer youth present in Twic and Ngok areas are moved either back to the Nuer land or away from the areas of conflict to States such as Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal or Lakes.
5. The relevant Security Forces, Law enforcement agencies and Legal Institutions MUST ensure that any politician or person or group of politicians or persons who incites or incite violence on both or either sides of the respective communities, should be summoned and questioned or apprehended by the relevant authorities and where appropriate, arraign them in courts of law for justice and tranquility to prevail. Land, borders and boundaries in the conflict affected areas of Twic, the Ngok Dinka, Apuk, Marialbai, including the question of Abyei Box, MUST be put on hold and the leadership shall devise a peaceful means of resolving it accordingly. This Order shall equally apply to other land, boarder and boundary related conflicts in other parts of the Country.

6. The Governors of Warrap State, Western Bahr El Ghazel State and the Chief Administrator of Abyei Special Administrative Area, together with Governors from neighboring States are directed to engage the youth in their respective States or Areas to disengage and desist from violence, embrace peaceful co-existence including engaging them in agriculture, peace and developmental projects as well as income generating activities.
7. All the relevant Security Organs MUST continue to carry on arms search and peaceful disarmaments of the civil population in Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal States, as well as other parts of the Country.
8. All relevant institutions should engage UNISFA to stick to its legal mandate.
9. The Bridge in Wau remains Clement Mboro Bridge and the National Government shall dispatch a team to Wau to sensitize the citizens about the same and an investigation Committee shall be formed to investigate the incidence of violence in Wau for further action.
10. SSPDF, the Police and NSS are hereby directed to ensure that these orders are enforced and implemented accordingly.



3

The President


*Issued under my hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba,
this Sixteenth Day of the Month of January in the Year 2024.*



**Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Commander -In- Chief of the SSPDF,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba.**



Annex 43: Post by SSPDF Office of Commander for Mobilization Unit Ground Force, 16 December 2023



Annex 44: New SSPDF vehicles with forces under the command of Tito Biel



Source: confidential source, with additional photographs on file with the Panel.

**Annex 45: APC sales contract between Apollo Security Vehicles and ICD Ltd.,
3 February 2022**

SALES CONTRACT

Date: 3rd Feb 2022 Ref : ASV/SS/2022/01

Between: The Seller
 Apollo Security Vehicles LLC
 [Redacted]
 Aqaba, JORDAN

And : The Buyer
 ICD Ltd
 Juba, Republic of South Sudan

Subject: Contract towards supply of 4x4 APC's
 The Seller agrees to provide 100 units of APC for Army model TYGRA 4x4 Armoured B6 Level in Multiple Lots as detailed in our proforma invoice and in this Contract.

Pricing / Account Details : REF: PI-22197-R

#	Description	Quantity	Unit price	Amount
1	B6 Level Armored Personnel Carrier 8 seater (2+6) built on TLC 79 4.2 Ltr Turbo Diesel Engine 4x4 driveline	100	\$105,000.00	\$10,500,000.00
TOTAL OF THIS INVOICE US DOLLAR TEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY				\$ 10,500,000.00

Account Details

BANK Details

Account Name: Apollo Security Vehicles LLC
 [Redacted]

Validity : Proforma Invoice Valid till 28.02.2022

Pg. 1 of 3



<p>For the Seller:</p> <p>[Redacted]</p>  <p>Apollo Security Vehicles LLC</p>	<p>For the Buyer:</p> <p>[Redacted]</p> 
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Annex 46: Export approval for Shield Armored Vehicles, 7 January 2023



SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES
Chief of Defence Forces

RSS/SSPDF/CDF/01/2023/047 7th January, 2023

SSPDF GHQs, Bilpam Juba
Republic of South Sudan


To Whom It May Concern

Subject: Approval of Export of Armored Vehicles

By this notification, we request the authorities "whom it may concern" for approval of export and shipment of **sixteen (16)** armored vehicles through **M/S Shield for Armored Vehicles, Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZA) Jordan**, which was contracted for modification and supply of these vehicles. The details of the vehicles are as hereunder:

S/No.	Type	Year	Purpose	Chassis No.	Modification Completed
1.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J0NB048614	Yes
2.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J2NB049442	Yes
3.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J6NB050478	Yes
4.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J6NB050299	Yes
5.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73JXNB050564	Yes
6.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J2NB043401	Yes
7.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73JXNB045302	Yes
8.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J0NB048239	Yes
9.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J6NB049900	Yes
10.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J7NB050859	Yes
11.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J5NB050150	Yes
12.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J6NB049444	Yes
13.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73JXNB050998	Yes
14.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J3NB052317	Yes
15.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J5PB053682	Yes
16.	Toyota Land Cruiser 79	2022	Government	JTFLV73J7PB053991	Yes

...aring in mind that the modified Toyota 79s have the inherent undertaking not to re-export, use, transfer or donate these vehicle(s) for military activities unless approved by the relevant governmental authority in the State of the Organization's headquarters. We take this opportunity




OF CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCES SSPDF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS-BILPAM JUBA REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

Annex 47: ICD Ltd Registration document



Annex 48: ICD Ltd Business licence for Central Equatoria State, 15 January 2020

 **REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN** 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PUBLIC SERVICE
DIRECTORATE OF COMMERCE & SUPPLY
JUBEK STATE
JUBA

LICENCE SERIAL NUMBER 012465 C

OPERATION LICENCE.

The issuance of Operation Licence in Accordance with Article 85(2) of Jubek State, Transitional Constitution is hereby Certified.

That

(THE NAME) * ICD LTD. *

JS - THONGPING - JUBA

BEING THE PROPERTY OF: AS PER MEMO & ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION

Has been duly issued in accordance with Article (52) read together with item (14) of schedule B and item (28) of schedule C of Jubek State Transitional Constitution 2011.

Expiry Date - 15TH JANUARY, 2021.


DIRECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTORATE OF COMMERCE & SUPPLY
JUBEK STATE
JUBA



This 15TH day of JANUARY, 2020


Annex 49: MP-5A5 observed in South Sudan

An MP-5A5 with a retractable buttstock and 3-round burst trigger group was seen in possession of security detail for the Governor of Upper Nile State while he was overseeing the deployment of 522 soldiers on 11 December 2023.

The MP-5 sub-machine gun is also used by Sudanese security services and is produced in a range of countries, including Germany, China, Greece, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkiye and the United Kingdom.



Annex 50: Micro Tavor X95 observed in South Sudan in possession of private security



Annex 51: Attempt to procure weapons by SSPDF, 19 September 2023

Office of the Director of
Acquisitions
Government of South Sudan



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
AND VETERAN AFFAIRS
P.O. Box 649, Juba
South Sudan

IN ANY CORRESPONDENCE ON
THIS SUBJECT PLEASE QUOTE

Our Ref: SUPLS/MODVA/042/022-23/EXT

Your Ref:

Date: 19th Sept, 2023



**Subject: Military Equipment & Supplies Procurement
Request for Quotation (RFQ) No. 511017**

The Ministry of Defense & Veterans Affairs (MODVA), - Republic of South Sudan (RSS) invites you to submit a Firm Fixed Price Proposal for the following items;

No.	Item description	Quantity
1.	12.7 x 108 mm DshK Machine Guns	30
2.	7.62 x 54 mm SDV Sniper rifles	500
3.	12.7 x 108 NSV Machine Guns	50
4.	23 x 152 mm Zu-23-2 Twin Barrel Anti-Aircraft Machine Guns on Towed wheel chassis	15
5.	60 mm HE Mortar Shells	25,000
6.	60 mm Mortar Launchers	25
7.	82mm HE Mortar Shells	10,000
8.	82mm Mortar Launchers	20
9.	120mm HE Mortar Shells	100
10.	120 mm Mortar Launchers	15
11.	SPG-9-73mm Recoilless Anti-Tank Gun	15
12.	OG-9V FRAG-HE (73mm) Rounds for SPG-9	5,000
13.	RPG-7 Launcher	30
14.	PG-7 HE Rounds for RPG	100
15.	40/46mm Revolvers Hand Grenade Launchers	25
16.	30mm AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launchers	30
17.	Tactical Bulletproof vests (III-IV NIJ / 3 rd class, Br4, Br5, S2)	2,000
18.	Assault Bulletproof Vests (IV NIJ / class, Br4, Br5)	2,000
19.	Protective Bulletproof Helmets (PASGT Level IIIA)	1,500
20.	Armored Trucks with anti-mine protection.	20

You will solely be responsible for ensuring that your offer is received by the Directorate of Acquisitions by the 30th September, 2023.

1. **Offer submission:** The offer must be submitted electronically only.

Electronic submission only; The offer must be sent to the following address:
to: info@modva-rss.com Dr. John Moduk, Director Acquisitions.

Please reference the RFQ number in any response to this RFQ.

2. **Specifications:** All commodities offered in response to this RFQ must be new and unused.
3. **Quotation:** The quote made in response to this RFQ must be priced on a fixed-price, all inclusive basis, including delivery and all other associated costs. You are required to submit your quotation using your company letterhead.

During the validity of the quotation, MODVA will not accept any changes in unit prices, due to escalation, inflation, exchange rate fluctuation, or other market factors, after receipt of the quotation. At the time of award MODVA reserves the right to increase or decrease the quantity of goods, by up to a maximum twenty-five per cent (25%) of the total offer, without changes in the unit price.

Currency of Quotation: Pricing must be presented in either US dollars Or Euros (VAT 0%, and exempt of customs taxes).

Quotation validity: The offer must remain valid for not less than 90 calendar days after submission. In exceptional circumstances, MODVA may request your company to extend the validity of the quotation beyond what has initially been indicated in the RFQ. The Proposal shall then confirm the extension in writing, without any modification whatsoever on the Quotation.

Note: Due to certain prevailing systematic issues associated with the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) that are beyond the control of the Ministry of Defense & Veterans Affairs (MODVA) which limit the government's direct import of classified equipment of a military nature all contractual arrangements will be arranged, executed and implemented between [REDACTED] and Uganda's Ministry of Defense & Veterans Affairs who will be fully responsible for providing the End User Certificates (EUCs), sign contract documents, effect the contract payments and receive all the imports on our behalf.

Please take note that the Directorate of Acquisitions will internally examine and evaluate your offer to ascertain whether it gives government the best value for money after which your file will be passed on to Uganda's Ministry of Defense for further management.

As a precursor to contract signature with the Ugandan establishment, its advisable that an interactive meeting be held between both parties to agree on vital elements such as the payment schedule, delivery timelines, warranties, securities, and after sales maintenance among other things that will finally result into the draft contract that will be signed interparty.


Yours respectfully,



John Moduk
Director of Acquisitions



Annex 52: Request to RECSA for support on stockpile management, 12 February 2024


REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

REF: RSS/MFA&IC/A&F/MO/12/02/2024/013 Date: 12/02/2024

Your Excellency Prof. Kithure Kindiki and dear brother,

Subject: Requesting assistance for our Unified Forces

I hope this message finds you well.


I am writing to you in your capacity as the Cabinet Secretary of Interior and National Coordination of the Republic of Kenya and Chair of the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) Council of Ministers, seeking your assistance on behalf of the Republic of South Sudan.

We are kindly requesting your support in providing training for our unified forces in as per the Revitalized Peace Agreement in the Republic of South Sudan, specifically in the area of developing effective inventory and stockpile management procedures. As we prepare for the upcoming elections, the unified forces play a crucial role to ensuring the smooth democratic exercise.


Given your expertise and experience in this field, we believe that your guidance and support would significantly contribute to the enhancement of our unified forces' capabilities. We are confident that with proper training in inventory and stockpile management, these forces will be better equipped to fulfil their responsibilities effectively.

Your assistance will greatly contribute to the overall security and success of our democratic processes. We sincerely hope that you will find it possible to allocate the necessary resources and expertise to address our request.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan avails itself of this opportunity to present to you the assurance of its highest regards and consideration.


Amb. Dr. James Pitia Morgan (PhD)
Minister,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation


Professor Kithure Kindiki
Cabinet Secretary,
Interior and National Coordination
Chair, Regional Centre on Small Arms & Light Weapons (RECSA)



CC: Ministry of Interior
Republic of South Sudan
CC: Executive Secretariat (RECSA)
Nairobi, Kenya

JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Annex 53: Explosion at Giada military barracks



4.816999°, 31.587608°

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus.
Imagery Date: 5 May 2023.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.





Images sourced from South Sudanese media reports and social media reports.

**Annex 54: NAS claim of responsibility for explosion at Giada barracks,
25 February 2024**



DATE: 25TH /02/2024

FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE.

The NAS Army Leadership would like to inform all NAS members and the people of South Sudan that on 24/ 02/2024, at about 24.00 hours, NAS Special Force carried out an operation on the “SSPDF” Armored Ammunitions Store at the old General Headquarters (El-Giada) in Juba.

The NAS Force withdrew safely after accomplishing its mission, leaving the enemy in panic and disarray.

NAS would like to assure the people of South Sudan that it will not leave any stone unturned to stop the suffering inflicted by the oppressive Regime of Salva Kiir on our citizens!

The Leadership of NAS congratulates the gallant NAS Army / Special Force for this heroic operation against the enemy right into the heart of the capital, Juba.

NAS remains committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the RSS by addressing the Root Causes

NAS Guwa!

People power!

The Struggle Continues and victory is certain!

Col. Yongule Emmanuel Thomas!

NAS Military Spokesperson.



**Annex 55: Bashayer Pipeline Company (BAPCO) emergency notification,
12 February 2024**



BASHAYER PIPELINE COMPANY (BAPCO)

Almugran District – Petrodar Tower
Khartoum, Sudan

Tel: +249 187 008011 Fax: +249 183 790550

Date: February, 12th, 2024
Ref: BAPCO/DPOC/letter/MT.24/003

TO: Mr. Ayoung Bol Deng
Acting President
Dar Petroleum Operating Company

CC: BAPCO BOD chairman
CC: DGD General Director

Subject: Emergency Notification

Dear Sir,

Reference is made to letter number BAPCO/DPOC/letter/MT.24/001, dated February 10th, 2024, and letter number BAPCO/DPOC/letter/MT.24/002, dated February 12th, 2024.

We regret to inform you that the pressure reading at PS#3 sharply declined from 93 bar to 3 bar and ESD system accordingly shutdown, which is seem that there is a leak or rupture in pipeline at the section between PS#3 & PS#4.

BAPCO has activated the ERP and started the rectification and mitigation of current situation.

Kindly activate your ERP accordingly and BAPCO will keep you updated.

Kind regards,



Ibrahim Adam Yagoub
General Manager
Bashayer Pipeline Company

Annex 56: DPOC Force Majeure notification, 13 February 2024

**Dar Petroleum
Operating Company**

Plot No. 163A, Block No. 5
Rock City Road, Hai Jebel- Juba
Republic of South Sudan
Email:pres.off@darpetroleum.com



Date: 13 February 2024
Ref: DPOC/UDC/MOP & PARTNERS/24-011

To: **Hon. Dr. William Anyak Deng**
Undersecretary,
Ministry of Petroleum
Republic of South Sudan

Cc: **Hon. Puot Kang Chol**
Minister of Petroleum
Republic of South Sudan

Eng. Deng Lual Wol
Director General of Petroleum,
E&P Authority, Ministry of Petroleum
Republic of South Sudan

To:



Honorable Undersecretary and Partners

Force Majeure Notice for cancellation of Dar Blend Crude Lifting and Sales for the following cargoes in February and March 2024

With reference to our letter dated 12 Feb 2024 ref: DPOC/E& P/Production/MOP & Partners/24-001, we regret to inform you that BAPCO crude transportation system is currently facing an unavoidable incident in Sudan. As a result, the coming lifting on 22-23 Feb (Partners' entitlement) and 28-29 Feb (RSS's entitlement) cannot be secured.

The incident was unforeseeable event and beyond our control. Given the above unfortunate incident, we hereby declare the incident as a Force Majeure Event under Article XXIII of EPSA, Article 17 of JOA and Article 7.3 of JOCSA.

DPOC hereby declare the above mentioned lifting cargoes are cancelled and the bidding process for the cargoes in March 2024 to be suspended accordingly.

DPOC is closely monitoring the situation in Sudan and shall keep you updated in any new development in the due course.

Force Majeure Notice for cancellation of Dar Blend Crude Lifting and Sales for the following cargoes in February 2024

Annex 57: BAPCO pipeline update, 16 February 2024

**BASHAYER PIPELINE COMPANY (BAPCO)**Almugran District – Petrodar Tower
Khartoum, Sudan

Tel: +249 187 008011 Fax: +249 183 790550

Date: February, 16th, 2024
Ref: BAPCO/DPOC/letter/MT.24/006TO: Mr. Ayoung Bol Deng
Acting President
Dar Petroleum Operating CompanyCC: BAPCO BOD chairman
CC: DGD General Director**Subject: RE: BAPCO Pipeline Flow Ability Assurance Proposal**

Dear Sir,

Reference is made to the above subject, and your letter DPOC/UDC/BAPCO/24-014 dated 15th February 2024, BAPCO would like to appreciate DPOC continuous support and the close follow up for the current situation.


In fact, BAPCO has successfully completed the repair for the leak point and currently all preparation for resumption are in place of using BAPCO procedures for pipeline restart considering all technical and operation aspects for this case as BAPCO had treated the similar previous incidents successfully.

It is obviously the situation along the pipeline is not secured and most of area is considered as war zone yet the most critical problem we share here is the supply of diesel to PS#4 and restart the heating there which is so essential for both resumption and continuity of the smooth operation, BAPCO done whatever effort to supply the diesel to PS#4 but unfortunately failed so far, that's we request DPOCs' and whoever's support to resolve such matter.

The challenges now BAPCO facing are all related to security, logistic, communication and movement between stations, BAPCO spares no effort to settle most of the issues in spite the difficulties and challenges associated with the running War, however again we need your immediate attention to the diesel supply issue to PS#4

Support of DPOC is much appreciated and BAPCO do hope the current situation will end soonest and we can return back to normal.

Kind regards,


 Saifeldin Eltayeb Elmaghrabi
 A/ General Manager
 Bashayer Pipeline Company


P. O. Box 11778, Khartoum – Sudan Web: www.bapco.sd - Website: www.bashayerpi.com Email: info@bashayerpi.com

We appeal to the general public, especially our employees and those affected by today's events, to return to work tomorrow as usual. The Ministry assures all personnel of their safety within the ministry complex. Measures have been taken, with various units from the organized forces deployed, to ensure the security of both human lives and government property.

We regret the distress and inconvenience caused by today's events and remain committed to resolving the concerns of our wounded heroes in a manner that honors their service to our nation.

End of Statement



Annex 59: Authorisation of medical expenses for senior SSPDF officers, August 2023

Republic of South Sudan
Ministry of Defence & Veterans' Affairs

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENCE

29th Aug 2023

To: **1st Undersecretary,**
Ministry of Finance and Planning
Republic of South Sudan
Juba

SUBJECT: Payment of US\$ 560,000 (Five Hundred and Sixty Thousand US Dollars Only)

The Ministry of Defense presents its compliments to you, and I have the honor and privilege to write on the subject thereof.

I am hereby requesting your esteemed Office to pay the above mentioned amount, being the cost of **Medical Treatment for Seven Senior Officers** who have been referred abroad for better management as per the attached documents. They are;

1) Gen. Santino Deng Wol Chok	US\$ 150,000
2) Lt. Gen. Gabriel Duop Lam	US\$ 100,000
3) Brig. Gen. James Dhai Pam	US\$ 90,000
4) Lt. Col. Duang Duop Manaseh	US\$ 70,000
5) Maj. Jacob Marial Mabior	US\$ 60,000
6) 2 nd Lt. Isaac Malok Dhal	US\$ 50,000
7) SM Bullen Kot Mayen	US\$ 40,000

Your consideration and approval will be highly appreciated.

Kindly accept my assurances and best regards.

30 AUG 2023

Hon. Victor Atem Atem Angok
Undersecretary of Defence,
Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs
Republic of South Sudan
Juba

Handwritten notes:
 - For payment only
 - DA alc
 - for payment
 - 15/09/2023
 - Inspector of ALC
 - to please check and take action
 - H. Mami Rookh
 - I DA budget for commitment
 - 17/09/2023
 - plz of ALC please act
 - to please check & priorities for payment
 - 15/09/2023

Annex 60: Additional detail on government revenues and spending, Q1 FY 2023/24

An expenditure report for the First Quarter of the 2023/24 financial year, which covers July to September 2023, produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, provides some additional detail about government revenues and expenditure during this period.

Revenues


Total government revenues exceeded budget projections during this period, likely as a consequence of a higher-than-expected oil prices and the depreciation of the SSP during this period. As most of South Sudan's revenues are earned in Dollars, through the sale of oil, any depreciation in South Sudan's currency against the Dollar increases the government's revenues when converted to SSP, in which budget and expenditure documents are denominated.

During the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial year, oil revenues totalled SSP 543.7 billion against budget projections of SSP 384.1 billion, while non-oil revenues totalled SSP 77.7 billion against projections of SSP 61.3 billion

Expenditure

During the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial, the Ministry of Finance and Planning reported total spending of SSP 534.9 billion, which was broadly consistent with the budget estimate of SSP 526 billion for the quarter. This, however, included amortised loan repayments and oil-related transfers to Sudan and oil-producing States and Communities. While accounted for, these payments, and amortised loan repayments in particular, are not always made in practice.

During the first quarter of the 2023/24 financial year SSP 251.7 billion (\$228 million) was allocated to the oil for roads programme, while SSP 178.1 billion was allocated for budgeted government spending by Ministries, including salaries. Only around half of the budgeted expenditure in this category was spent during the first quarter.



The SSP 178.1 billion allocated to budgeted Ministry expenditure was heavily concentrated on the government itself, through Public Administration spending, and the security sector:

- 79 percent of this expenditure was spent on the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Office of the President, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the National Security Service (NSS).
- The Office of the President spent SSP 48 billion in the first quarter alone, more than its entire annual budget of SSP 32.17
- The Ministry of Finance and Planning spent more than SSP 60 billion during the first quarter, almost four times its annual budget of SSP 16 billion.

As a consequence, there were again substantial shortfalls against other budget lines:


- Just SSP 1.3 billion was allocated to the peace budget, despite an annual budget of SSP 50 billion. Twice as much (SSP 2.3 billion) was spent on "donations to private individuals and organisations". This exceeds spending by the majority of government ministries during the period and carries a risk of improper diversion of public funds, particularly as elections approach.
- Only 25 percent of the salary budget for the quarter was spent, leading the government continues to accrue substantial salary arrears for the quarter despite a reported budget surplus and high-profile efforts to raise government salaries.
- The Ministry of Health received just 10 percent of its quarterly budget of SSP 10.5 billion, although the Ministry of Social and Humanitarian Affairs did receive slightly more than its budget for the quarter.

Around 83 per cent of Ministerial expenditure was concentrated in three sectors: Public Administration, Economic Functions and Security


(SSP billions)	Salaries	Goods and Services	Capital Expenditure	Transfers and Grants	Donations	Total	Share of total
Accountability	0.31	0.10	-	0.00	-	0.41	0%
Economic Functions	9.24	29.50	2.48	20.25	0.49	61.96	35%
Education	2.51	2.43	-	0.99	-	5.94	3%
Health	0.07	0.97	-	0.07	-	1.11	1%
Infrastructure	0.02	0.46	0.41	-	-	0.89	0%
Natural Resources	0.22	2.42	-	0.21	-	2.85	2%
Public Administration	9.87	48.10	4.76	0.00	2.07	64.80	36%
Rule of Law	1.84	9.47	2.42	0.70	-	14.42	8%
Security	4.13	18.12	0.31	-	-	22.56	13%
Social and Humanitarian	0.29	2.88	-	-	-	3.17	2%
Total	28.49	114.46	10.38	22.22	2.55	178.10	100%

Of which a few key institutions significantly outspent their approved budgets:

Ministry recurrent expenditure	Q1 spending (SSPb)	% of total	Annual budget	Q1 budget	% of Q1 budget spent
Accountability	0.41	0.2%	3.7	0.925	44.54%
Economic functions	61.90	34.8%	45.8	11.45	540.61%
of which: Ministry of Finance and Planning	60.04	33.7%	16	4	1501.08%
Education	5.90	3.3%	172.2	43.05	13.70%
Health	1.10	0.6%	42.3	10.575	10.40%
Infrastructure	0.86	0.5%	445.4	111.35	0.77%
Natural resources	2.85	1.6%	65.4	16.35	17.43%
Public administration	64.80	36.4%	237.5	59.375	109.14%
of which: Presidential Affairs	48.15	27.1%	32.17	8.0425	598.65%
of which: Parliament	3.89	2.2%	93.1	23.275	16.70%
Rule of law	14.40	8.1%	92.9	23.225	62.00%
of which: Police	4.16	2.3%	46.2	11.55	36.03%
of which: Ministry of Interior	5.00	2.8%	12	3	166.56%
Security	22.56	12.7%	222.8	55.7	40.50%
of which: Ministry of Defence	14.84	8.3%	142.2	35.55	41.76%
of which: NSS	5.01	2.8%	238.9	59.725	8.39%
Social and Humanitarian Affairs	3.16	1.8%	9.1	2.275	138.90%
Total	177.94			334.275	53.23%



Annex 61: Ministry of Health, Purchase of equipment for Ebola prevention and equipment, 30 September 2022



CRAWFORD LABORATORY
Innovation for Development

*1. Hon. Minister
I perused the document - like need to sit and discuss with the company
10/10/22*

To the Minister
Ministry of Health Republic of South Sudan
Sudan Hon. Yolanda Awel Deng

REF: PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT FOR EBOLA PREVENTION AND SCREENING FOR ENTRY SCREENING AT AIRPORTS AND LAND CROSSINGS IN SOUTH SUDAN

Dear Madam,

We, much respect and honor, our company Crawford Laboratory are hereby presenting an invoice to the Ministry of Health regarding the purchase of all the equipment, chemical, human resource, and tents for all the borders and airports within the boundaries of the Republic of South Sudan.

Total Amount	\$ 10,000,000
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
Break Down

1. Point of Entry (International Travel from all ports of entry, (Airports, and borders), transport, mass gathering, and population movement

Objective	Activities	Costs
Point of Entry surveillance with integrated IPCWASH and RCC components is established and maintained	Crawford with the collaboration of MOH will establish Point of Entry surveillance and mechanism for the detection, management, and referral of ill travelers at six prioritized Points of Entry and ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of travelers and at-risk communities, including the prevention of gender-based violence by establishing (mid and long term comprehensive border health infrastructure and systems at six prioritized Point of Entries.	\$ 700,000
	Crawford with the collaboration of MOH will equip and train staff at the point of entry in the appropriate actions to detect, manage and refer ill travelers, identify their contacts, and clean and disinfection	\$ 750,000
Port health facility maintained and functional	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will provide operational support to port health at the Nimule border crossing and Juba International Airport	\$ 350,000
Point of Entry gate pass for screened travelers established	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will design, print disseminates gate passes and train port health in the implementation of gate pass at the Nimule border crossing point.	\$ 879,000
Port Health Staff are motivated and retained.	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will provide incentives to Port Health Staff: Juba 17; Nimule 20; Nadapal 5; Kaya 5; Renk 10; Kiradem (Awel North 5; Izo according to prevailing rates per position	\$ 790,000
Total		\$3,469,000

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 Phone: +211 922 288 888, +211912260088, +211922288888, +2119203333
 Address: PO BOX Private, Ministries Road, Juba, Republic of South Sudan
 Company Registration Number: 31932


Objective	Activities	Costs
National and state laboratory testing capacity enhanced	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will support the start of the EVD genomic sequencing laboratory at NPHL	\$ 200,000
	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will strengthen and expand laboratory quality management systems and external quality assurance.	\$ 306,000
	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will strengthen the specimen transport and referral system and waste management, and biosafety.	\$ 256,000
	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will scale up EVD testing in the communities and all regions of the Republic of South Sudan	\$ 600,000
	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will scale up the implementation of EVD molecular testing platforms in all listed points of entry	\$ 359,000
	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will expand testing laboratory space at the NPHL to meet the need for national quality and new technology domestication.	\$ 533,300
	Crawford in collaboration with the MOH will support human laboratory resources and incentives	\$ 600,000
Human resource capacity increased and retained		
Total		\$2,598,300



3. Operations and Logistics

Objective	Activities	Cost
Essential goods supplies made available without shortage at the national and state level	Crawford will procure PPE kits for health workers' IPC training and simulations	\$ 300,000
	Crawford will procure VFH 5000 kits for the case management	\$ 3,300,000
	Crawford will procure reagents and consumable	\$ 400,000
Total		\$ 4,000,000

Prepared By


 Ms. Hind All
 Approved by Managing Director

 Mr. Biang Deng Biang

Annex 62: Relationship between SSP/\$ rate and government borrowing

There is strong correlation between borrowing, by the Government of South Sudan, from the Central Bank of South Sudan; the resulting expansion of the monetary base; and the depreciation of the South Sudan Pound (SSP) against other currencies, such as the US Dollar.

Broadly speaking, the Monetary Base covers all currency in circulation, plus deposits held by the Central Bank and commercial banks. Government borrowing need not, in principle, increase the Monetary Base. In South Sudan, however, Government borrowing from the Central Bank is typically paid out as cash and used to support Government expenditure, such as salary payments. As such, in South Sudan, government borrowing from the Central Bank typically leads to an equivalent expansion of the Monetary Base.

In recent years, government borrowing from the Central Bank has increased significantly, leading to a corresponding depreciation of the SSP against the US Dollar, as well as other currencies.



Source: Panel analysis based on data from the Central Bank of South Sudan

Note: In data published by the Central Bank of South Sudan, the Government's overdraft with the Central Bank is denominated in SSP. As some of the Government's debts to the Central Bank are denominated in Dollars, and converted to SSP ahead of publication, the SSP-denominated overdraft can increase even if there is no new borrowing as a result of depreciation of the SSP against the Dollar.

Annex 63: Disclosure and audits of South Sudan’s debts

Republic of South Sudan external Debt													
Loan codes	Creditor Name	Currency	Principal	Disbursed Amount	Undisbursed Amount	Interest Rate	Interest Charged	Principal repayment	Outstanding	Start Date	Grace Period	Maturity / Payment Date	
SUDAN BANK LOANS			150,000,000	150,000,000	0	0%	0	0	150,000,000	15 Jun 2011	12 Yrs	15 Jun 2011	
IDA49120	Treatment Capacity Building Project	USD	9,900,000	8,282,598.94	1,617,401.06	2%	12,815.87	132,690.16	8,145,999	15 Jun 2011	12 Yrs	15 Jun 2011	
IDA 54010	Health Rapid Response project	USD	10,000,000	9,047,751.71	952,248.29	2%	42,599.87	-	9,047,752	15 April 2014	8 yrs	15 April 2015	
IDA49110	Health rapid results	USD	21,000,000	22,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	2%	539,860.96	-	21,000,000	15 April 2014	10 yrs	15 April 2015	
IDA 53940	Safety Net	USD	21,000,000	18,713,287.91	2,286,712.09	2%	144,525.28	-	18,713,288	01 Jun 2013	10 Yrs	01 Jun 2015	
IDA 53630	EA Regional Council	USD	80,000,000	3,776,207.69	76,223,792.31	2%	13,723.28	-	3,776,208	01 Jun 2013	10 Yrs	01 Jun 2015	
IDA 52130	Local Government Service Delivery	USD	70,000,000	44,493,948.68	25,506,051.32	2%	287,866.30	-	44,493,949	13 April 2013	10 Yrs	13 April 2015	
Sud Loans			270,404,179	270,404,179	-	-	-	-	270,404,179	-	-	-	
IMF CRF 1		USD	52,500,000	52,500,000.00	-	-	-	-	52,500,000	-	-	-	
IMF CRF 2		USD	174,604,179	174,604,179.00	-	-	-	-	174,604,179	-	-	-	
African Development Bank			27,546,800	18,546,172	8,999,628	0	119,310	-	18,546,172	-	-	-	
Financial Institution Development Bank loan			Currency	113,718,000	1,800,000	3,376,000.00	0.00%	41,458.58	0	113,718,000	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2017
AFRIDA-05			USD	3,771,000	816,628	908,372.38	0.00%	33,521.87	0	3,771,000	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2017
Joba power distribution and expansion			USD	14,841,800	16,128,544	4,513,255.75	0.00%	42,180.57	0	14,841,800	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2017
Other creditors			8,677,000,000	8,677,000,000	-	-	163,573,690	4,872,006,820	3,799,872,480	-	-	-	
Sahara Energy			USD	600,000,000	600,000,000	-	-	28,874,536.16	471,861,463.84	128,137,711.1	Apr 17	Dec 19	
Treasury Energy			USD	360,000,000	360,000,000	-	-	-	360,000,000	-	-	-	
Afrexim			USD	400,000,000	400,000,000	-	-	-	211,254,737.42	188,745,263	MoP	MoP	
Afrexim			USD	250,000,000	250,000,000	-	-	-	-	267,657,578	MoP	MoP	
China Export-Import Bank			USD	150,000,000	150,000,000	-	-	4,422,479.36	14,999,930.01	167,894,000	MoT	MoT	
China Export - Import Bank - ATM			USD	400,000,000	400,000,000	-	-	-	-	231,952,567	-	-	
Qatar National Bank			USD	700,000,000	700,000,000	-	-	-	114,190,661.00	585,809,339	MoP	MoP	
NASDEC			USD	539,000,000	539,000,000	-	-	13,067,573.93	172,319,341.66	366,680,658	Need confirmation	Need confirmation	
CIC Stanbic Bank			USD	700,000,000	700,000,000	-	-	-	-	To be confirmed	MoP	MoP	
NIDB			USD	80,000,000	80,000,000	-	-	-	-	100,000,000	Not identified	Not identified	
Grand Total in USD			4,478,440,979	4,376,795,738	99,644,753	0	163,607,111	4,872,006,820	2,011,393,900				

Stock-take of external debt of the Government of South Sudan’s debts, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, dated June 2022

Other creditors	2,719,000,000	252,000,000	2,387,000,000	2,387,000,000	-	62,890,120	561,289,205	2,219,221,421				
Sahara Energy	600,000,000	352,000,000	348,000,000	348,000,000	-	28,874,536.16	48,524,535.12	310,482,015	MoP & MoP	MoP	Non Concessional	-
Afrexim	400,000,000	-	400,000,000	400,000,000	-	16,525,530.10	211,254,737.42	188,745,263	MoP	MoP	Non Concessional	-
Afrexim	250,000,000	-	250,000,000	250,000,000	-	-	-	267,657,578	MoP	MoP	Non Concessional	-
China Export-Import Bank	150,000,000	0	150,000,000	150,000,000	-	4,422,479.36	14,999,930.01	167,894,000	MoT	MoT	Non Concessional	-
China Export - Import Bank - ATM								231,952,567				
Qatar National Bank	700,000,000	0	700,000,000	700,000,000	-	-	114,190,661.00	585,809,339	MoP	MoP	Non Concessional	-
NASDEC	539,000,000	-	539,000,000	539,000,000	-	13,067,573.93	172,319,341.66	366,680,658	Need confirmation	Need confirmation	Non Concessional	-
CIC Stanbic Bank								To be confirmed	MoP	MoP	Non Concessional	-
NIDB	80,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,000,000	Not identified	Not identified	Non Concessional	-
	3,168,036,800	327,511,332	2,760,525,468	2,740,800,108	18,809,281	63,310,950	561,686,794	2,575,462,670				

f) Trade Development Bank
 Trade and Development Bank (TDB) is a multilateral, treaty-based, investment-grade development finance institution. The financial institution was established in 1985 and serves 22 economies in its region.
 Upon consultation with the lender, it was identified that there are no loans from TDB to the Government of South Sudan.

EY independent “Stock-take of External Debt of the Government of South Sudan,” December 2022, available from: https://mofp.gov.ss/?dlp_document=stock-take-of-external-debt-of-the-government-of-south-sudan-2022