

A high-angle photograph of a person sitting on the ground, eating from a large metal bowl. The person is wearing a vibrant, patterned shirt with green, yellow, and blue designs. Their hands are visible, one holding a piece of food. To the right, another metal bowl contains a large portion of a thick, brown, textured food. The ground is dark and appears to be dirt or mud. The overall scene suggests a simple, possibly outdoor or semi-outdoor, dining environment.

CRISIS ANALYSIS

DR CONGO

MONTHLY DISPLACEMENT REPORT

July 2023

Contents

I. Methodological approach	3
Data collection	3
Data analysis and report structure	3
II. Displacement and humanitarian needs	5
Overview of humanitarian needs	5
Population movements, July 2023	6
Ituri	6
North Kivu	9
South Kivu	14
III. Humanitarian access	18
Humanitarian access in territories with major humanitarian needs	20
Annex 1. Categorization of needs and selection of priority areas for humanitarian access analysis	26

Cover photo: Camp food in IDP camp in Ituri, eastern DRC. © Mercy Corps.

Tables and figures

Map 1. Displacement hotspots in eastern DRC, from April 2022 to July 2023.

Map 2. Population movement in Mahagi territory.

Map 3. Population movement in Djugu territory. Most of the movement shown took place in several waves, from December 2022 to July 2023

Map 4. Population movement in Irumu territory.

Map 5. Population movement in Beni territory.

Map 6. Population movement in Rutshuru territory.

Map 7: Population movement in Masisi territory.

Map 8. Population movement in Walikale territory.

Map 9. Population movement in Kalehe territory.

Map 10. Population movement in Kabare territory.

Map 11. Population movement in Shabunda territory.

Map 12. Population movement in Mwenga territory.

Figure 1. Distribution of security incidents according to their humanitarian access score in the eastern DRC.

Figure 2. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Ituri.

Map 13. New positions established by CODECO in Djugu territory.

Figure 3: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in North Kivu.

Figure 4: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in South Kivu.

Figure 5. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Maniema.

Figure 6. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Tanganyika.



I. Methodological approach

Data collection

The researchers and analysts of the Crisis Analysis Team in the Democratic Republic of Congo (CAT-DRC) collect, triangulate, and analyze information from primary and secondary sources. Each week, researchers conduct interviews with key informants to better understand the events that contribute to the humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC (violent incidents, epidemics, natural disasters, etc.). They analyze their potential impact on humanitarian operations. These interviews take place with local administrative officials, customary representatives, health personnel, representatives of the army and armed groups, as well as humanitarian organizations active in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and Maniema. The CAT-DRC also uses several secondary sources made available by humanitarian partners (e.g., OCHA, INSO) and the community. All information undergoes a triangulation process before analysis and dissemination. However, the information presented in this report is subject to change at the time of publication due to rapidly changing situations in the region. If you have any comments or information you would like the CAT-DRC to follow up on, please complete a feedback form linked below:

[CAT-DRC feedback form](#)

Data analysis and report structure

The analyses presented focus on two main themes: (i) population displacement and the status of humanitarian needs coverage; and (ii) humanitarian access in the areas hosting the most displaced in eastern DRC.

Displacement and humanitarian needs

Analysis of displacement is the first section of this report. This section aims to (i) document and understand new population movements which occurred during the month covered by

this report, and (ii) assess and map humanitarian needs from unassisted displacement that took place in the past four months, including the month under review. Areas with high unassisted displacement are referred to as displacement hotspots.

Both displacement hotspots and new displacements are analyzed at the territory level in the five provinces studied in eastern DRC, and are presented on Map 1. On this map, territories are categorized into class intervals (shown by a graduated colored background) that correspond to the number of households hosted in the territory which have not yet received humanitarian assistance. The number of households used to categorize territories corresponds to the sum of all major displacements, i.e., over 300 households, reported in each territory between **April and July 2023**.

Displacements of over 300 households in July are also illustrated on Map 1, by marking the position of the localities hosting the displaced people. These new displacements are then described in more detail, on a case-by-case basis, with maps showing population movements of departure and reception areas for each of the territories concerned.

Humanitarian access

Analysis of humanitarian access is the second section of this report. To do this, CAT-DRC categorizes incidents by a humanitarian access score. This score has six levels, from 1 to 6, which describe the severity of security incidents and their impact on humanitarian access. Level 1 corresponds to a situation where the incident does not result in access restrictions. Level 6, the highest level, corresponds to a situation where the incident causes extreme access restrictions. Incidents at levels 4 to 6 are those that severely impact humanitarian access and generally involve ambushes, clashes between armed actors, attacks and looting of villages, and natural disasters. The humanitarian access score allows the CAT-DRC to identify the main hotspots in eastern DRC. For


a given month, analysis of the access scores makes it possible to identify actors who have caused significantly restricted humanitarian access. From one month to the next, this score also allows us to understand the evolution of humanitarian access restrictions in the territories studied.

Given the large number of territories studied in eastern DRC, CAT-DRC has focused its analysis on only those territories with a high concentration of displaced persons. Priority is given to those areas that have recorded the largest number of displaced persons over the last four months (including the month covered by this report) and whose humanitarian needs have not yet been met. These areas with high concentrations of IDPs are typically the ones that should be targeted for humanitarian intervention in the short term. As such, documenting access restrictions to these areas is relevant. Specifically, in this report, the territories included in the humanitarian access analysis are those where the number of displaced/returned persons is greater than the median value (7,107 households) of displacements recorded in all territories over the past four months (see Annex 1).

II. Displacement and humanitarian needs

Overview of humanitarian needs

Rutshuru and Masisi territories in North Kivu, and Mahagi and Djugu in Ituri, hosted the largest number of households that moved and/or returned between **April and July 2023**, whose humanitarian needs were not covered by any humanitarian assistance as of the end of July 2023 (Map 1). Also in July, Beni territory received the most displaced or returnee households (15,621). Population movement in Beni was largely caused by ADF militancy.




Map 1. Displacement hotspots in eastern DRC, from April to July 2023. Population movement in July 2023 is marked by dots. Territories are colored according to the number of households displaced and/or returned in the last four months, and not yet assisted. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

Population movements, July 2023

Ituri

Mahagi territory

Returns and new displacements were recorded in Mahagi territory. Following a relative lull in the security situation, 1,184 households returned to the Kepira locality in the Aungba health zone from the localities of Kandoyi, Biringi (Biringi health zone), Alego (Rimba health zone) and Mahagi Etat (Mahagi health zone). These households had fled clashes between CODECO and the Zaire self-defense militia between January and March 2023. In addition, following attacks on civilians by CODECO–URDPC combatants, 5,186 households were displaced from the Rimba health zone. These households fled from the localities of Akusi, Jupagaza, Jupalangu 1 and 2, Libi, Panyabiu, Rimba, Ugogo, Yagu and Wasi to the localities of Avu, Ngote, Nioka, Pabong’Dro, Pacuwa, Pamac and Rethy.




Map 2. Population movement in Mahagi territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

Djugu territory

From mid-June to mid-July, 2,150 households from Penyi, Loga, Kaprngaza and Katoto returned to their original localities (Bulo, Bukpa, Gobhu, Dhedhe, Dyku and Dheyi) in the Lita health zone following an improvement in security conditions.¹

Several waves of displacement between December 2022 and July 2023 were documented. These displacements were largely caused by CODECO-URDPC attacks on civilian populations: A recorded 12,5438 households were displaced between December 2022 and July 2023, including 8,088 households in the Damascus health zone, 1,947 households in the Drodo health zone and 2,150 households in the Jiba health zone. In the Damas health zone, people moved from Oke, Akwe, Bendere, Kiri, Kotha, Lodda, Makofi, Mbidjo, Mongbwalu, Passion and Plito to Dzila, Golgotha, Limbuti, Mapendo, Mawa and Seke. In the Drodo health zone, people fled from Dirokpa, ucha, Beliba, Pimbo and Buku towards Jangi, as well as into Njala, Dhenga, Tsilu, Tsukpa, Blukwa-Mbi, Lotru, Lara, Mbuchi, Kweki, Lombu, Lora, Dheja, Lipe and Monga. In the Jiba health zone, people were displaced from Dadda, Eyi, Gora, Petro, Kassa, Tsalo, Tsuga, Ukareba and Zenovi to Laudjo.^{2,3,4,5}




Map 3. Population movement in Djugu territory, July 2023. Most of the movement shown took place in several waves, from December 2022 to July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

- 1 ETools, alerte 4839 du 23 juillet 2023
- 2 ETools, alerte 4821 du 07 juillet 2023
- 3 ETools, alerte 4849 du 25 juillet 2023
- 4 ETools, alerte 4850 du 25 juillet 2023
- 5 ETools, alerte 4858 du 23 juillet 2023

Irumu territory

In Bavidan, Boloma and Olongba, 523 households were displaced to Singo Dradadi, Avenyuma and Opili (Ghethy health zone). They were fleeing conflict between people from the Baviba and Boloma groupements in the Walendu Bindi chiefdom.⁶



Map 4. Population movement in Irumu territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).


⁶ ETools, alerte 4822 du 07 juillet 2023

North Kivu

Beni territory

An improvement in security conditions in the Mutwanga health zone has favored the return of 7,276 households to the localities of Halungupa, Kisima, Kalembo, Luolu-Loselose, Kabalwa, Mwenda and Rugetsy, returning from the localities of Bulongo, Kasindi, Lime and Nzenga, where they had taken refuge for almost two years.⁷

A recorded 8,345 households were displaced in the Kalunguta (3,154) and Kyondo (5,191) health zones. The displacement was caused by ADF attacks on civilian populations. Civilians were displaced from Kanyihunga, Lisaa, Soma, Butungu and Mabulengwa to Kalunguta (Kalunguta health zone), and from Katondo, Vuhesi/Isale, Lulinda, Mutendero, Isango, Bulambo, Kavase-wa, Kisunga, Kirindera, Kyavinyonge and Luseya to Kighali-Musenda, Kibwe, Buynyaka center, Vuhovi/Butungera, Katondo and Vuhovi/Butungera.^{8,9}



Map 5. Population movement in Beni territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

7 ETools, alerte 4837 du 19 juillet 2023

8 ETools, alerte 4827 du 17 juillet 2023

9 ETools, alerte 4828 du 11 juillet 2023

Rutshuru territory

In July, 4,374 households were displaced in Rutshuru territory following clashes between M23 and Nyatura CMC combatants. These displacements took place in four health zones: Bambo (491 households), Kibirizi (458 households), Bukombo (836 households) and Birambizo (2,589 households). Localities of origin and destination are shown in Table 1, by wave of displacement.^{10,11,12,13}

Table 1. Number of displaced households in the different health zones of Rutshuru territory, July 2023.


	Origin		Displaced households	Destination	
	Health zone	Locality		Health zone	Locality
1	Bambo	Maroba Bishigiro Bungushu	491	Bambo	Kanaba Rushovu Kabizo
2	Birambizo	Bukombo centre Kazuba Gashavu, Mashango, Mashiga, Muko, Rulere	458	Kibirizi	Kasoko
3	Bukombo	Bukombo centre Kanyatsi, Kodjo Gashovu Mushababwe Shonyi, Rulere Rushashi	836	Bukombo	Bambo Bugina
4	Birambizo	Shonyi Kashavu, Rulere Bukombo centre Kibwe, Kanage Kavumu Mashango, Mudugudu,	2,589	Birambizo	Katsuru Mashango

10 EHtools, alerte 4824 du 10 juillet 2023

11 EHtools, alerte 4840 du 19 juillet 2023

12 EHtools, alerte 4845 du 21 juillet 2023


13 EHtools, alerte 4852 du 26 juillet 2023



Map 6. Population movement in Rutshuru territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

Masisi territory

In July, 11,257 households were displaced within Masisi territory. Of these, 1,570 households were displaced as a result of attacks by APCLS combatants against Mai-Mai PARECO/PP, from the localities of Bulinda, Kyangitsi, Luho, Matala, Mutiri and Ngoyi (Katoyi health zone) to the localities of Bushaire, Humura, Kalungu, Kishee, Kitobo and Rutoboko (Masisi health zone).¹⁴ The remaining 9,687 households fled following clashes between the M23 and Nyatura CMC, from the localities of Butare, Kanzenze, Kausa, Nyamitaba and Nyakaruba (Mweso health zone) to Burungu, Kitchanga (Mweso health zone), Kahira, Lushebere and Masisi center (Masisi health zone).¹⁵




Map 7: Population movement in Masisi territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

14 ETools, alerte 4857 du 27 juillet 2023

15 ETools, alerte 4813 du 02 août 2023

Walikale territory

Clashes between the armed groups of Nyatura Bazungu and Mai-Mai UPDF Kapasi in Masisi territory displaced 434 households to Walikale territory. People fled from the localities of Kashindi and Mahya (Katoyi health zone) to the localities of Myanga and Katambira (Itebero health zone).¹⁶



Map 8. Population movement in Walikale territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

16 [EHtools](#), alerte 4826 du 07 juillet 2023

Territoire de Kalehe

A total of 5,276 households have been displaced by the militancy of Nyatura combatants in Kalehe territory. This includes 848 households who fled from Muvumo, Kavumu, Kihonga and Kamatale to Chebumba, Kalungu, Kihonga, Kitalima and Numbi (Minova health zone) following clashes between Nyatura Kalume and Nyatura Muzungu.¹⁷ The total number of displaced people includes 4,428 households who arrived in Ziralo (Bunyakiri health zone in Kalehe territory) from Ngungu (Kirotshe health zone in Masisi territory) following clashes between the Nyatura (Matata faction) and the FARDC.¹⁸




Map 9. Population movement in Kalehe territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)

¹⁷ EHtools, alerte 4823 du 14 juillet 2023

¹⁸ EHtools, alerte 4834 du 14 juillet 2023

Territoire de Kabare

Nearly 3,191 households were displaced within the Kaniola health zone in Kabare territory. These displacements were caused by clashes between two Raia Mutomboki factions, the Mubangu and the Lukoba, and between Raia Mutomboki combatants and the FARDC. People fled from the localities of Chirambo, Kibandomangobo and Busole to Kishadu, Lubimbe, Tchulwe (Kaniola health zone), Mayimingi, Nyalubemba (Mulungu health zone, Shabunda territory) and Kibanda Mangobo (Mubumbano health zone, Walungu territory).^{19,20}




Map 10. Population movement in Kabare territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

19 ETools, alerte 4835 du 14 juillet 2023

20 ETools, alerte 4853 du 26 juillet 2023

Shabunda territory

Attacks by unidentified armed individuals in the Nyalinga mining area led to the displacement of 650 households from Kamulila to Kibombo, Lubila, Mulungu and Mupando Musingi (Mulungu health zone).²¹




Map 11. Population movement in Shabunda territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

21 [EHtools](#), alerte 4819 du 05 juillet 2023

Mwenga territory

A fire of unknown origin in the locality of Lugushwa affected almost 1,500 households. These households, which lost all or part of their homes, were taken in by families in nearby villages in the same locality.²²



Map 12. Population movement in Mwenga territory, July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

22 [EHtools](#), alerte 4844 du 20 juillet 2023

III. Humanitarian access

Overview of humanitarian access

In **Ituri**, efforts to sensitize the community to improve security in the province, undertaken through the Aru dialogue held in May, continue to be successful at reducing small-scale criminality of various armed groups (including CODECO and Zaire) active in the province. While there was a relative lull in security incidents in Mahagi territory, in Djugu the large number of CODECO combatants are difficult to control, and were often involved in economic predation. Awareness-raising efforts therefore need to be accompanied by concrete actions to demobilize combatants and promote their social integration (hence the importance of effectively implementing the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Rehabilitation and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS)). In addition, in Mambasa territory, the ADF carried out attacks against civilians and clashed with the FARDC and Mai-Mai Kabidon, causing severe restrictions to humanitarian access, particularly on the RN4 (Lolwa–Mambasa and Lolwa–Mandina sections).

In **North Kivu**, humanitarian access was impacted by a general increase in clashes between the M23 and local armed groups (Wazalendu) in the Bwito chiefdom in Rutshuru territory and across Masisi territory. These clashes restricted humanitarian access in the Tongo (Rutshuru), Bashali Mokoto and Kayembe (Masisi) groupements. This is the first time that M23 has taken territory in the localities in the Bashali chiefdom (Masisi). The M23 is also advancing into areas where the EAC regional forces (EACRF) are present, showing that the forces' presence are not a deterrent against militancy in all cases. The M23 appears to be taking advantage of the FARDC's observance of the ceasefire to extend its zone of control, which could be an advantageous position to demand a dialogue with the Congolese government.

In **South Kivu**, recruitment to reinforce the Gumino-Twirwaneho armed group continued into July. The leader of the Mekanika faction attempted to recruit people from the Banyamulenge community in the Balala Nord groupement in the Fizi highlands. Burundian soldiers from the Burundian National Defense Force (FDNB) are also moving towards the Kipupu locality (Mwenga territory) in the Itombwe sector and towards Kamombo (Fizi territory), one of the Gumino-Twirwaneho strongholds. This move by the FDNB augurs an intensification of clashes between armed actors, which could further restrict humanitarian access in Mwenga and Fizi territories.

In **Maniema**, humanitarian access in July remained only slightly restricted and broadly similar to as in June. A few rare incidents attributed to the Mai-Mai Malaika were reported in Kabambare territory.

In **Tanganyika**, security remains dominated by the prevalence of urban crime. Also, armed members of the Twa and Bantu communities clashed, causing access restrictions, notably on the RN33 in the Mugonda groupement in Kalemie territory.




Figure 1. Distribution of security incidents according to their humanitarian access score in the eastern DRC, in June and July 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

Humanitarian access in territories with major humanitarian needs

In this section, we present statistics of security incidents that have had a high impact on humanitarian access, for each of the provinces monitored. Humanitarian access is then analyzed in greater detail in the territories that are displacement hotspots, or rather those that have recorded the highest number of displaced people and returnees over the last four months (April to July), and which have not yet received any assistance.

Ituri




Figure 2. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Ituri in July 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

Aru territory

Although no displacement was recorded in July in Aru, the territory hosted the most displaced households between April and July 2023. It is therefore useful to analyze humanitarian access.

Aru remained generally accessible to humanitarian actors, with low-level restrictions recorded in July. The low presence of non-state armed groups in the territory has made armed clashes rare. In July, only five security incidents were caused by non-state armed actors, between Zaire-FPAC and the National Salvation Front (NSF), a South Sudanese armed group present in the territory. These

incidents included extortion, physical aggression, and ambushes against civilians in the localities of Olobho (Obitabo groupement), Liku and Kimba (Rumu groupement) and Aupe (Rumu groupement).

A popular demonstration was organized against harassment on the Aru-Adranga road. Civil society was therefore instructed to suspend all movement on this route. This restricted the passage of humanitarian workers on the Aru-Durba road.

Mahagi territory

Humanitarian access in July in Mahagi territory remained similar to that in June, with a low number of incidents causing severe access restrictions. This situation is probably the result of the various peace awareness initiatives launched as part of the Aru dialogue since May. Several armed groups, including CODECO, have taken part in these dialogues and, for the period under review, seemed to have taken on board the call for a cessation of hostilities.

However, in July, CODECO-URDPC combatants carried out six predatory attacks against civilians. In a bid to protect the population, the FARDC responded, leading to clashes. The CODECO attacks took place in the localities of Adrasi, Pakenge-Juu, Parumanga, Sisi, Bong and Sana; restricting humanitarian access on the routes connecting Nioka-Nzere, Nioka-Awu (Nioka groupement), Ngote-Nioka (Ngote groupement), Rona-Awuu (Rona groupement), Ndrele-Rethy (Umoyo groupement), and Djalusene-Abaka (Jupawalu groupement). In addition, CODECO-URDPC ambushed a resident on the Djupalungu-Rimba route (Nioka groupement) however this did not impact humanitarian access.

The reduction of incidents perpetrated by CODECO in Mahagi territory shows how successful awareness-raising initiatives involving local leaders can be to reduce armed group activi-


ty. These results need to be sustained through definitive demobilization and effective social reintegration of combatants. The Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Rehabilitation and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS) could therefore make a significant contribution to the cessation of hostilities, if effectively implemented.

Djugu territory

Although the number of security incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access decreased by 20% in Djugu territory between

June and July, humanitarian access remains severely restricted. The CODECO (ALC, FDBC, URDPC factions) and Zaire armed groups carried out 12 attacks and set up 16 new positions (see Map 9) in July.²³

The CODECO-URDPC were the most active in the territory, accounting for 85% of all incidents and 75% of all recorded attacks. The Akeso, Fataki and Buku groupements were the most affected by armed attacks in July. Access restrictions were reported mostly on the RN27, on the Djugu-Fataki and Djugu-Libi sections. In addition, combatants set up six



Map 13. New positions established by CODECO in Djugu territory in July 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC).

23 Les CODECO ont installé de nouvelles positions dans les localités de Adde, Bura, Digene, Kparanganza, adile, Lisey, Litho, LKpatiz, Meli, Petro, Saidi, Salo, Tchunga, Tsibu, Ukpa.

ambushes against local populations, mainly traders, also restricting humanitarian access on the Blukwa État–Blukwa Mbi routes in the Buku groupement, and on the Bassa–Djugu and Djugu–Pimbo sections of the RN27 in the Ndjaudha groupement.

The sustained militancy of CODECO in this territory runs counter to the various peace dialogues in which these combatants have taken part, with the agreement of a ceasefire. This situation is linked to the very high number of CODECO combatants in Djugu territory, which makes it difficult for their leaders to maintain control.

Given the large number of combatants in Djugu, many who use economic predation as a primary income source, it would appear that awareness-raising alone without concrete demobilization efforts will not produce lasting results. As noted above, it appears that coupling community awareness-raising with the effective implementation of the P-DDCRS is the approach that would make it possible to sustainably reduce CODECO militancy in Djugu, allowing restored humanitarian access.

incidents. This deterioration in humanitarian access in July was caused by ADF attacks on civilian populations and by the intensification of military operations to track down the ADF by the FARDC, sometimes alongside the UPDF. Attacks took place in Musandaba, Musuku, Mayi Moya (Bambumba groupement), Bilimani (Bambuba Kisiki groupement) and Mwalika (Masiki Vayana groupement). They severely restricted humanitarian access on several roads, including Mbau–Kamango, Mbau–Mandumbi (Batangi Mbau groupement), and on the Eringeti–Oïcha section of the RN4. Other humanitarian access restrictions in Beni territory are linked to six ambushes by the ADF and soldiers from the FARDC–UPDF coalition. In particular, the FARDC ambushed the ADF at Mwalika, in the Virunga National Park. The outcome of the ADF crisis is often difficult to predict due to the generally unpredictable nature of this armed group’s activity. However, continued FARDC–UPDF operations against the group should eventually reduce the ADF-led incidents in the territory.

Rutshuru territory

Rutshuru territory was characterized by an increase in M23 militancy, with incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access almost doubling, rising from 21 to 39 between June and July.

A total of 18 clashes were recorded in the territory, 14 of which were instigated by the M23 against local armed groups (Nyatura CMC and MPA as well as FPC Domi) and foreign armed groups (FDLR). These clashes mainly took place in the Bwito chiefdom, causing access restrictions to the Bishusha, Bukoma, Bukombo and Tongo groupements. Six ambushes were also reported in these groupements, five of which were set against the M23 by Nyatura and FDLR combatants. Also in the Bwisha chiefdom, there were two M23 attacks against Mai-Mai and FDLR in the Busanza and Bukoma groupements. In Bwisha, the M23 is still manning roadblocks on the RN2 (Goma–Rutshuru) at Kibumba, Mwaro and Kalengera. Humanitarian actors have access to most of Bwisha chiefdom, but only to part of Bwito chiefdom (Kiribirizi, Nyanzale).




Figure 3: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in North Kivu in July 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

Beni territory

Humanitarian access in Beni territory deteriorated sharply between June and July, with an increase of almost 60% in high-impact security

Security in the two chiefdoms that make up Rutshuru territory is very different. The intensification of fighting in Bwito is explained in particular by the strong presence of armed groups opposed to the M23, whereas the M23 control most of the Bwisha chiefdom, and have little opposition. Notable also is that the presence of the EACRF, particularly in Tongo, has not eliminated M23 activity. The resurgence in M23 militancy can be interpreted as a desire to take advantage of the ceasefire currently observed by the FARDC to take control of new areas in Rutshuru territory, to push the Congolese government towards negotiation.

Masisi territory

Humanitarian access in Masisi territory has deteriorated since June, with a 26% increase in high-impact security incidents. The rise in incidents in July is linked to the M23, which initiated 18 attacks on rival groups, and suffered eight retaliatory attacks by local (ANCDH, FDLR, Nyatura Kagiri and APCLS, UPDS) and foreign (FDLR) non-state armed groups. M23 clashes took place in the Bashali and Bahunde chiefdoms, restricting access to the Bashali Mokoto, Kayembe and Kamuronza groupements. The M23 was able to push back rival armed groups, taking control of several localities in the groupements for the first time since the resurgence of the conflict. The M23's advance was made in the presence of Burundian contingents from the EACRF, notably in Kitshanga (Bashali Mokoto groupement), which raises questions about its purpose. (Part of the EACRF mandate is to be a deterrent to conflict between armed groups.) In particular, the clashes caused by the M23 have led to displacement.

There were also clashes between various Mai-Mai factions (Pareco/FF, Kifuafua) and the Nyatura Delta FDDH, UPDC Kapasi and APCLS, over territorial control and economic predation. These clashes restricted humanitarian access in the Nyamaboko II and Ufamandu I groupements. In addition, these armed groups set up seven ambushes to extort goods from civilians, causing moderate and high levels of access restrictions, particularly on the Sake-Bihambwe section of Route Provinciale 529.

South Kivu




Figure 4: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in South Kivu in July 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

Fizi territory

Although no displacement was recorded in July in Fizi, the territory received some of the highest numbers of displaced and/or returnee households between April and July 2023. It is therefore useful to analyze the humanitarian access situation.

Humanitarian access in Fizi territory in July remained similar to that in June, with an equivalent number of security incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access in the territory. The security situation continues to be dominated by the militancy of the Mai-Mai Biloze Bishambuke, Gumino-Twirwaneho and Red-Tabara armed groups, who clash over leadership and economic predation.

In July, the Gumino-Twirwaneho and Biloze-Bishambuke armed groups clashed six times. This fighting restricted access to several main roads (Kabingo-Kabanja, Kabingo-Mikalati, Minembwe centre-Rugezi, Kabingo-Runundu) in the Basimunyaka Sud and Basimukindje II groupements. Three ambushes against civilians were also recorded in the Basimunyaka groupement, causing access restrictions on the RN5, along the sections connecting Kigongo-Kabumbe, Akie-Basiksiu and Mukolwe-Lusenda. Reportedly the Burundi National Defense Force (FDNB) redeployed from Minembwe to the Kamombo locality,

known to be one of Gumino-Twirwaneho's strongholds. This move by the FDNB could lead to new clashes, further restricting humanitarian access in the Balala Nord groupement. The Gumino-Twirwaneho have also set up two new positions at Milimnba (Fizi centre-Rugezi route) and Tchakira (Bijombo centre-Kamombo route); while the Red Tabara have moved to Kutupu (Kasolelo-Kilenga route) in the Basimimbi groupement.

Continued recruitment into the Gumino-Twirwaneho (Makanika faction) and strengthening of its armed forces raises fears of intensified clashes with the FARDC and other rival armed groups in the Fizi highlands.

In addition, the humanitarian situation in Fizi territory was marked by five demonstrations that restricted access to several stretches of the RN5, along the Swima-Nundu, Mboko-Kabumbe and Lusenda-Lweba sections. Two of these demonstrations were organized by self-defense youths, demanding the release of members of the community arrested by the FARDC at Mboko, in the Babungwe Nord groupement. The other demonstrations were held by the civilian population, to protest against decisions by local authorities to block the establishment of a camp for displaced persons in Mukolwe (Basimunyaka Nord groupement).

Kabare territory

Humanitarian access in Kabare territory has improved, with a 40% drop in security incidents that severely restricted humanitarian access, from 32 to 19 between June and July.

The worst security incidents in July consisted of two clashes between factions of Raia Mutomboki (Lukoba and Mubangu) in the localities Lubimbe II (in the Luhago groupement) and Mupoke (Irhegabarhonyi groupement). The clashes in Lubimbe notably led to displacement and restricted humanitarian access on the Nzibira-Kibandamangobo route. Each of the two Raia Mutomboki factions fought to take control of the mining area located in the Mupoke locality. Control of land thus remains a central cause of clashes between Raia Mu-

tomboki combatants and is likely to continue to restrict access to several localities in the Irhegabarhonyi groupement, which contains several mines. The Raia Mutomboki also installed a barrier on the Nzibira-Nyalubemba route imposing illegal taxes on passengers.




Figure 5. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Maniema in July 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

No territory in Maniema province is a displacement hotspot. Across Kabambare territory, only four high-impact security incidents impacting humanitarian access were recorded in July, demonstrating a situation characterized by low access restrictions in the province. These incidents are attributed to Mai-Mai Malaika activity, including imposing illegal taxes and extorting property in the localities of Musongelwa (Benyekabambare groupement) and Buledi (Benyekilungu groupement).




Figure 6. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Tanganyika in July 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

The province of Tanganyika did not have any displacement hotspots between April and July 2023. Humanitarian access restrictions there remain moderate: 54 high-impact security incidents restricting humanitarian access were recorded in all the territories of this province, including 22 in the territory of Kalemie alone. In this territory, two attacks carried out by armed members of the Twa community against a Bantu self-defense group and against the FARDC were reported in the localities Sinando (PK12 in the Fatuma groupement) and Sango Mutosha (RN33, in the Mugonda groupement). Security in the territory of Kalemie remains marked by urban crime, with 79 incidents of ambushes, extortions and robberies recorded in July, mainly perpetrated by unidentified armed persons.

Annex 1. Categorization of needs and selection of priority areas for humanitarian access analysis

Categorization of humanitarian needs

In order to categorize territories according to humanitarian needs, we have represented classes of humanitarian needs using the Sturges formula.¹ For a statistical series of n values, Sturges proposes the number k of classes based on the formula [1].

$$k = 1 + 3.3 * \log(n) \text{ formula [1]}$$

where log is the base logarithm 10

The class interval i is then calculated by equation [2].

$$i = \frac{\text{max-min}}{k} \text{ formula [2]}$$

where max and min are the maximum and minimum values of the series respectively.

Applying these formulas to the population displacement data series has enabled us to group territories into five classes of 14,600 household intervals, as illustrated in the table below. Territories whose displacement did not reach the threshold of 1,000 households over the last four months (March to June 2023) are grouped in a dedicated class, noted as "< 1,000 households". Table 1. Number of households displaced between April and July 2023. Only movements of more than 1,000 households have been counted.

Table 2. Number of households displaced between April and July 2023. Only territories that recorded at least one displacement of more than 1,000 households were considered. (Source: OCHA/CAT-DRC)

	Province	Territory	Displaced households	Priority
1	Nord-Kivu	Rutshuru	72 304	Yes
2	Ituri	Mahagi	52 254	Yes
3	Nord-Kivu	Masisi	33 400	Yes
4	Ituri	Djugu	32 351	Yes
5	Sud-Kivu	Fizi	21 661	Yes
6	Ituri	Aru	18 464	Yes
7	Nord-Kivu	Beni	17 121	Yes
8	Sud-Kivu	Kabare	7 107	Yes
9	Sud-Kivu	Kalehe	6 676	No
10	Ituri	Irumu	5 495	No
11	Sud-Kivu	Shabunda	4 283	No

¹ [Herbert A. Sturges. "The Choice of a Class Interval" Journal of the American Statistical Association, March 1926.](#)

12	Ituri	Mambasa	3 147	No
13	Sud-Kivu	Mwenga	2 123	No
14	Nord-Kivu	Walikale	1 771	No
15	Nord-Kivu	Lubero	1 163	No
Min			1 163	
Max			72 304	
Mediane			7 107	
Nombre K de classes		$1+3,3\log(15)$	4,88 ~ 5 classes	
Intervalle i de classe		$(\max-\min)/k$	14 575 ~ 14 600 households	

Selection of priority areas

The analysis of humanitarian access is done in territories considered to be major displacement hotspots. For a territory to be considered a 'major displacement hotspot', the number of households hosted (and not assisted) in that territory must be greater than or equal to the median value of displacement recorded in all territories during the period considered for analysis. Thus, for the dataset in Table 1, with a median trip size of 7,107 households, the major trip hotspots are those where the number of households displaced is greater than or equal to 7,107. These areas are identified by the column 'priority' and are those for which a humanitarian access analysis has been detailed in this report.

ACRONYMS & ARMED GROUPS

ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) – founded in the 1970s as a Ugandan Islamist group in opposition to the Ugandan government, they fled to the DRC in the 1990s. In April 2019, they declared themselves the Central African Wilaya under the Islamic State. In November 2019, they pledged allegiance to the Islamic State's new leader after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's death.

APCLS (Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo) – Formed in 2010 and led by Janvier Karairi, traditionally located in Masisi. The APCLS claim to defend the interests of the Hunde population.

Banro (Banro Corporation) – a Cayman Islands-based gold mining company focused on the development of its four projects in the South Kivu and Maniema provinces of the DRC.

CNRD (National Council for Renewal and Democracy) – armed dissident group of the FDLR created in 2016.

CODECO (Coalition for the Defense of East Congo) – In November 2019, a faction split off and called itself Mai Mai Sambaza. Please refer to information below for the URDPC.

FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) – The official armed forces of the DRC.

FDLR-FOCA (short form, FDLR in this report; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) – Established in 2000 by remaining Interahamwe groups from pre-genocide Rwanda. An ethnically Hutu group traditionally opposed to Tutsis.

FNL (National Forces of Liberation) – A Burundian rebel group formed in 1985. Currently allied with the Mai-Mai Yakutumba and the FDLR in South Kivu.

FRPI (Patriotic Resistance Front Ituri) – Established in 2002 to support the Lendu-dominated Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI). Have demobilized in the past and are going through a third demobilization effort.

Gumino – A self-defense group claiming to protect the interests of the Banyamulenge in the upper plateau of Uvira and Fizi.

ICCN (Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation) – Congolese government department that oversees the protection of national parks in the DRC.

Mai-Mai Kifuafua – Established in 2002 by Delphin Mbaena, one of the longest-standing armed groups in the country and established to combat the FDLR. Traditionally Tembo roots and based in South Kivu. Currently in negotiations with the Congolese government for integration into the FARDC and/or PNC.

Mai-Mai Mazembe – A collection of self-defense militias established between 2015 and 2016 in response to FDLR abuses against the Nande and Kobo communities in Lubero and Walikale. Control much of southern Lubero.

Mai-Mai Sambaza – Breakaway armed group from CODECO due to differences regarding the peace process.

Mai-Mai Simba – A group established in 1964 based in Ituri, Haut-Uele and Maniema provinces. They are considered the oldest Congolese armed group. They were established to fight for a Congolese State based on the ideals of the first Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba.

Mai-Mai UPLC (Union of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo) – An armed group based in North Kivu, in areas south of Beni and on the road to Butembo.

MAC (Mouvement acquis pour le changement) – Led by Mbura Matondi, they can be found in Toto, Walikale in North Kivu.

MONUSCO (UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) – The UN mission to the DRC that took over from earlier peacekeeping operations. Has a controversial mandate in the DRC.

NDC-R (Ndume Defence of Congo, Renove) – Created by Guidon Shimiray Mwisasa in 2015 and traditionally based in Walikale and southern Lubero. Established to counter the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandan Hutu group targeting Tutsis in eastern Congo.

Nyatura CMC (Coalition of Movements for Change) – An umbrella movement of mostly Nyatura groups and Congolese Hutu militias that may have emerged as local partners to the FDLR.

Nyatura FPC – A Congolese Hutu self-defense militia that emerged between 2013 and 2014 under the leadership of Dominique Ndaruhutse (Domi) and part of the CMC coalition. Traditionally based in Bukombo in Rutshuru.

PNC (Congolese National Police) – The national police force of the DRC.

Raia Mutomboki – A series of self-defense groups under different leaders traditionally based in Kalehe and Walikale in South Kivu and in Masisi in North Kivu, and existing in opposition to the FDLR.

Red Tabara (Resistance for a State of Law) – A Burundian armed group that has been highly active since 2015 in opposition to president Nkurunziza.

RDF (Rwanda Democratic Forces) – The official armed forces of the Rwandan government.

RPRC (Patriotic Resistance of Eastern Congo) – A coalition of armed groups formed in November 2019 with the Mai-Mai Mazembe, Mai-Mai Simba, Raia Mutomboki, Alliance of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo, and Movement Acquired for Change in Lubero, Rutshuru, Masisi, and Walikale. They are mainly fighting another

coalition of armed groups that includes the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Nyatura, and National Council for Renewal and Democracy.

Turarambiwe – A local self-defense group claiming to protect the interests of the Hutu population against the exactions of the NDC-R in Masisi. Established recently and considered a Nyatura group.

Twirwaneho – A Banyamulenge militia based mostly in the high plateau of Fizi. Maintains ties with Ngumino.

Sokola 1 and Sokola 2 – “Sokola” means “to clean” in Lingala. Sokola 1 and Sokola 2 are two FARDC operations against armed groups. Sokola 1 focuses on the territories of Beni and Lubero. Sokola 2 focuses on the territories on Masisi and Walikale and, in August, also in Rutshuru. They are also present in South Kivu.

UNPOL – The United Nations Police

UPC (Congolese Patriots Union) – a former militia now political group in Ituri, created in the context of the Ugandan occupation. The initial movement was founded by Thomas Lubanga and supported and mostly composed by the Hema community in the province.

UPDF – Uganda People’s Defense Force

URDPC – Union of Revolutionaries for the Defense of the Congolese People (a CODECO faction). In his announcement, Ngudjolu presented the URDPC’s three objectives: (1) to defend the DRC against foreign aggression; (2) to guarantee freedom and prosperity on national soil; and (3) to fight for the rule of law.

ZDF – Zambian Defense Forces

CRISIS ANALYSIS

DR CONGO

Crisis Analysis Team - DR Congo

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